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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this study was to investigate how 
undergraduate students at the University of Northern Iowa 
who had taken prior coursework on non-calculus general 
physics with a unit on mechanics understand the Newtonian 
model of motion. In general, the study was concerned with 
reasoning strategies, the preconceptions that give rise to 
these strategies, and the schema that might be inferred from 
the preconceptions. In particular, the study focused on the 
three fundamental notions of the Newtonian model of motion: 
{a) that uniform straight line motion is equivalent to rest, 
{b) that motion is relative to an inertial frame of 
reference including that of the earth if the acceleration 
due to rotation of the latter is neglected, and {c) that 
uniform straight line motion can exist in the absence of a 
net force. Paper and pencil tasks in an interview mode were 
employed throughout the study. However, a short clinical 
interview was also used in order to assess prior knowledge 
of the above notions. The tasks were designed according to 
the Phenomenographic approach to investigating different 
understandings of reality, and the Rule Assessment 
Methodology in order for a variety of strategies, correct or 
incorrect, that a student might think of, be identified. 
It was found that for the great majority of students uniform 
straight line motion is viewed as being fundamentally 
different from the state of rest, and that uniform straight 
line motion can exist only in the presence of a net force. 
As for the notion of relativity, students adopt a "point of 
observation," rather than an inertial frame of reference, 
and motion is viewed relative to that point. This point was 
either on the ground or on the fixed stars depending upon 
the context of the problem in question. Several 
preconceptions and two types of schemata were also 
identified. In regard to the implications of the findings 
of the study for instructional practices, the explicit 
teaching of the Newtonian model as well as the provision of 
advance organizers and schemata at an early age should be 
given priority by physics instructors. 
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CHAPTER I 
THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
Introduction 
1 
over the past two decades considerable international 
interest has been shown by science educators in studying 
children's as well as university students' ideas about 
physical phenomena, particularly those of mechanics. A 
wealth of both individual and group studies have been 
carried out, and there are a number of documents that review 
their findings {Connor, 1990; Driver, 1991; Driver & 
Erickson, 1983; Gilbert & Watts 1983; McDermott, 1984; 
Osborne & Freyberg, 1985). These studies were significant 
in that, for the first time, collectively they provided 
overwhelming evidence that students, at all levels of 
instruction, bring into the classroom a great many ideas 
about how the world works. 
The research findings appear to indicate that, contrary 
to the behaviourist view of the mind as an "empty bottle" 
awaiting to be filled by the teacher, students are 
continually trying to make sense of the world by building 
models or schemata. These schemata are structures or 
clusters of prior concepts that students use in order to 
interpret any kind of new information {Carey, 1986; Resnick, 
1983). They (schemata) are also subject to modification so 
that better predictions can be made in the future (Osborne, 
1984; Pope & Keen, 1981). But they can remain unchanged so 
2 
long as they make sense to the students, and provide them 
with satisfactory, although not correct, explanations and 
predictions {Dykstra, Boyle, & Monarch, 1992; Gilbert, 
Osborne, & Fensham, 1982; Viennot, 1979). Resnick {1983} 
points out that: 
All learning depends on prior knowledge. Learners try 
to link new information to what they already know in 
order to interpret the new material in terms of 
established schemata. This is why students interpret 
science demonstrations in terms of their naive theories 
and why they hold onto their naive theories for so 
long. {Resnick, 1983, p. 478) 
Although any consideration about the origin of 
particular ideas is speculative, it seems that sensorimotor 
experience plays an important role in their acquisition. 
For example, through early experiences with lifting, 
pushing, throwing and catching objects, children do develop 
ideas about motion and forces, and the schemata "forces 
produce motion" and "the direction of force is the same as 
the direction of motion" are very common. Osborne {1984) 
calls these schemata "mini-theories" or "gut dynamics." He 
remarks that, 
through learning about the world, from the day we 
are born, we develop mini-theories which apply to 
specific situations and help us make predictions and 
decide on certain actions. The theories may operate at 
a subconscious level of thinking, they need not be 
articulated, and can be used in a spontaneous and 
intuitive way ..• the active efforts made at a young 
age to comprehend the world enable children to make 
predictions about what will happen, for example, to an 
object thrown from the high chair or kicked along the 
kitchen floor •••• Gut dynamics is about the tangible 
world and influences motor skills and perception. 
This perception can be quite different from the reality 
staring one in the face. {Osborne, 1984, p. 505} 
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In addition, these schemata seem to be reinforced by 
everyday language and even by culture (Osborne, 1984; 
Solomon, 1987; Viennot, 1979). Newspapers, science fiction 
books, television, all have an influence on the way people 
acquire their vocabulary. The sport commentator quite often 
uses the expression "the ball was travelling with such a 
great force that"; and the popular expressions such as "the 
force of the explosion could be seen or heard," "your weight 
increases or decreases while you are going up or down on an 
elevator" together with "weightlessness" concepts of science 
fiction are widely used in everyday language. These 
expressions are what Osborne (1984) calls "lay dynamics," 
and they are expressions used to provide "entertaining 
conversations," although, as he points out, they are "of 
little practical use in terms of doing things" (p. 506). 
Language, however, can have an effect on the 
understanding of fundamental concepts in another way. Mori, 
Kitagawa, and Tadang (1974a) investigated the role of 
language in understanding the concepts of time and space. 
They found that Thai children showed less tendency to judge 
the time duration of a moving object by the distance it 
moved when compared with Japanese children. This was 
attributed to the phonological distinctions between words 
showing temporal and spatial length. In Japanese, as in 
English, French, or Greek,. both temporal and spatial length 
are expressed by the same word; in Thai these words are 
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different. Similar findings regarding linguistic meaning 
are reported by Mori, Koyima, and Tadang (1976} who 
investigated the understanding of the concept of speed in 
Japanese and Thai children. It was found that the 
performance of Thai children was better than that of 
Japanese, and the researchers attributed this to the fact 
that in Japanese the concepts "early" and "speed" are 
expressed by the same word. And more recently, Choi and 
Bowerman (1991) studied the meaning of motion in English and 
Korean students. Through the investigation of the relative 
position of concepts, that is, the position in semantic 
space that one concept occupies relative to another, the 
different meanings for the concept of motion were noticed. 
Cross-cultural studies carried out by Mori, Kitagawa, 
and Tadang (1974b) as well as by Ross and Sutton (1982) also 
show the effect of culture on the understanding of concepts. 
Mori et al. (1974b) studied the fundamental concept of time 
in Thai and Japanese children. It was found that, at the 
elementary level, Thai children opted for a circular concept 
of time (time returns to the same point), Christian Japanese 
opted for a segmental concept (time had a beginning and will 
end in the distant future), while public school Japanese 
children showed a rectilinear concept (no beginning or end). 
The same results were obtained from high school students. 
Although the segmental approach was discarded, Thai children 
opted again for a circular concept. Ross and Sutton (1982) 
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found that it was the mother tongue, rather than the 
language used during school instruction, which determined 
the understanding of associated concepts such as 
"electricity" and "energy" among English children, Tiv 
speaking children educated in English, and Tiv speaking 
children educated in Tiv. 
But to what extent should statements like "time returns 
to the same point," "forces are pushes and pulls," "forces 
produce and maintain motion," "gravity requires the presence 
of air," or "a car moves in a circle because the driver 
turns the wheel" be considered errors, partial 
understandings, or misunderstandings? And to what extent 
should they be considered inherited or acquired, and, 
therefore, culture and language determined? These questions 
are central to epistemology, but as yet no definite answers 
have been found. 
Certainly, a distinction needs to be made, as has been 
pointed out by Driver and Easley (1978), between a 
misconception that results from an incorrect assimilation of 
scientific theories, and an autonomous alternative framework 
resulting from personal experience in an attempt to 
understand the world. The former is more likely to be held 
by secondary school and university students, whereas the 
latter seems to be common among children who have not yet 
experienced any, or adequate, instruction. However, this 
distinction is not very helpful. For when asked to explain 
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what happens when a coin is tossed in the air, an answer 
like "we give the coin a force and it goes up until that 
force is all used up and then gravity takes over and the 
coin comes down" is very common among children (Driver, 
1991) and university students alike (Clement, 1982). In 
fact, Clement found that 72% of engineering students at the 
end of a physics course failed to give the correct response! 
Peters (1982) and Osborne (1984) also reconfirm that 
university physics students encounter conceptual 
difficulties. Osborne (1984) was surprised at the fact 
that, although 77% of a group of first year university 
students could cope with relatively complex applied 
mathematics, only 60% could correctly identify the force of 
gravity as the only force acting on a golf ball traveling 
through the air. The "force of the hit" that accompanies 
the ball throughout its flight was as common among Osborne's 
univerity students, as it was among a group of secondary 
school students (Watts & Zylbersztajn, 1981). 
The consistency in the explanations of both young 
children and university students indicates that language and 
semantic knowledge cannot be the sole determinants of these 
mistaken ideas. In fact, the similarities between children 
who have been exposed to little or no instruction, and 
university students provide strong evidence for the 
existence of similar, or even identical, explanatory models, 
and tend to justify Johnson's (1987) position, namely, that 
almost all of our knowledge derives from bodily experiences 
through metaphorical projections into abstract domains. 
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Johnson {1987) remarks that behind each of our concepts 
there is a non-propositional mental model that guides our 
thinking process and understanding, and he provides a sound 
justification for the development of such mental models as 
constraints of our understanding. Drawing on the work of 
several researchers and philosophers, he argues that the 
most fundamental of all concepts is that of force, which, 
through bodily experiences from the day we are born, 
develops into various conceptual schemata such as those of 
compulsion, blockage, contact, attraction, balance, 
equilibrium, in-out orientation, containment, trajectory and 
so forth. Even emotions like anger are experienced through 
a conceptual schema involving a fluid within a container 
that can burst open, and our experience of symmetry is not 
in our perception of symmetrical objects, but, instead in 
our experience of bodily balance. In short, bodily motion 
and forces provide not only "a coherent meaningful structure 
to our physical experience at a preconceptual level" {p. 
13), but also give meaning to all abstract concepts of our 
language through the use of metaphors. What is unfortunate 
though, is that these "abstract extensions" and 
"metaphorical elaborations constrain our meaning and 
understanding" {p. 137-138). 
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More often than not, students' models and ideas are 
different from the conceptions employed by the scientists, 
and have been referred to variously as schemata (Champagne, 
Gunstone, & Klopher, 1985), naive theories (Caramazza, 
Mccloskey, & Green, 1981), naive notions (Reif & Larkin, 
1991), children's science (Osborne, 1984), alternative 
conceptual frameworks (Carey, 1986), alternative conceptions 
(Dykstra et al., 1992), misconceptions (Helm, 1980; Savage & 
Williams, 1989), preconceptions (Clement, 1982) and so 
forth. However, it was Ausubel (1968) who first used the 
term "preconception" to describe these ideas. His claim was 
that these "preconceptions" are likely to persist despite 
instruction, and are therefore the most important factor in 
the learning process. 
Although the terms schemata, preconceptions, 
misconceptions, alternative frameworks or conceptions are 
used interchangeably to describe ideas which are at variance 
with those of the scientists, it should be stressed that the 
the term "schema" refers either to a non-propositional 
mental image (Johnson, 1987) or to a structure that 
facilates conceptual organization (Anderson, 1985). 
A "preconception," on the other hand, is better justifiable 
as a term to describe an idea or "preconcept" developed at 
an early age, even before formal instruction has begun, and 
which can remain unchanged unless challenged by the teacher. 
In addition, it is through the preconceptions of a student 
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that one can interpret his/her schematic structure, since 
access to, and interpretation of, the latter becomes 
possible only through the externalization of the former. 
And it is for this reason that research on conceptual 
understanding has concentrated upon preconceptions. 
By now, a general consensus about these preconceptions 
has been reached with the following general characteristics: 
1. They begin well before children encounter formal 
instruction, and they cross national boundaries (Driver, 
1991) • 
2. They are often missed by the teachers (Anderson & 
Smith, 1985; Berg & Brower, 1991; Gilbert et al., 1982; 
Terry, Jones, & Hurford, 1985; Viennot, 1979; Watts & 
Zylbersztajn, 1981). 
3. They can exist without any contradiction with what 
is taught by the teacher (di Sessa, 1982; Driver, 1991; 
Gilbert et al., 1982; Viennot, 1979). 
4. They are change-resistant (Brown, 1989; Viennot, 
1979) . 
5. They persist into adulthood despite many years of 
formal instruction (Driver, 1991), and can be held by 
university students (Clement, 1982; Halloun & Hestenes, 
1985a, 1895b). 
6. They are in many ways similar to the ideas held by 
the scientists of the past (Boeha, 1990; Halloun & 
Hestenes, 1985b; Mccloskey, 1983; Whitaker, 1983). 
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7. They form a coherent theory that can explain 
phenomena of force and motion (Carey, 1986; Clement, 1982; 
Mccloskey, 1983; Viennot, 1979). 
8. They have less internal coherence than both the 
Aristotelian and the impetus theories of motion since they 
are not used with consistency in all contexts (Halloun & 
Hestenes, 1985b; McDermott, 1984; White, 1983). 
9. They pose serious implications for the learning 
process (diSessa, 1983; Dykstra et al., 1992; Gilbert et 
al., 1982; Halloun & Hestenes, 1985a; McDermott, 1984; Reif 
& Larkin, 1991). 
The last characteristic, namely the implications of the 
existence and persistence of preconceptions for the learning 
process, is the most important message that has emerged from 
the various studies on student conceptual undestanding. For 
unless these preconceptions are challenged by teachers, 
science will continue to be taught as a vocabulary lesson 
that will be nothing more than "a recipe for disaster" 
(Carey, 1986, p. 1,124). And as Viennot (1979) has put it, 
preconceptions, particularly about motion and forces, will 
result in juxtaposition of academic knowledge and intuitive 
science, "laying one on the other without conflict between 
the two" (p. 213). 
11 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of the present study was to investigate how 
undergraduate students who have taken coursework on non-
calculus physics with elements of Newtonian mechanics 
understand the concept of uniform straight line motion, that 
is motion with constant speed in a straight line, as well as 
the notion that motion, in general, is relative to a frame 
of reference including that of the earth. 
In particular, the study was concerned with reasoning 
strategies, the preconceptions that give rise to these 
strategies, and the schema that might be inferred from these 
preconceptions. The ultimate purpose of the study, however, 
was to contribute to an improvement of the teaching and 
learning of physics in terms of efficiency and 
effectiveness. 
Research Questions 
1. Do students have the qualitative definition of 
uniform straight line motion? 
a. Do they view uniform straight line motion as being 
a relative kind of motion? 
b. Do they view uniform straight line motion as being 
equivalent to rest? 
2. Do students view motion, in general, as being 
relative to a frame of reference, including that of the 
earth if its acceleration due to rotation is considered 
negligible? 
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3. Do students have the conceptual link between 
uniform straight line motion and zero net force? 
4. What strategies do students employ in their 
reasoning process? 
5. What preconceptions lead students to employ those 
strategies? 
6. What schema might be inferred from those 
preconceptions? 
7. What interpetation might be given to the 
representation of the concepts of force and motion? 
Significance of the Study 
Undoubtedly, any study on conceptual understanding will 
uncover a number of preconceptions, and, at the same time, 
help the researcher with an interpretation of the students' 
conceptual schema. As previous research in this area has 
shown, these schemata and preconceptions are the single most 
important factor in understanding any new piece of knowledge 
(Dykstra et al., 1992; Carey, 1986; Resnick, 1983). 
Conceptual schemata become manifest in reading 
(Anderson, 1984), human reasoning (Johnson, 1987; Johnson-
Laird, 1983), problem solving (Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser, 
1982; Greeno, 1978; Larkin, 1983; Larkin & Reif, 1979) and 
science learning (Carey, 1986; Driver, 1991). However, more 
often than not, conceptual schemata, particularly in the 
area of force and motion, give rise to preconceptions that 
interfere with formal instruction. Viennot (1979) remarks: 
13 
We all share a common explanatory scheme of 
intuitive physics which, although we were not taught it 
at school, represents a common and self-consistent 
stock of concepts and which, however wrong it may be, 
resists attempts to change or modify it. This 
intuitive physics presents, at the very least, a 
considerable challenge to teaching. (Viennot, 1979, p. 
205) 
current views in science education (Basili & Sanford, 
1991; Brown & Clement, 1989; Carey, 1986; Dykstra et al., 
1992; Gorsky & Finegold, 1992; Posner, Strike, Hewson, & 
Gertzog, 1982; Resnick, 1983; Shuell, 1987) hold conceptual 
change as the number one priority of science teachers. 
This, in turn, implies that teachers first become aware of 
what preconceptions and schemata the students might have, 
and then challenge them in order for a conceptual change to 
be produced. Gilbert, Osborne, and Fensham (1982) did in 
fact find that the teacher's explanation is not enough, 
since the problem seems to be not the acquisition of the new 
concept, but the reluctance on the part of the student to 
give up the initial preconception. In most cases students 
adopt either two perspectives or a mixed outcome. In the 
first case students retain both the original conception and 
the teacher's explanation as a memorized version, whereas in 
the second case they can learn some of the taught material 
but fail to integrate it into their conceptual framework. 
Similar findings have been reported by Halloun and 
Hestenes (1985a); instruction brought about only a 14% 
improvement on student knowledge. As they report, the same 
preconceptions were entertained even after the completion of 
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the instruction. Halloun and Hestenes (1985a) also found 
that physics students could successfully solve problems 
without understanding the underlying conceptions, thus 
confirming what both Chi, Feltovich, and Glaser (1982), and 
Larkin (1983) reported from their own studies. 
However, unlike previous studies which investigated 
isolated concepts in specific contexts, this study 
attempted to assess the "whole picture" of the Newtonian 
concept of motion in the students' cognitive structure 
through a wide variety of problem situations. For "only by 
keeping careful track of how students respond in a rich 
variety of situations will we be able to better infer which 
conceptions are responsible for their behavior" 
(Dykstra et al., 1992, p. 621). It was thought 
that this approach would enable students to put into 
relationship all their prior conceptions and thus present a 
more coherent picture of how they understand. Previous 
research in the area of Newtonian mechanics has concentrated 
mainly on the motion-implies-a-force preconception. The 
present study attempted to assess all related concepts that 
might have been in the students' schema of motion. 
But there is also another reason why this study was 
important. The concept of motion is the most fundamental of 
all concepts, since it is central to all of physics. There 
is an argument, that in order to understand physics one has 
to understand mechanics. It is therefore imperative that a 
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good understanding be secured before students move on to 
other areas of physics. How can students be taught even an 
introductory special relativity course without a good 
understanding of the concept of motion? Even collisions of 
high-energy particles are better understood through 
mechanical models utilizing billiard balls! 
True, the early 20th century saw the collapse of 
Newtonian mechanics, since Newton's laws were shown to be 
unsatisfactory over very small distances, and at very high 
velocities. Even the Newtonian theory of gravitation was 
found inadequate, and was replaced by the General Principle. 
And it is also true that, as important as Newtonian 
mechanics is, it does not represent an accurate picture of 
modern physics. In fact it can present an extremely 
distorted view of the world. For according to Osborne 
(1990), it fails "to meet one of the first aims of physics 
education--to present an ontology of the physical universe 
answering the child's question--what is the world like?" (p. 
191) . 
Yet, it should be recognized that it is the way it is 
presented and not the Newtonian mechanics itself that gives 
this "false" picture of the world. For although Newton's 
model is based on the determinism of the seventeenth century 
natural philosophy, it is mainly the imposition of the 
correct answer to a given problem situation that 
overstresses this determinism. And apart from this 
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argument, we have to accept the fact that the uniqueness of 
Newton's intellectual achievement still exists. It cannot 
be discarded as an obsolete theory, since it gives accurate 
solution to an immense number of problems. And despite the 
shift of the paradigms, the fundamental questions that were 
posed by Newton have remained the same. For as Einstein 
himself commented: 
No one must think that Newton's great creation can be 
overthrown in any real sense by this or any other 
theory. His clear and wide ideas will forever retain 
their significance as the foundation on which our 
modern conceptions of physics have been built. 
(Einstein, 1950, p. 58) 
Assumptions 
1. Human understanding is a complex process that is 
not quantifiable. 
2. Students understand when they become emotionally 
involved of their own free will. 
3. Understanding is the result of imaginative 
restructuring of ideas and experiences students already have 
rather than the taking in of new ideas. 
4. Students show what and how they understand by 
putting into relationship all the possible factors that 
might be involved in a given problem situation. 
5. Understanding is contextual and can be assessed 
only through a wide variety of problem tasks referring to 
the same concept. 
Delimitations 
1. The present study was descriptive explanatory and 
its findings can be generalized only to a population with 
similar prior conceptions, beliefs, and expectations. 
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2. The present study was qualitative and therefore no 
statistical information was produced. 
3. The participants were all volunteers but received 
10 course grade points. 
Limitations 
1. The emotional state of the students, that is, their 
degree of involvement and the desire to actively construct 
meaning, could not be controlled. 
2. The interaction between the interviewer and the 
students resulted in a negotiation of meanings and 
understanding in the form of a conceptual change. 
3. Prior propositional knowledge might not have been 
activated through the problem tasks used in the study. 
Definitions of Terms 
1. Advance Organizer: Brief statement formulated in 
terms that are already familiar to the learner, and which is 
presented at a higher level of abstractness, inclusiveness, 
and generality. It helps subsume other less inclusive and 
more specific concepts and propositions. They act as mental 
bridges that connect prior with new concepts (Ausubel, 1965; 
Ausubel, Novak, & Hanesian, 1978). 
2. Analogical Representation: It is a 
representational format of knowledge in which accurate 
images of original scenes are maintained (Norman & 
Rumelhart, 1976). 
18 
3. Cognitive Structure: Organization of concepts in 
the mind that acts as a mechanism in one's interaction with 
the external world {Piaget, 1970). 
4. Concept: Regularity in naturally occuring or man-
made objects (entities) and events (happenings) (Novak & 
Gowin, 1984). 
5. Constructivism: A perspective which holds that 
knowledge, rather than passively received, is actively 
constructed in one's mind. The constructions can be either 
the representations of an autonomous real world to which we 
must fit or ''accomodate" (Piaget, 1970), or the viable 
explanations of personal experiences (von Glasersfeld, 
1989). An important implication of the latter 
constructivist perspective is the existence of a plurality 
of worlds rather than a single ontological reality (Goodman, 
1984; von Glasersfeld, 1987). The constructivist 
perspective also holds that what is constructed in a given 
situation depends as much upon one's prior concepts and 
beliefs, as upon the characteristics of the context of each 
particular situation (Driver & Oldham, 1986). 
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6. Episodic Memory: Memory that receives and stores 
information about temporally dated events, and temporal-
spatial relations among these events (Tulving, 1972). 
7. Frame of Reference: A system relative to which 
motion is analyzed. It is chosen in such a way that 
collection and analysis of data are more easily 
accomplished. An inertial frame of reference is a frame of 
reference moving with constant velocity (Alonso & Finn, 
197 0) . 
8. Integrative Reconciliation: The process whereby 
two or more concepts are seen to relate to each other in a 
new way. It occurs when explicit effort is made to explore 
relationships between concepts and propositions, and to 
point out significant similarities and differences in order 
to reconcile real or apparent inconsistencies (Ausubel, 
1965) . 
9. Knowledge: The result of the construction that 
begins with propositions between the concepts one already 
has and new concepts (Novak & Gowin, 1984), through an 
interaction with the physical and social world (Driver & 
Oldham, 1986). It is public and is shared by others 
(Gergen, 1982). It can be declarative--that is knowing 
"that"-- procedural--that is knowing "how" (Rumelhart & 
Norman, 1981), or conditional--that is knowing the 
conditions under which a rule or concept are applicable 
(Prawat, 1989). 
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10. Meaning: A construction taking place within the 
short-term memory where organized knowledge retrieved from 
the long-term memory interacts with new concepts (Wandersee, 
1992), and it is personal and idiosyncratic (Johnson, 1987; 
Polanyi, 1958). 
11. Newtonian Model: A representation of phenomena of 
force and motion based on four distinct components of human 
experience, namely, matter, motion, absolute space, and 
absolute time. Central to the model is the relativity of 
motion, and the idea that motion at constant velocity can 
take place even in the absence of a net force, and therefore 
rest and motion at constant velocity are fundamentally 
equivalent (Hadzigeorgiou, 1987). 
12. Preconceptions: Ideas which are at variance with 
those of the scientists. They result both from personal 
experience and from an incorrect assimilation of scientific 
theories. They are often referred to as common sense 
theories, common sense beliefs, misconceptions, alternative 
conceptions, alternative frameworks, intuitive theories, 
naive theories, and children's science (Driver, 1991; 
Dykstra et al., 1992; Gilbert & watts, 1983; Halloun & 
Hestenes, 1985). 
13. Progressive Differentiation: The process whereby 
concepts are being constantly modified in order to acquire 
more meaning. (Ausubel, 1965). 
14. Propositional Representation: A manner by which 
we retain our knowledge about the world. It is a 
representational format in which concepts are expressed as 
statements about the relationships among the concepts 
(Norman & Rumelhart, 1976). 
15. Reality: Whatever constructs exist in one's 
Cognitive Structure, and through which one interprets and 
reinterprets one's experiences (Driver & Oldham, 1986). 
This definition does not differentiate between a Reality 
existing "out there" and a Reality of which people become 
aware. If a differentiation is made, however, the latter 
could be called Actuality (Fischer & Aufschnaiter, 1993). 
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16. Schema: Abstract propositional structure taking 
the form of a mental image that is developed through 
sensorimotor experiences (with motion and forces) at a very 
early age (Johnson, 1987), and also reinforced by everyday 
language (Osborne, 1984; Solomon, 1987; Viennot, 1979). As 
more experiences and concepts are acquired the schema 
evolves and takes the form of a hierarchically organized 
structure. This structure can also represent a single 
concept, object or event, according to a slot structure, 
where slots specify values that the concept has on various 
attributes (Anderson, 1985). 
17. Semantic Memory: Memory about words and other 
verbal symbols, their meaning, and their relations among 
them (Tulving, 1972). 
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18. Strategy: Reasoning method employing a number of 
factors involved in a given problem task (Maloney, 1985). 
19. Subsumption: The process whereby new knowledge is 
incorporated into more general concepts or propositions 
(Ausubel, Novak, & Hanesian, 1978). 
20. Understanding: Mental activity that involves an 
attempt to relate a new piece of information to an 
established schema (Carey, 1986; Resnick, 1983). However, 
the following are also involved: 
a. Expectations to form meaning (Bruner, 1986; Fischer 
& Ausfchnaiter, 1993; Wheatley, 1991). 
b. Emotions (Norman, 1981, Scheffler, 1991). 
c. Freedom and responsibility to construct meaning 
(Kelly, 1970). 
d. Sharing of meaning (Mead, 1932; Solomon, 1987; 
Wheatley, 1991). 
e. Relationships among concepts (Bruner, 1963; 
Karplus, 1981; Novak & Gowin, 1984; Prawat, 1989; 
Resnick, 1983; Scheffler, 1991; Wandersee, 1992). 
f. Ability to use of a concept in multiple contexts 
(Bowden et al., 1992; Nickerson, 1985). 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
This chapter consists of four major parts. In the 
first part there is a discussion of the fundamental problem 
of human understanding as well as some of the limitations 
inherent in the problem itself. This part does not provide 
an in-depth review of the related literature--this would 
require an excursion into the philosophy of cognition over 
the past twenty or so centuries. Instead, it demonstrates 
some of the difficulties with which any researcher on human 
understanding is confronted. Moreover, an argument about 
how one might approach the problem of human understanding, 
despite those difficulties, is also raised. In the second 
part there is a review of the epistemological foundations of 
constructivism. The purpose of this part is to present, 
through a discussion of the fundamental ideas of Vico, Kant, 
Piaget, and Kelly, the constructivist model of knowledge, 
which, as it is argued, is in line with development of 
scientific concepts. The third part provides a synthesis of 
ideas about how humans understand. The purpose of this part 
is to discuss findings from cognitive psychology that give 
support to the constructivist model. Finally, the fourth 
part provides an in-depth review of the literature on 
student conceptual understanding in the area of force and 
motion. Starting from the pioneering work of Jean Piaget, 
this section discusses student preconceptions as have been 
identified by researchers worldwide. The purpose of the 
discussion of preconceptions is to draw attention to the 
importance of their awareness by physics instructors. 
Part 1: The Problem and the Limits of 
Human Understanding 
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The problem of human understanding is certainly not a 
new one. Each generation, from the time of Plato to the 
present day, has reformulated the detailed epistemological 
questions in its own terms. However, the central guiding 
problems have remained the same: "How do we come to know?," 
"What sort of things do we know?," "To what extent do our 
senses determine what we know?," "Do our prior concepts, if 
any, predetermine our ability to acquire new knowledge?," 
and "Is there any difference between knowing and 
understanding?" 
Nowadays most of the interest in student conceptual 
understanding is, hopefully, to answer the same 
epistemological questions about knowing, knowledge, 
concepts, and understanding. Yet, researchers on human 
cognition are faced with a problem simply because they do 
not t1really11 know what to look for when doing research on 
conceptual understanding. For any serious attempt on their 
part to define such terms is bound to leave them in the 
dark. 
Current views in cognitive science and science 
education involve what is called conceptual change rather 
than conceptual growth (Brown & Clement, 1989; Dykstra et 
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al., 1992; Gorsky & Finegold, 1992; Posner et al., 1982). 
In sharp contrast to behaviourist views, the current 
constructivist perspective places emphasis on mental 
reorganization rather than "mental saturation." 
Understanding seems to take place not so much through the 
taking in of new knowledge, as through a restructuring of 
ideas we already have (Driver & Bell, 1986). The history of 
science explicitly testifies to this fact. Kuhn (1970) 
challenged the traditional view of science as a continuous 
accumulation of knowledge, and suggested paradigm shifts 
which overturn much of what has been taken as "true" before. 
However, such mental restructuring and paradigm shifts 
in the concepts of people, be they scientists working at the 
frontiers of knowledge or students in a classroom, do not 
take place spontaneously. Nor is it an easy and 
straightforward task to assess them. It seems that the 
search for knowledge does not involve rules, standard 
hierarchies of processes, but instead factors unique to the 
particular individual seeking knowledge and understanding 
(Millar, 1988; Polanyi, 1958). There are arguments that 
show the immensity and complexity of the problem of human 
understanding. 
The Nature of Knowledge and Understanding 
Russell (1948) expresses the view that knowledge is 
something vague and it is a matter of degree, while Popper 
(1974) argues that even scientific knowledge, that is, our 
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best knowledge, is purely conjectural. Toulmin (1972) also 
points out that "the precise meaning of the terms concept 
and conceptual is rarely made explicit and frequently left 
quite obscure" (p. 8). In addition, understanding and 
knowledge are intimately related to beliefs, intuitions, and 
expectations (Russell, 1948), and any philosophical 
analysis, both metaphysical and epistemological, will 
unlikely provide us with any definitions. 
No doubt, there is a close link between knowledge and 
understanding, since the latter presupposes the former. 
Moreover, the more knowledge one has the better one's 
understanding. Yet, one need not know everything there is 
to know about a specific concept in order to understand it. 
our day-to-day communication is based upon such an 
"understanding." However, a thorough understanding of a 
concept is impossible simply because that would require 
knowledge of everything to which it relates (Nickerson, 
1985) . 
It becomes quite apparent that in attempting to arrive 
at an acceptable definition of knowledge and understanding 
many contradictions begin to emerge. And the paradox, as 
had been identified by Socrates, is that the more knowledge 
one has about a certain aspect of the world, the more aware 
one becomes of the extent of one's ignorance. Understanding 
in this sense is equated with confusion, which, however, 
according to Nickerson, 
27 
does not mean that one's understanding actually 
decreases but simply that one's appreciation of the 
complexity of that aspect of the world is likely to 
increase, which may be, after all, a better 
understanding of a fundamental sort. 
(Nickerson, 1985, p. 230) 
But although Nickerson's (1985) point is well taken, the 
problem of assessing human understanding still remains a 
challenge. Does any person who is confused demonstrate an 
understanding? The only possibility available, as has been 
pointed out by Trowbridge and McDermott (1980) in their 
study with physics students, is to assess the "degree" of 
understanding: 
We may consider as an indicator of degree of 
understanding the extent to which a student's 
understanding corresponds to that of a physicist, i.e., 
the extent to which the student can define a particular 
concept in an acceptable operational manner, 
distinguish it from related, but different, concepts 
and apply it successfully. (Trowbridge & McDermott, 
1980, p. 1,020) 
It seems that this "indicator of degree of 
understanding" can take us out of our dilemma. The problem 
though is that it is the "number" of "successful 
applications" of a concept that will determine its 
understanding, and, therefore, an abstract mental process is 
reduced to quantifiable terms. And in such a case, a scale, 
probably based upon a certain number and types of 
applications, with a "minimum amount of understanding," will 
determine the degree of a person's understanding. The 
question, however, is "who," and "by what standards," will 
select the number and the types of applications. 
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Believing and Understanding 
Beliefs, according to Polanyi (1958), are "the source 
of all knowledge" (p. 266), and even "truth is something 
that can be thought of only by believing it" (p. 305). 
Evidence, of course, for such statements can be found in the 
developmemt of major scientific theories. Metaphysical 
beliefs about the universe played a major role in Einstein's 
thought, and Galileo held on to his conviction about the 
motion of the earth despite the fear of imminent death. 
But can we say that all people who understand such 
theories believe in them? Do people believe in the Big Bang 
or the the theory of evolution? For there is a distinction 
to be made between those who have the commitment and the 
intellectual passion to search for a pre-existing truth, and 
those who just understand theories, concepts, and symbols 
without necessarily believing them. According to Goodman 
and Elgin (1988), 
Whereas knowledge typically requires truth, belief, and 
substantiation, understanding requires none of these. 
Statements can be understood regardless of their truth 
and regardless of belief in them. (Goodman & Elgin, 
1988, p. 161) 
Driver and Oldham (1986) speaking from a pedagogical 
point of view "believe" that understanding is not the same 
as believing, since "it is possible to construct a meaning 
to generate a way of seeing something" like "phlogiston 
theory, without accepting it" (p. 110). Yet, here there is 
a paradox. For if it is accepted that knowledge is 
29 
constructed by the individual in his or her attempt to 
understand the world, then all knowledge can be seen as 
beliefs which are tenaciously held (Dykstra et al., 1992). 
There is a difference between the belief in "a force 
acting on a baseball traveling through the air" and the 
factual statement "nuclei are composed of protons and 
neutrons." The former is constructed by individuals 
themeselves, while the latter can be retrieved from a 
textbook, or imparted by a teacher during instruction. And 
regardless of whether or not the factual statement about the 
composition of nuclei is taken as true, a force in the 
direction of the baseball's motion is understood and taken 
to be a true belief! 
The Emotional Dimension 
Emotions seem to be intricately related to cognition 
(Bower, 1981; Norman, 1981; Scheffler, 1991; West & Foster, 
1976), and matters become even more complicated. Polanyi 
(1958) provides strong arguments for a "personal knowledge" 
with an emotional tacit dimension that cannot even be 
assessed. 
Into every act of knowing there enters a tacit and 
passionate contribution of the person knowing what is 
being known, and .•. this coefficient is no mere 
imperfection, but a necessary component of all 
knowledge. All this evidence turns into a 
demonstration of the utter baselessness of all 
alleged knowledge, unless we can wholeheartedly uphold 
our own convictions. (Polanyi, 1958, p. 312) 
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The Hierarchy of the Cognitive Domain 
Certainly, Bloom's work on the "Taxonomy of Educational 
Objectives" (Bloom, 1956) did throw some light in the area 
of human understanding, and particularly the cognitive 
domain. But his compartmentalization of the thinking 
process has its own problems too. No doubt, "Comprehension" 
requires a person to do more than memorize information. But 
do students say that "forces act in the direction of motion" 
because they have memorized every piece of information, word 
by word, about "forces" and "motion?" Do students not 
really "Comprehend," and therefore explain in their own 
words, why "heavy bodies should fall faster than light 
ones?" Do students not understand, since it makes sense, 
that once they stop applying a force on a body, the body 
stops moving, and therefore "all motion implies a force in 
the direction of motion?" Although all these are common 
sense beliefs, and should be considered "serious alternative 
hypotheses" (Halloun & Hestenes, 1985b), they are 
nonetheless at variance with what the teacher is supposed to 
teach. According to Bloom's (1956) model, students can move 
on to the Application level, since they have the 
prerequisites required at the Comprehension level. However, 
unless conceptual change takes place while students are at 
the Comprehension level, it would be meaningless to ask them 
to apply a concept or principle to other situations. In 
addition, it would be more appropriate to speak of levels of 
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understanding, where "students move from one level ..• to 
another more complete one" (Bowden et al., 1992, p. 263), 
rather than of Comprehension, Application, and so forth. 
On the other hand, is "Application" or "Analysis" so 
different, or even at a higher level in the taxonomy, from 
"Comprehension?" Is it not true that sometimes we have 
first to analyze in order to understand? Is it not true 
that we understand better by using a variety of 
applications, and that we do make evaluation judgements even 
before we become willing to understand? 
In problem-solving under conditions of uncertainty 
where there seems to be no right answer, or no information 
available, judgements based upon assumptions about knowledge 
and reality are the first, if not the only, means to 
understand a situation (Kitchener, 1983). Evaluation 
judgements that make one decide about what is more relevant 
to a given problem situation played the most important role 
in the development of conceptual models and scientific 
theories. Ignoring friction, shape and colour of objects, 
and describing motion as change in position of dimensionless 
particles in 3-D space, was a judgement that was not based 
upon any current knowledge about motion, forces, and the 
nature of matter. 
Understanding and Hemispheric Preferences 
Problems, however, seem to exist even with the Learning 
Style Inventory developed by Kolb (1985), and the 4MAT model 
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developed by McCarthy (1990). The latter, acknowledging 
Kolb's contibution, argues that there are "those who 
perceive in a sensing/feeling way" and who "project 
themselves into the reality of the now," and "those who 
think through experiences" by attending to the "abstract 
dimensions of reality" (p. 31). 
But although it can be true that people have 
hemispheric preferences when perceiving and processing 
information, there is a question about the validity of the 
model with its four quadrants. Can it be so simple that 
people should fall within those quadrants? Can an 
individual not be both a thinker and intuitor, or both a 
feeler and thinker? Can an individual not belong to all 
those four categories, depending upon the particular task 
and the circumstances? In addition, is perception quite 
separate from processing? Do "reflective observation" and 
"active experimentation," as the ends of the processing 
continuum, not involve some thinking, which is only one end 
on the continuum of perception? 
It sounds reasonable that, since the human mind invents 
models that can explain the world, it can invent a model of 
itself too. But perhaps this might be the only model that 
cannot be invented. Which feature of the human mind should 
be included, or excluded, so that it can best represent "the 
real mind?" And who, and by what standards, should make the 
decision? In the end it becomes evident that even this 
model of the mind represents a personal belief of his 
inventor! 
The Piagetian Model 
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It should be stressed that Piaget's biological model 
(Piaget, 1972a) consisting of three separate phases, namely, 
assimilation, disequilibration, and accomodation also poses 
problems. The reason for this is that it does not 
necessarily explain human understanding. It seems that the 
disequilibration that results from the dissonance between 
existing concepts and experiences that explicitly contradict 
these concepts can help us understand. Yet as research by 
Mccloskey (1983) showed, even college students failed to 
give the correct answer to problem situations that seem to 
have provided rich opportunities for accomodation and 
reflective abstraction. These findings undermine the 
Piagetian model, for they show that even motor activities 
that are done sensori-motorically, reflectively are known 
poorly. 
But there is further evidence that undermines Piaget's 
model. For as research has shown (Driver et al., 1985; 
Johnson-Laird, 1983), children, through early experiences, 
build models or conceptual schemata in order to understand 
what is going on around them. Most of the time though these 
models and schemata are at variance with those of the 
scientists, despite the fact that children do seem to 
understand and explain the world! In short, autonomous 
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cognitive development, as postulated by Piaget, does not 
necessarily lead to understanding since it can lead to the 
construction of "false" knowledge. This, of course, may 
sound self-contradictory, but knowledge and understanding 
have also a public dimension that complements, rather than 
contradicts, Polanyi's personal component. This can be also 
seen in Popper's (1972) three worlds: the world of 
perception, the personal world of mental constructions, and 
the public world of knowledge as documented in reports, 
books, and journals. The interrelationship between the 
personal and the public dimensions of knowledge and 
understanding is stated by Johnson (1987): 
To know is to understand in a certain manner, a manner 
which can be shared by others who join with you to form 
a community of understanding. (Johnson, 1987, p. 206) 
The Conceptual structure of Knowledge 
Bruner (1963) and Hirst (1973), although speaking from 
different perspectives--the former as a cognitive scientist, 
and the latter as a philosopher--see understanding as 
involving the grasp of the structure of a discipline. But 
what is the structure of a scientific discipline like 
Newtonian mechanics? Accepting current views about the 
nature of reality and human knowledge (Gregory, 1988; 
Manicas & Secord, 1983), it becomes obvious that it is the 
human mind itself that constructs the structure or the 
logical organization of a discipline. If, of course, it is 
implied that "grasping the structure" is equivalent to 
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helping students assimilate the structure with which a 
certain subject like Newtonian mechanics is presented in a 
book, two things can happen: either the students assimilate 
the structure of the book in a rote fashion, or they 
construct their own meaning, and therefore structure, by 
taking into account their prior conceptions. However, in 
the former case understanding will never take place, and in 
the latter every student will have his or her own structure 
which might be different from that of the textbook's or the 
teacher's. But the question remains: do those students who 
constructed their own conceptual organization "see the 
structure", as Scheffler (1991, p. 36) suggests? It is not 
very clear whose structure the student is supposed to see, 
because Scheffler himself says that the structure of a 
discipline is not what the author says or means. 
Hirst's (1973) arguments for understanding by having 
the fundamental concepts of a discipline have their problems 
too. For it would be difficult to isolate certain concepts, 
particularly of a scientific discipline, and "term" them 
fundamental. For example, which concept of the Newtonian 
model is more fundamental? Force, or motion, or both? It 
is quite apparent that motion is more fundamental if one 
starts inductively, and force becomes the fundamental 
concept if one starts deductively. It might seem, of 
course, that the argument could be settled if it were 
accepted that both are fundamental. Yet it could be further 
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argued that space and time are more fundamental than both 
force and motion since, according to Kant, these two 
concepts are "a priori.'' In fact, Kant does not even call 
them concepts but forms of intuition (Russell, 1948, p. 
708). The only one who could settle this kind of argument 
is Newton himself, who based his model on the four distinct 
components of human experience, namely, matter, space, time, 
and motion (Hadzigeorgiou, 1987). Yet, his starting point 
was motion, since induction played a major role in his work. 
But would motion, as a starting point, be a guarantee 
for understanding? Would induction, as was used by Newton, 
result in understanding? It seems that if one were to 
follow Newton's logic of reasoning in the classroom, two 
strategies would be appropriate for understanding. First 
to instruct or train students how to observe phenomena of 
motion, and second to start the teaching of the Newtonian 
model by introducing the concepts of length and time, and 
then move on to velocity and acceleration. At the end, the 
concept of force would be introduced and everybody could be 
confident that understanding has taken place. So far, 
however, both approaches have not helped students to 
understand (Ausubel et al., 1978; Shelley, 1989). For, on 
the one hand, observations are theory laden and are always 
preceded by a hypothesis (Popper, 1972); and on the other, 
the direction of cognition does not take place from simple 
concepts to the more complex concepts and principles but 
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rather in the opposite direction, from a general problem to 
the specific concepts and principles involved in the problem 
(Ausubel et al., 1978). 
Linguistic Meaning 
Toulmin (1972), in his seminal work on human 
understanding, has argued that, although each of us has his 
or her own thoughts, our concepts are necessarily and 
inevitably shared. And yet, this sharing of concepts within 
a certain social context poses a problem, since there is the 
inescapable subjectivity of linguistic meaning. For as 
Glasersfeld (1989) has pointed out, 
We can no longer maintain the preconceived notion that 
words convey ideas or knowledge; nor can we believe 
that a listener who apparently "understands" what we 
say must necessarily have conceptual structures that 
are identical with ours. (Glasersfeld, 1989, p. 134) 
It is quite evident that understanding through 
linguistic communication, oral or written, necessitates an 
active construction of meaning on the part of the listener 
or reader. However, there is no guarantee that such an 
understanding will take place, unless the listener or reader 
has built a conceptual framework that is compatible and 
fits--not matches--with the speaker's or author's conceptual 
framework. This fit, though, "manifests itself in no other 
way than that the receiver says and does nothing that 
contravenes the speaker's expectations" (Glasersfeld, 1989, 
p. 134). 
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Ogden and Richards (1956), starting from the premise 
that human communication involves thoughts (mental 
processes), words (symbols), and things (referents), have 
pointed out the problems, complexities, and ambiguities 
associated with linguistic meaning which always requires a 
personal interpretation of a sign or symbol. They have also 
noticed that: (a) meanings can be denotative and 
connotative, something any physics teacher is aware of when 
acceleration is taken to mean only an increase in speed, 
although in mechanics it refers to both increase and 
decrease, as well as change in direction, (b) definitions 
are contextual, since "they are relevant to some purpose or 
situation" (p. 111), and (c) meanings can be symbolic and 
emotive. In regard to the last differentiation between 
linguistic meanings, Odgen and Richards (1956) remark that, 
In symbolic speech the essential considerations are the 
correctness of the symbolization and the truth of the 
references. In evocative speech the essential 
consideration is the character aroused. Symbolic 
statements may indeed be used as a means of evoking 
attitudes but when this use is occurring it will be 
noticed that the truth or falsity of the statements is 
of no consequence provided that they are accepted by 
the hearer. (Ogden & Richards, 1956, p. 239) 
Intellectual Relativism 
Leaving aside beliefs, emotions, and their relation to 
human understanding, there are still problems if one takes 
into account the effect of language, and accepts the 
evidence that tends to justify linguistic relativism (Choi & 
Bowerman, 1991; Mori, Kitagawa, & Tadang, 1974). The work 
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of Talmy (1975) also shed enough light on how different 
languages combine different notions to form meaning and 
words. In fact, these studies reconfirm what both Toulmin 
(1972) and Bernstein (1983) have stressed: that there is no 
permanent and neutral conceptual framework that can provide 
us with a rational judgement. It is therefore crucial that 
the evaluation of an individual's conceptual framework take 
place by an individual who speaks the same language, and 
belongs to the same culture as well. 
However, the problems with relativism do not end here. 
For in looking down the history of mankind, it becomes 
evident that ideas about how humans understand are 
inevitably shaped by ideas about the world prevalent at a 
particular time. Plato's approach was purely philosophical, 
and therefore speculative. Descartes and Locke, although 
critical thinkers, were also men of their time who 
approached the problem of human understanding from the 
perspective of current ideas about physics, physiology, and 
psychology. Therefore they both studied epistemological 
problems in the light of the prior conceptions about a fixed 
order of Nature, and an inert matter that was distinct from 
a rational mind (Toulmin, 1972). 
Dewey's concepts about Darwin's theory of evolution 
also played a major, and perhaps the most important, role in 
his thought, as it can be seen in his Experience and 
Education (1938) and How We Think (1933). It is no 
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coincidence that thinking and learning, as integral parts of 
the knowing process, have evolved because they both have a 
vital function--namely the survival of man in the struggle 
of life. It is therefore obvious that his pragmatism and 
his instrumentalist theory of truth are the results of, and 
at the same time rooted in, a practical view of knowledge. 
And Piaget is no exception. Although a genetic 
epistemologist, his earlier training in biology did have a 
profound effect upon his subsequent philosophical thinking. 
Not only the terms assimilation, equilibration, and 
accomodation, but also his idea of postulating the 
construction of cognitive structures in a developmental way, 
show the influence of biology. 
At present, constructivist views about the nature of 
knowledge, reality, and understanding are gaining 
acceptance, and we also view the human mind as an 
information processing machine. But the question remains: 
what intellectual authority does the thinking of Plato or 
Descartes have over that of Dewey or Piaget or the modern 
constructivists? For if we accept the fact that "we are 
brought up with certain ideas about society and morality, 
about geometry and algebra, about matter and the universe" 
and "we learn to regard certain methods of investigation and 
types of arguments as rational or scientific, and others as 
superstitious or muddle-headed" (Toulmin, 1972, pp. 50-51), 
would it not be true that our modes of thought can be as 
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much reflections of our particular time and place in history 
as our modes of social behaviour? 
Twenty years or so ago the human brain was believed to 
be compartmentalized into three different and separate 
domains, but at present the holistic mechanism of cognition 
is gaining acceptance. And the idea that brought about the 
cognitive revolution, namely that the human brain is nothing 
more than a computer is currently criticized {Scheffler, 
1991) • 
Following this line of reasoning, no rational authority 
appears to exist, and no claims can be made on behalf of the 
ideas of Plato or Dewey as compared with those of today's or 
tomorrow's cognitive scientists. Therefore the question 
"who is right?" seems to be meaningless. 
Approaching the Problem of Human Understanding 
Having discussed the complexities associated with human 
understanding, the most plausible question that might be 
asked is how one might approach it. At first glance this 
appears to be a difficult, if not an impossible, task. 
Given in addition the fact that an assessment of human 
understanding will inevitably involve personal 
interpretations, the validity of that assessment seems to be 
called into question. Yet, what is consoling is that we 
have at our disposal a rich store of knowledge that has been 
accumulated over the past 2000 years. And more consoling, 
as a consequence, is the fact that we know more than any of 
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those past thinkers who approached the same problem. This 
knowledge though is a powerful tool provided that neither a 
relativist nor an objectivist approach is adopted, and 
therefore a coherent system of ideas is established. 
Although we will inevitably approach the problem of 
human understanding from our current perspectives about the 
world and human nature, we should be careful not to fall 
into the trap of relativism. Nor should we adopt an 
absolutist view of our, or any, intellectual authority. 
After all, Plato seems to have been justified by modern 
cognitive scientists who stress the importance of "prior," 
though not "innate," ideas. And the early Gestalt 
psychologists, who had focused on "wholes" rather than 
parts, seem, at least at present, to have been in the right. 
Even Locke's "sense experiences" do play a major role in the 
knowing process, although we do not consider the mind as a 
"tabula rasa" any more. 
However, although we do not have an absolute authority 
over previous thinkers, we are at a better vantage point to 
make cross-contextual judgements about the various 
approaches to the problem of human understanding. The 
findings of modern cognitive science as well as those of 
neurophysiology cannot be ignored. Nor should rational 
cross-comparisons be dismissed as meaningless. Certainly, 
due to their different linguistic, cultural, and conceptual 
frameworks, Plato and Piaget appear to have no common points 
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of contact. But would Plato not agree that infants possess 
an intelligence, and, by actively exploring their 
environment, do in fact learn something about the world? It 
is quite certain that Plato would not have dismissed that, 
despite his insistence that "true knowledge" is only a 
recollection of Ultimate Reality (Plato, Republic). And 
would modern constructivists not agree with Plato that for 
an understanding of our own reality we have to "look inside" 
rather than "outside ourselves?" 
The attraction of intellectual relativism remains very 
strong. But it should be stressed that there are several 
points of contact among all those thinkers who approached 
epistemological problems. And the fact that Plato's 
epistemology has strands that appear in today's journals of 
cognitive psychology do show that neither an objectivist nor 
a relativist view of human understanding will prove 
fruitful. Some ideas are rejected, some are retained, and 
some are modified; and in such a way knowledge grows. 
Today of one thing we are almost certain: that 
knowledge "was not there" one day; it has grown. And this 
growth was the result of two complementary activities: 
looking inside and looking outside ourselves. 
Looking outside ourselves and mastering the problems by 
the world we live in, we have extended our 
understanding; looking inwards and considering how it 
is that we master those problems, we have deepened it. 
And throughout the history of thought these twin 
activities have gone continuously in parallel. 
(Toulmin, 1972, p. 1) 
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It is true that ever since the dawn of western 
civilization the pendulum of history has been swinging back 
and forth, between two extreme positions, and mankind has 
been thinking in terms of extreme opposites. At one time 
there was just one ultimate reality, and at others many; at 
one time knowledge was due to innate ideas and at others to 
sense experiences; and at one time God seemed to play dice 
with the universe and at others he did not. However, it is 
time we recognized that Either-Or philosophies are not going 
to be fruitful. Deciding between objectivism and 
relativism, or between rationalism and empiricism, is not 
going to help us approach, let alone "understand," the 
problem of human understanding. 
There seems to be no reason for us to assume that there 
are no linkages between Descartes and Dewey, or between 
Plato and Piaget. For despite the effect of several 
centuries of conceptual change, and therefore the different 
conceptual frameworks that separate them, their fundamental 
epistemological positions have remained the same, and their 
theoretical positions are not totally unbridgeable. 
The progress in science provides strong evidence 
against both relativism and objectivism, since this progress 
was the result of a continuous process of falsification and 
modification rather than the acceptance of ideas, either 
from a relativist or absolutist point of view. Scientists 
did not remain "trapped" in their own worlds. For different 
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paradigms do not necessarily imply that there is no common 
ground among them. Kuhn (1970) adopts a relativist 
approach, which, however, does not explain how communication 
among scientists working within different paradigms, and 
therefore how scientific progress, become possible (Sayers, 
1982). Although there is no "God's Eye" view, and value-
free framework of the world, although there is no 
ahistorical matrix of human rationality, we cannot accept 
the idea that "any" individual can have "any" idea about the 
world. Conceptual change and paradigmatic shifts have 
resulted within a social and historical context, and it does 
not follow that "anything goes." For although "judgements 
are not reduced to simply a matter of taste, opinion, or 
emotive reaction ... in an anything goes sense", our 
concepts "must be understood as relative to a particular 
conceptual scheme ..• society, or culture" (Smith, 1988, 
p. 18) . 
It should be recognized that without something that can 
be taken as a standard, no comparisons, and therefore no 
judgements can be made. Even in the theory of relativity 
the speed of light was taken to be an absolute fixed 
standard, regardless the relative interpretation of space 
and time. By the same token, there is a fixed standard 
against which to judge human rationality and understanding. 
This standard, though, is not only shared within the context 
of history, language, and culture, as Johnson (1987) argues, 
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but is also personal. This may sound self-contradictory, 
but the complementarity of this personal meaning and public 
understanding provides us with a fixed standard, and that is 
the coherence and fit of our beliefs and knowledge. These 
beliefs and knowledge, in this sense, are not subjective, 
since they represent a synthesis of ideas about human 
understanding, and which themselves become accepted for 
their coherence and fit. For as Putnam (1981) has stated: 
What makes a statement, or a whole system of statements 
--a theory or a conceptual scheme--rationally 
acceptable is, in large part, its coherence and fit; 
coherence of "theoretical" or less experiential beliefs 
with one another and with more experiential beliefs, 
and also coherence of experiential beliefs with 
theoretical beliefs. Our conceptions of 
coherence ••. depend upon our biology and our 
culture; they are by no means "value free". But they 
are our conceptions of something real. They define a 
kind of objectivity, objectivity for us, even if it is 
not the metaphysical objectivity of the God's Eye view. 
(Putnam, 1981, pp. 54-55) 
Accepting, therefore, "the inevitable consequence of 
our hermeneutical or interpretive mode of being in the 
world" (Smith, 1988, p. 18}, we can judge how people 
understand according to our own rationality, that is, in 
terms of the coherence and fit of our arguments, but taking, 
nevertheless, into account the acceptable conceptual 
framework of our culture. 
Part 2: Constructivism and Human Understanding 
A current paradigm that explains how people, and 
particularly students studying science, understand is 
"Constructivism." Contrary to the hidden assumption that 
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knowledge can be transmitted from a textbook or the mind of 
a teacher to the mind of the learner, the constructivist 
model of knowledge acknowledges the active role of the 
learner (Driver & Oldham, 1986; Wheatley, 1991). 
Knowledge originates in the learners activity performed 
on objects. But objects do not lie around ready made 
in the world but are mental constructions. We reason 
with scientifical objects which are our constructions. 
(Wheatley, 1991, p. 10) 
The Philosophical Roots of Constructivism 
According to Glasersfeld (1985, 1989), it was Vico, a 
Venetian philosopher, who provided the first exposition of a 
thoroughly constructivist epistemology with his treatise De 
Antiquissima Italorum Sapientia. Vico's central argument is 
that 
God is the artificer of Nature, man the god of 
artifacts ••. to know means to know how to make. 
one knows a thing only when one can tell what 
components it consists of. Consequently, God alone can 
know the real world, because He knows how and of what 
he has created it. In contrast the human knower can 
only know what the human knower has constructed. 
(Glasersfeld, 1989, p. 123) 
The idea that knowledge originates in the learner's head is 
also evident from Vico's writings: 
Man cannot know the things that are in the world 
because their components lie outside man's mind, and 
man, therefore has no access to them and cannot use 
them to build up true knowledge. (Glasersfeld, 1985, 
p. 94) 
If Vico's argument is taken into consideration, the fact 
that students have difficulty understanding science is 
explained. (It would be therefore unrealistic to expect 
students to understand the mental constructions of Newton, 
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Einstein, Maxwell, or Plank. But it would be equally 
unrealistic to expext students to construct advanced 
concepts and models. This dilemma though is resolved once 
students are given the opportunity to act upon the 
environment, and, in the process, consider and reconsider 
ideas and thus construct knowledge.) 
Kant (1934), on the other hand, was the first to argue 
that our concepts are mental constructions through which we 
interpret our experiences. But unlike Kant's idealism which 
postulated universal fixed concepts and categories, in 
constructivist terms, our concepts are both historically and 
socially determined. This is quite apparent in Weber's 
(1949) interpretive epistemology--based on the idea that 
concepts are constructed and reconstructed by individuals in 
their attempt to make sense of the world--as well as in the 
theories of quantum physics and relativity which have 
abandoned causality, permanence of matter, the classical 
conception of time, and the Euclidean interpretation of 
space. Unlike also Kant's approach to reality--that is, the 
things-in-themselves (noumena), and reason--that is, the 
things as they appear to be (phenomena), constructivism 
unites reason and reality: our concepts and categories both 
reflect and interpret reality, and there is, therefore, no 
difference between the "noumena" and the "phenomema. 11 This 
unification of appearence and reality is central to the 
Hegelian epistemology which found Kant's metaphysical and 
49 
unknownable thing in itself to be repugnant to an idealistic 
monism. However, unlike the Hegelian approach to reality 
which is objective and "shines forth" in order to manifest 
itself in appearence (Sayers, 1985, pp. 33-45), reality, as 
again Kant (1934) argued, is a purely mental product. 
At present, three major constructivist epistemologies 
can be found in the literature; that of Weber (1949), that 
of Kelly (1970), and that of Piaget (1970). Weber's 
epistemology is briefly discussed in the section of the 
social dimension of knowledge, while the other two are 
reviewed in some detail below. 
The Biological Theory of Jean Piaget 
The constructivist approach to the study of cognition, 
after it was disregarded for two centuries, started with the 
work of Piaget who became concerned with the way children 
construct knowledge. His thesis is elaborated in his books 
Biology and Knowledge (1971a), Psychology and Epistemology 
(1971b), and The Principles of Genetic Epistemology (1972a). 
Although Piaget does not use the term "understanding" in his 
own writings, his answer to the two fundamental questions of 
genetic epistemology, namely, "what is knowledge?" and "how 
are the various types of knowledge possible?" (Piaget, 
1971b), provides a new approach to the problem of human 
understanding. 
Starting from the metaphysical premise that "all 
reality--biological, physical, psychological, sociological, 
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intellectual--is evolving in the direction of progress" 
(Kitchener, 1986, p. 6), Piaget explains reason and 
understanding in evolutionary terms. This evolutionary 
explanation also leads Piaget to adopt the biological terms 
"assimilation," "accomodation," that is, two simultaneous 
processes occuring while the "organism," and hence the 
epistemic subject, interacts with the environment in order 
to satisfy its "epistemic needs," and "equilibration," that 
is, a state of equilibrium resulting from the satisfaction 
of those needs. It is obvious, according to this biological 
model, that the essence of cognition lies in its adaptive 
function. And through this function, the epistemic subject 
is progressing from one level of equilibrium to another, 
thus attaining a better understanding. Kitchener (1986), in 
an interpretation of Piaget's writings, also speaks of 
levels of understanding which are subject to an ongoing 
dialectical process. This certainly shows the Hegelian 
influence on Piaget's philosophical thinking. 
In rejecting traditional empiricism and the copy theory 
of knowledge, as well as traditional idealism and 
rationalism, Piaget proposes that knowledge is constructed 
through the active interplay of experiences and the 
developing cognitive structures. These structures are not 
innate but are developed because of the way the human brain 
is designed to interpret the stimuli it receives. According 
to Piaget (1970, 1972a), cognitive development unfolds in 
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much the same way a logical argument unfolds, step by step, 
in a logical sequence, and proceeds by means of four basic 
and distinct stages: the sensorimotor stage (0-2 years), the 
preoperational stage (2-7 years), the concrete operational 
stage (7-12 years), and the formal operational stage (12-15 
years). During and throughout these stages, the child's 
cognitive structure might be regarded as a set of logical 
premises, and experience provides the information that the 
child uses to make deductions from his premises, resulting 
in a new set of cognitive structures, from which further 
deductions can be made, and so on until an adequate set of 
structures is acquired that enables the child to understand 
and cope with the world. This making of deduction after 
deduction from given cognitive structures leads to the 
construction of knowledge, and hence, to understanding. 
The idea of autonomous construction of knowledge is 
different from both rationalism and empiricism, although it 
seems to be a combination of both. Something must be innate 
that allows for autonomous development. And external 
experiences must also play a major role in the interaction 
between people and their environment. 
Piaget (1970) reports that cognitive structures exist 
even in deaf and blind children, although, due to the lack 
of sensory input, they develop much later. But reality is 
not eternal and unchanging, awaiting to be "recollected" by 
the knower. Nor is it "out there," awaiting to be 
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discovered through the senses. Instead, reality, including 
"cognitive schemes, categories, concepts, and structures 
necessary for knowledge" (Kitchener, 1986, p. 102), is 
constructed through a personal interaction with the 
environment, and it is therefore a personal affair. It is 
evident that this kind of constructivism departs from the 
Kantian constructivism that postulated universal innate 
categories. 
It would be worth mentioning that Piaget (1970, 1972a) 
equates intelligence and understanding with the development 
of increasingly logical, complex, and numerous schemata, 
which he defines as "the structures or organization of 
actions as they are generated by repetition in similar or 
analogous circumstances" (Piaget & Inhelder, 1969. p. 4). 
His essential contribution is the description of how those 
mature schemata, so numerous and complex, have evolved from 
infantile reflexes such as sucking and palmar grasping. 
Understanding is equivalent to incorporating an object into 
an already existing schema. 
In discussing Piaget's ideas, it becomes apparent that 
at the heart of his model is the "action" of the "knowing" 
subject upon the "objects" of the world. This action upon 
an object can take two forms: 
One consists in modifying its positions, its movements, 
or its characteristics in order to explore its nature: 
this action is known as "physical." The other consists 
in enriching the object with characteristics or new 
relationships which retain its characteristics or 
previous relationships, yet completing them by systems 
of classification, numerical order, measure, and so 
forth: these actions are known as "logico-
mathematical.11 (Piaget, 1971b, p. 67) 
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It becomes also apparent that "reality" and "knowledge" had 
for Piaget (1970) a special meaning. In regard to the 
former he accepted that it is known only when it is acted 
upon. This obviously shows his departure from the copy 
theory of reality of classical empiricism. In regard to the 
latter, he distinguished between two kinds of knowledge: 
empirical knowledge, that is knowing "about" the world 
through an abstraction from that world, and logico-
mathematical knowledge, that is knowing about the intricate 
relationships of the actions upon the world. 
Although it could be argued only logico-mathematical 
actions and knowledge result in understanding, the notion 
that the knower, or epistemic subject, is actively involved 
in any kind of action, makes one infer that even in 
empirical knowledge, that is, knowledge derived from 
physical actions, abstraction is an active affair. For as 
Piaget (1971b) repeatedly stresses, "we only know an object 
by acting on it and transforming it" (p. 67). 
Kelly's Theory of Personal Constructs 
An epistemology of the interpretive tradition is at the 
heart of Kelly's theory of personal constructs which 
stresses the fact that "whatever the world may be, man can 
come to grips with it only by placing his own interpretation 
upon what he sees" (Kelly, 1970, p. 2). 
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It is worth mentioning that the work of Kelly (1955) on 
the theory of personal constructs, initially published 
almost 40 years ago, offers a constructive perspective since 
it views the individual as a "scientist" who builds for him 
or herself internal models in an effort to understand and 
make predictions about events of the external world. These 
models are subject to modification, since construction of 
reality is constantly tested out so that better predictions 
can be made in the future. For Kelly human behaviour is 
anticipatory rather than reactive. 
The theory is based upon the philosophical position of 
constructive alternativism, the notion that there are 
many workable alternative ways for one to construe his 
world. The theory itself starts with the basic 
assumption, or postulate, that a person's processes are 
psychologically channelized by ways in which he 
anticipates events. (Kelly, 1955, p. 560) 
Central to the theory of personal constructs is the 
notion that "the thoughtful man is neither the prisoner of 
his environment nor the victim of his biography" (Kelly, 
1955, p. 560), but, instead, 
an inveterate inquirer, self-invented and shaped, 
sometimes wonderfully and sometimes disastrously, by 
the direction of his enquiries. (Bannister & Fransella, 
1986, p. vii). 
It is evident that, contrary to the deterministic ideas of 
both Freudianism and behaviourism, namely, that we are the 
victims of our infancy, and our reinforcement activities 
respectively, constructive alternativism views people as 
free agents able to construct their own reality, and take 
also the responsibility for such constructions. 
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The very idea of construct, as distinct from a concept, 
is that it introduces criteria of relevance and 
responsibility. Action can only be subjected to moral 
judgement in the context of what a man might have done, 
as a field of choice around what he did, and 
perceptions, being selective, negate certain 
possibilities. We are then responsible for our 
construing since this is the formative structure of 
our choosing. (Holland, 1970, p. 125) 
It becomes quite apparent that Kelly's theory of 
personal constructs shares with existentialism a number of 
features, as that of action--they are both theories of 
action--that of person--they both treat the individual as a 
person as opposed to an object or even a biological organism 
--and that of responsibility--Kelly himself equates the 
philosophical position of constructive alternativism with an 
"epistemological responsibility" (Kelly, 1970, p. 2). In 
fact, the notion of responsibility is an important one, for 
as Kelly further remarks, 
even the most valuable construction we have yet 
contrived--even our particular notion of God Himself--
is one for which we shall have to continue to take 
personal responsibility, at least until someone turns 
up with a better one. (Kelly, 1970, p. 4) 
Although Kelly's ideas have immense implications for a 
wide variety of fields, their consequences for conceptual, 
or rather "constructive," understanding are significant and 
far-reaching too. For accepting the notions of free choice 
and "epistemological responsibility," the idea that neither 
the reinforcement nor the motivational methods have worked 
so far becomes justified. 
Constructivism and the Notion of Truth 
As far as the notion of truth is concerned, coherence 
and fit, viability and usefulness are all united in a new 
constructivist epistemology. 
Facts are true, we may say, just so far as they work, 
just so far as they contribute to the order of 
experience. If by taking certain judgements of 
perception as true, I can get more system into my 
world, then these "facts" are so far true, and if by 
taking certain facts as errors I can order my 
experience better, then so far these "facts" are 
errors. And there are no "facts" which possess an 
absolute truth. (Bradley, 1914, p. 240) 
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It should be noted that while coherence and fit play a role 
in accepting or rejecting certain ideas and arguments "in 
accordance with how they cohere and fit with the rest of our 
ideas about reality" (Sayers, 1985, p. 136), the 
instrumentalist approach is taken as the main avenue to 
gaining knowledge. This approach leads to knowledge that is 
viable within our experiences (Glasersfeld, 1989) and is 
therefore similar, although not identical, to Dewey's 
inquiry method where viability and usefulness are blended in 
"the opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by 
all who investigate" (Russell, 1946, p. 824). 
The idea that there are no facts that possess an 
absolute truth is also central to the philosophical position 
of constructive alternativism. For 
even when events are reconciled with a construction 
we cannot be sure that they have proved it true. There 
are always other constructions, and there is the 
lurking likelihood that some of them will turn out to 
be better. The best we can ever do is project our 
anticipation with frank uncertainty and observe the 
outcome in terms in which we have a bit more 
confidence. But neither anticipation nor outcome is 
ever a matter of absolute certainty from the dark in 
which we mortals crouch. (Kelly, 1970, p. 4) 
Contrary to the positivist tradition and the 
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epistemological assumption of "accumulative fragmentalism," 
truth, according to constructive alternativism, is not to be 
collected piece by piece, nor to be judged in terms of 
whether a proposition can be proved true or not true, but 
instead in terms of whether a proposition can lead towards a 
new proposition (Kelly, 1970). And although we cannot say 
that one proposition or construction is better than any 
other, any new proposition 
must be regarded as a crude formulation of a 
question which, at best, can serve only as an 
invitation to further inquiry, and one that can be 
answered only through personal experience, and .•. 
the answer we get is not likely to be exactly an answer 
to our question at all, but an answer to some other 
question we have not yet thought to ask. (Kelly, 1970, 
p. 5) 
Constructivism and ontological Reality 
The notion of the transformation of the epistemic 
object raises metaphysical questions regarding the nature of 
reality. For as in the theory of quantum mechanics where 
what is observed is the result of an interaction between the 
subject and the object, in Piaget's constructivism reality 
is constantly modified through the action of the epistemic 
subject on the epistemic object. 
The metaphysical question that could be asked concerns 
the existence of the epistemic object, namely whether it 
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exists independently of any constructions, or whether it can 
be constructed through the mental processes of the epistemic 
subject. It is quite obvious from such considerations that 
an independent existence leads to a realism, while an free 
construction leads to an idealism. However, as Kitchener 
{1986) points out, the interaction between subject and 
object presupposes their existence prior to interaction, and 
therefore, "Piaget's constructivism only makes sense if one 
is committed to some kind of metaphysical realism" (p. 114). 
In short, constructions for Piaget were representations of a 
real world to which children had to accomodate. 
Constructivist views are held by recent philosophers 
and philosophers of science who reject the notion of the 
existence of objective observations against which any theory 
about the world can be checked {Goodman, 1984; Manicas & 
Secord, 1983). It is quite evident that this constructivist 
approach to cognition is different from Piaget's, since the 
latter seemed to cling to an epistemology of naive realism. 
In defending a constructivist philosophy, Goodman 
{1984) puts forward the thesis that, contrary to the common-
sense view that there is a unique real world which preexists 
and is independent of human mental activity, every aspect of 
the world, whether a constellation, a single star, or a 
chair, is the result of a conscious interaction between a 
previously made world and the symbolic procedures of a mind. 
In this way, man is not only the observer, but also the 
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participator "in making the past, as well as the present and 
the future" (p. 36). Gregory (1988) has a similar view: 
There seems to be no already-made world, waiting to 
be discovered. The fabric of nature, like all fabrics, 
is woven by human beings for human purposes. 
(Gregory, 1988, p. 186) 
Manicas and Secord (1983), share the same epistemology, 
since in our attempt to represent the world, we construct 
concepts which take on a reality, although 
"epistemologically, there is nothing known to which our 
ideas can correspond" (p. 401). This is eloquently and 
unambiguously epitomized by Einstein and Infeld (1938): 
Physical concepts are free creations of the human mind, 
and are not, however, it may seem, uniquely determined 
by the external world. (Einstein & Infeld, 1938, p. 31) 
It is quite obvious from what Einstein and Infeld say, that, 
rather than viewing our observations as real, it is our 
constructions of the world which are real, in the sense 
that, through these constructions, we interpret and re-
interpret our experience. Einstein and Infeld (1938) 
further tell us that at the heart of the knowing process is 
our attempt to build models, which, however, can never be 
compared with the external world, since "we cannot even 
imagine the possibility of the meaning of such a comparison" 
(p. 31). 
Glasersfeld (1985, 1987, 1989) also states that the 
function of cognition is adaptive and serves the 
organization of the experiential world, not the discovery of 
ontological reality, echoing Bohr's own words: "It is wrong 
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to think that the task of physics is to find out how nature 
is. Physics concerns only what we can say about nature" 
(cited in Peterson, 1985, p. 305). Glasersfeld (1989) 
stresses the fact that we cannot "check" our knowledge 
against an external reality. our only check is the extent 
to which our constructions fit with our experience in a 
coherent and consistent way. Knowledge in this sense is 
"conceptual constructs" that are "viable in the experiential 
world of the knowing subject" (p. 122). 
Glasersfeld (1985), in discussing the notion of 
"adaptation," points out that adaptation is misunderstood 
"as the process of a structure becoming more and more like 
whatever it is adapting to" (p. 96). on the contrary, a 
radical constructivism that postulates mental constructions 
that fit, rather than match, with reality 
does not require building blocks that are part of 
ontological reality, but ... elements found in the 
knower's experiential world.(Glasersfeld, 1985, p. 97) 
The Philosophical Strands of Constructivism 
In discussing the epistemological roots of 
constructivism, it deserves to be noted that it has borrowed 
fundamental notions from all philosophical positions. A 
personal interpretation of the contribution of these 
philosophical positions with their respective notions could 
be as follows: 
1. Formal Idealism: The human mind is the primary 
element in the construction of knowledge. 
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2. Absolute Idealism: The knower and the known are 
united and are in a dialectical process of becoming, reality 
is experience, and the primacy of the whole over its parts. 
3. Rationalism: Belief in an innate structure (but 
not innate ideas) that develops through a rational order. 
(Contrary to Descartes and Leibniz, the mind is not fully 
formed at birth but is developed autonomously.) 
4. Empiricism: Sense experience is necessary in the 
construction of knowledge, but it is not the only element 
present in this construction (as empiricism holds), since 
the latter presupposes a prior concept, schema, into which 
the sense experience will be assimilated. 
5. Realism: An independent world exists but of which 
we have no knowledge (noumena). 
6. Pragmatism: Knowledge is tied to action, reality 
is not something ouside of experience, and truth of 
knowledge is judged in terms of its utility (in the sense 
that it can explain and predict our experiences, and also 
provide knowledge for further inquiry). 
7. Existentialism: Freedom of choice and 
responsibility for the construction of knowledge, reality 
exists only in action, and the meanings are shared since in 
their construction we have involved all humanity. 
Part 3: What We Know About How Humans Understand 
Granted that the current constructivist perspective 
places an emphasis on the reorganization of the conceptual 
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structure, it is obvious that what really matters is what is 
in a person's head. Although a personal interpretation, 
this reorganization could be described by the prior 
conceptions and their inter-relationship, the schemata, the 
direction of cognition, as well as the emotions and the 
expectations of the epistemic subject. However, the social 
context in the construction of knowledge is also a factor to 
be considered. 
Prior Concepts 
The first to stress the importance of prior ideas was 
Plato who explicitly stated in one of his famous dialogues: 
I know, Meno, what you mean ... you argue that a 
man cannot inquire either about that which he knows, or 
about that which he does not know; for if he knows, he 
has no need to inquire; and if not, he cannot; for he 
does not know the very subject about which he is to 
inquire. (Plato, Meno, p. 36) 
That our prior concepts "turn out to be the instruments 
of effective thought" has been pointed out by Toulmin (1972, 
p. 35), and Ausubel et al. (1978) have explicitly stated in 
their epigraph that the single most important factor in 
understanding any new piece of knowledge is what the 
individual already knows. 
Carey (1986), in discussing the implications of 
cognitive science for science education, remarks that: 
Students reading a science text or listening to a 
science teacher must gain understanding by relating 
what they are reading (hearing) to what they know, and 
this requires active, constructive work. 
(Carey, 1986, p. 1,123) 
63 
Popper (1972), arguing from a philosophical point of view, 
stresses the fact that knowledge never begins from nothing, 
but always from some background knowledge. "The growth of 
knowledge consists in the modification of previous knowledge 
that results either in its alteration or its large-scale 
rejection" (p. 71). Popper's ideas, in fact, echo what 
Plato (Republic) had remarked upon almost 25 centuries 
ago: 
We must reject the conception of education professed by 
those who say that they can put into the mind knowledge 
that was not there before--rather as if they could put 
sight into blind eyes. {Plato, Republic, p. 285) 
The stucture of Knowledge 
Putting aside metaphysical questions about the nature 
of reality, as well as epistemological questions about the 
nature of knowledge, it is evident that there is an 
interaction between the "knower" and "what is to be known." 
The latter can be the subject matter of a discipline which 
has a certain structure. Hirst {1973) speaks, not of 
disciplines, but of "Forms of Knowledge" which have their 
own logical structure, and equates understanding with 
"having" this logical structure. The structure of physics, 
for example, is different from that of philosophy or 
literature, and therefore understanding will necessarily 
involve having each form's "distinctive logical structure." 
Bruner (1963) expresses a similar view, for he believes that 
conceptual understanding entails an understanding of the 
structure of the particular discipline. However, he sees 
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structure in terms of relationships among concepts. 
Grasping the structure of a subject is understanding it 
in a way that permits many other things to be related 
to it meaningfully. To learn structure, in short, is to 
learn how things are related. (Bruner, 1963, p. 7) 
Prawat (1989) and Scheffler (1991) also believe that 
structure is important. To understand a theory is "to see 
its structure, its organization, its references, its various 
interpretations ••• not what the author means, for an 
author may intend something not in fact said, and say 
something not in fact meant" (Scheffler, 1991, p. 36}. 
Novak and Gowin (1984), and Heinze-Fry and Novak (1991) 
assert that knowledge which is maintained in long term 
memory is not a series of isolated facts, but is highly 
organized and inter-related in multiple ways. This 
structure helps individuals integrate their knowledge, 
clarify the relationships among the various concepts, and 
spend less time in rote memorization. They propose concept 
mapping as a strategy that helps students develop this 
structured knowledge (Figure 1). 
The importance of structured knowledge is stressed by 
Prawat (1989) who says that structure enhances knowledge 
accessibility. Resnick (1983) express the view that 
isolated pieces of information are meaningless unless they 
are organized into clusters of concepts. 
Ausubel (1965, 1968) and Ausubel et al. (1978) are 
thinking along similar lines. They see understanding in 
terms of making meaningful relationships, that is, in terms 
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of how meaningfully subject matter is related to existing 
general and abstract ideas that act as organizers. 
According to Ausubel (1968), organizers provide "ideational 
scaffolding for the stable incorporation and retention of 
more detailed and differentiated material that follows" (p. 
148) . 
is equal and 
opposite to 
is done by 
moves through 
increases with 
Figure 1. Concept Map Showing Relationship of Concepts 
Involved in Work Done when Pushing Box on Floor. 
Having discussed the structure of knowledge due credit 
should tie given to Vico's epistemological argument that "one 
knows a thing only when one can tell what components it 
consists of" (Glasersfeld, 1989, p. 123). It seems that the 
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relationships among the concepts are the most important 
factor in human cognition, and their primacy had been 
pointed out by Dewey (1956): "a wagon cannot be perceived 
as a wagon even when all its individual parts are put 
together; it is rather the connections between its parts 
that make it a wagon" (p. 143). Phenix (1964), in his 
philosophical discussion of meaning, also pointed out that 
"meanings are relational" (p. 13). Although his analysis is 
concerned with the sharing of meanings in a community, the 
notion of "relational" gives further support to Vice's 
argument for the importance of relationships. In fact, 
Vice's idea, namely that knowledge of something implies 
knowledge of its components, could be extended by adding 
that the more relationships we have the better our 
understanding. 
Basseches (1980) challenged Piaget's "formal 
operations" by suggesting that a transformation from formal 
thought to dialectic operations might be characteristic of 
cognitive development after early adolesence. In defining 
dialectic thought, Basseches (1980) stresses the primacy of 
conceptual relationships over other features of cognition. 
Dialectic is developmental transformation which occurs 
via constitutive and interactive relationships ..•. 
Although a relationship is often thought of as 
connection between things, where the things are taken 
to exist prior to the relationship, the phrase 
"constitutive relationship" is meant to indicate the 
opposite--that the relationship has a role in making 
the parties what they are. (Basseches, 1980, 
pp. 405-406) 
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The Context of Knowledge 
studies conducted over the last two decades have 
identified two major types of knowledge. Distinctions are 
being made between declarative knowledge, that is "knowing 
that," and procedural knowledge, that is "knowing how" 
(Anderson, 1985; Rumelhart & Norman, 1978; Rumelhart & 
Ortony, 1977; Tulving, 1972). Rumelhart and Norman (1981) 
argue that human knowledge has characteristics which are 
attributed to procedural rather than to declarative systems, 
since our ability to reason and use our knowledge seems to 
depend strongly upon the context in which the knowledge is 
required. 
Most of the reasoning we do apparently does not involve 
the application of general purpose reasoning skills. 
Rather it seems that most of our reasoning is tied to 
particular bodies of knowledge. (Rumelhart & Norman, 
1981, p. 338) 
Resnick (1983, p. 478) thinks along similar lines, since she 
stresses that "a person's intelligent performance, is not as 
a matter of disembodied processes of thinking, but dependes 
intimately on kind of knowledge a person has about a 
particular situation." Halloun and Hestenes (1985b) did in 
fact find that university physics students had difficulty in 
applying the same principle in two different contexts. For 
example, 60% correctly predicted a parabolic path of a 
projectile, but only 20% applied the same principle in the 
context of a rocket that was coasting in outer space. Brown 
and Desforges (1977) also showed that individual students do 
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not operate at the same level of thought in different 
situations. And while Inhelder and Piaget (1958) had 
originally suggested that formal operations are independent 
of the content area in which they are assessed, Piaget 
himself (1972b) later acknowledged the importance of the 
context in the development and use of formal operations. 
Glaser (1984) stresses the fact that the ability to 
retrieve the appropriate rule applicable to a particular 
problem situation is dependent upon the knowledge 
representation in memory. Bransford et al. (1986) also 
state that "competencies in a domain and the ability to 
think about the domain seem to develop hand in hand" (p. 
1,080). There is evidence that differences between "mature 
thought" and "expert thought" can be attributed to the fact 
that "expertise" is strongly dependent upon both content-
specific knowledge and task-specific strategies (Chi, 1978; 
Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser, 1982). As the study by Chi (1978) 
showed, in knowledge-free tasks, performance differences 
between young children and college students can be 
attributed to chronological age. But in knowledge-specific 
tasks it is knowledge about the particular problem 
situation, and not age, that can account for differences. 
Further support is also given by the results of the study by 
Wason and Johnson-Laird (1972) indicating the importance of 
the context and its primacy over structural characteristics 
of problem solving situations. And Carey (1986) stresses 
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the importance of context in understanding all kinds of 
information, since it allows access to known schemata that 
will, in turn, provide a framework for understanding. 
More recently, however, a third kind of "contextual" 
knowledge has been identified. Bransford et al. {1986), 
drawing on a number of studies, report on a kind of 
"conditionalized knowledge that includes information about 
the conditions and constraints of its use" (p. 1,081). This 
knowledge, according to Prawat {1989) is about knowing 
"when" and "why" to use a procedure, that is, under what 
circumstances a certain rule is appropriate. But it is not 
only procedural, since the "if-then" pattern of thinking 
goes beyond the procedural knowing "how." 
Schemata 
In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant (1787/1934) 
provides arguments for the existence of innate schemata that 
guide our reasoning process: 
In truth it is not images of objects, but schemata, 
which lie at the foundation of our pure sensuous 
conceptions. No image could ever be adequate to our 
conception of triangles in general. For the 
generalness of the conception it never could attain to, 
as this includes under itself all triangles, whether 
right-angled, acute-angled, etc., whilst the image 
would always be limited to a single part of this 
sphere. The schema of the triangle can exist nowhere 
else than in thought. (Kant, 1787/1934, A141/Bl80) 
In modern literature of cognitive science the word 
"schemata" is quite ubiquitous and schemata serve as guides 
or maps in the interpretation of any kind of new knowledge 
(Anderson, 1985; Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977). These schemata 
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become manifest in reading (Anderson, 1984), human reasoning 
(Johnson, 1987; Johnson-Laird, 1983), problem solving 
(Greeno, 1978; Larkin, 1983) and in science learning (Carey, 
1986; Driver, 1973, 1991; Driver & Erickson, 1983; Resnick, 
1983), and they point towards the holistic mechanism of 
human understanding (Gardner, 1987). 
It was Piaget who first introduced the concept of 
"scheme'' (1970) as a general and goal-defined action that 
can be generalized by repetition, and which helps people, 
from infants to mature adults, to interact and thus make 
sense of the world. 
Whatever is repeatable and generalizable in an action 
is what I have called a scheme, and I maintain that 
there is a logic of schemes. Any given scheme in 
itself does not have a logical component, but schemes 
can be coordinated with one another, thus implying the 
general coordination of actions .... For example, a 
scheme can consist of subschemes of subsystems. If I 
move a stick to move an object, there is within that 
scheme one subscheme of the relationship between the 
hand and the stick, a second subscheme of the 
relationship between the stick and the object, a third 
subscheme of the relationship between the object and 
its position in space, etc. (Piaget, 1970, p. 42) 
Knowing, according to Piaget (1970), is the assimilation of 
reality to the existing scheme, and, simultaneously, the 
accomodation of the schema to reality. According to 
Kitchener (1986), 
action schemes (e.g., sucking, pulling, turning) are 
thus pure behavioral dispositions and also practical 
concepts--or more correctly, the sensorimotor 
equivalents or precursors of concepts--into which 
objects are assimilated. (Kitchener, 1986, p. 17) 
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But the idea of the "whole" as a schema that guides the 
knowing process is better described by Anderson (1985) who 
defines it as structure or cluster of knowledge representing 
an object or event. This generalized knowledge facilitates 
understanding and making inferences about the world. 
According to Anderson (1985), schemata are an economical way 
to store propositional representations about a particular 
concept, since an immense number of propositions is 
condensed into a limited number of "slots." These slots are 
"filled in" by the various attributes of the concept. For 
example, an immense number of propositions about the concept 
"house" can be represented through a few slots referring to 
Structure, Location, Function, and so forth (Anderson, 
1985). However, a schema can take the form of network of 
concepts, like a concept map. 
Johnson (1987) also sees schemata as structures for 
organizing our experiences in order to comprehend the world. 
However, he argues that schemata "fall between abstract 
propositional structures ... and particular concrete 
images" (p. 29), and are derived from bodily experiences. 
For example, our bodies as three-dimensional containers give 
rise to a "containment" and an "in-out" schema, while 
"pushes" and "pulls" help develop "motion-is-in-the-
direction-of-force" schemata. 
The importance of conceptual schemata has been 
documented by Gick and Holyoak (1983) who demonstrated that 
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access is considerably facilitated when prior experiences 
induce the relevant schema. And Bransford and Johnson 
(1973), in an influential study, showed that, without a 
schema with which new information can be integrated, people 
have considerable difficulty in making sense of a passage 
from a text. All subjects who participated in the study 
thought that the text was incomprehensible, and they could 
remember very little of it. However, once the subjects were 
allowed to look at a picture that provided the context, 
comprehension became possible. It is apparent that the 
visual image of the context, as was perceived from the 
picture, acted as a conceptual schema to which all 
information from the text was related. 
The importance of schemata has been also pointed out by 
Chi, Feltovich, and Glaser (1982) who studied the 
differences between experts and novices in problem solving. 
Whereas the former organize their knowledge in terms of 
schemata by placing together problems solvable either with 
Newton's laws or the concept of energy, the latter tend to 
classify problems according to surface features such as 
pulleys, pendula, inclined planes and so forth. In 
addition, it was found that experts' schemata contain more 
procedural knowledge, with certain conditions for 
applicability (that is, conditional knowledge), while 
novices' schemata contain more declarative knowledge about 
the physical configurations of the problem. 
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The Direction of Cognition 
One of the characteristics of the cognitive perspective 
is its holistic mechanism (Gardner, 1987). This means that 
the direction of cognition is from whole to parts, rather 
than from part to part or from part to whole. Piaget 
(1971b) stresses the fact that when we perceive a house, we 
do not see first "the color of a tile, the height of a 
chimney and the rest, and finally the house," but, instead, 
we "immediately see the house as gestalt and then analyze it 
in detail" (p. 65). The word superiority effect testifies 
to the fact that even letters are perceived more accurately 
when they are part of a word than when they do not form a 
word (Kreiger, 1975; Smith & Spoehr, 1974). Although the 
word superiority effect could be interpreted as a decoding 
process whereby letters are more easily and more accurately 
recognized when they are in the context of a word rather 
than by themselves, it nevertheless provides evidence for 
the primacy of the whole over the individual parts. 
The ideas of "wholes" and "patterns of organization" 
had been investigated by the early Gestalt Psychologists 
(Kaffka, 1935; Kohler, 1925; Wertheimer, 1945), and their 
ontological priority has been emphasized by the dialectical 
perspective (Basseches, 1980), and the theory of Personal 
Knowledge (Polanyi, 1958, 1959). Both the dialectical 
perspective and the Theory of Personal Knowledge stress the 
idea of perceiving the "whole." 
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Polanyi (1959) equates the knowledge of a comprehensive 
whole with an understanding which presupposes "an 
indwelling" (p. 66). It is evident that this notion of 
"indwelling" implies a personal meaning, which, as Phenix 
(1964) points out, "is not developed through formal 
instruction" (p. 196). 
According to the theory of Personal Knowledge, all 
meaning lies in the comprehension of a set of 
particulars in terms of a coherent entity--a 
comprehension which is personal act that can never be 
replaced by a formal operation. (Polanyi, 1959, p. 49) 
The whole-to-parts direction of cognition can be also 
seen in the idea that understanding begins with the 
acquisition of general, rather than specific, concepts. 
According to Ausubel et al. (1978), new knowledge is always 
subsumed under a given concept or proposition that already 
exists in the cognitive structure (p. 124). Unless there is 
a general concept in the cognitive structure, this 
subsumption will not take place, and the new knowledge will 
be simply retained as meaningless information. It is 
obvious from what Ausubel and his collaborators suggest, 
that the more general an existing concept in the cognitive 
structure is, the better or easier the subsumption, and 
therefore the better the understanding. "Students fail to 
understand because most inclusive concepts have not been 
presented first" (p. 153). That is why they are very 
critical of the idea that simple concepts should precede 
more complex and general ones. 
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Children first form intuitive concepts of work from 
their experience with carrying toys up to their room, 
recognizing in time that carrying more weight to higher 
levels takes more work. As children gradually 
recognize the scalar values for weight and height and 
learn how to perform simple arithmetic operations on 
scalar quantities their concept of work can subsume new 
meanings and become differentiated to include the 
mathematical characterization that forces (or 
weights) and distances combine to define the physical 
quantity of work ..•. Assimilation theory stresses 
the importance of superordinate concepts for 
facilitation of new learning through subsumption of 
new, relevant information or concepts. When this does 
not occur, students of physics may learn to perform 
algebraic manipulation necessary for solving problems 
using the algorithm W=F*d and still not recognize that 
it takes more work to move a Cadillac up a mountain 
than it does to move a Toyota. (Ausubel et al., 1978, 
p. 362) 
The Expectations of the Knower 
Munz (1985), arguing from an epistemological point of 
view, says that humans possess expectations which are 
responsible for our growth of knowledge. Without the 
expectation to hear and see objects and events we would not 
be able to recognize second objects and events since they 
are different from each other in each particular (p. 27). 
Although, for example, every man is clearly different and 
distinguisable from another, we recognize each one of them 
as a man. The same holds true for a triangle and a sunset. 
Polanyi (1969, p. 167) interprets this expectation as a 
process of ''tacit knowing," and, as it becomes evident, 
solves, or rather better justifies, Plato's argument for the 
existence of eternal universal ideas. 
A universal concept usually anticipates the occurence 
of further instances of itself in the future, and if 
the concept is true, it will validly subsume these 
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future instances in spite of the fact that they 
unpredictably differ in every particular from all the 
instances subsumed in the past. (Polanyi, 1969, pp. 
170-171) 
Polanyi (1969) further argues that our expectations 
represent not only our ability to recognize problems, but 
also our innate capacity to know and differentiate between 
good and bad problems, and to pursue them successfully. 
A problem designates a gap within a constellation of 
clues pointing towards something unknown. If we hold a 
problem to be a good one, we also imply that this 
unknown can yet be discovered by our own efforts, and 
that this would be worth these efforts. (Polanyi, 1969, 
p. 171) 
From a pedagogical point of view according to Driver 
and Bell (1986), the expectation to form meaning is a 
necessary condition for understanding. It is quite 
apparent, however, that this expectation is not just a kind 
of motivation that will act as a prerequisite for "putting 
all knowledge in the head." It is rather a commitment on 
the part of the person who wants to understand (Woods & 
Barrow, 1975). The expectations to understand is part of 
what Carey (1986) calls "the cognitive rationale" since it 
requires people to actively construct meaning. This has 
also been pointed out by Wheatley (1991, p. 11) who says 
that "we cannot transmit meaning but must construct it for 
ourselves" since "we give meaning to what someone says by 
first anticipating what they will say." 
The expectation to form meaning is at the very heart of 
the constructivist perspective. Since, according to 
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Glasersfeld (1989, p. 134), "a language user's meanings 
cannot be anything but subjective constructs derived from 
the speaker's individual experiences," human communication 
becomes possible only because the "receiver says and does 
nothing that contravenes the speaker's expectations." 
Bruner (1986) also remarks that "looking and listening are 
shaped by expectancy, stance, and intention" (p. 110). 
The Emotions of the Knower 
The correlation between affect and academic achievement 
is well documented by a recent study (Rennie & Punch, 1991). 
Yet it was very unfortunate that the work on the Taxonomy of 
Educational Objectives (Bloom, 1956) separated, quite 
inadvertently, the domains of the human brain. Regardeless 
of whether or not the initial intention was otherwise, 
understanding was viewed as something separate from emotions 
and feelings; the cognitive domain was different from the 
affective domain. And although the importance of motivation 
and feelings had not been dismissed, they were both seen as 
prerequisites or starters, rather than integral parts, of 
the process of understanding: one must be first motivated 
and then understand. This, of course, can, and very often 
does happen, but the important point which, unfortunately, 
was missed is that both feelings and understanding go 
together. This is the reason why accomodation and 
conceptual change are difficult to occur, and students hold 
on to their beliefs even after several years of instruction. 
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The idea that our emotions play a major role in 
governing our cognitive functioning seems to be gaining 
great acceptance among cognitive scientists (Bower, 1981; 
Deweck, 1986; Norman, 1981). Their findings point towards a 
cognitive component of motivation and the interrelationship 
between motivation and cognition, and tend to justify 
Scheffler (1991) who argues for "cognitive emotions." 
Ausubel et al. (1978), it should be stressed, had remarked 
upon the idea that the causal relationship between 
motivation and understanding is reciprocal rather than 
unidirectional. Bruner (1963) also saw motivation, 
particularly that arising from curiosity and interest, as a 
way to sustain rather than initiate the knowing process. At 
present there is a changeover, even more recent than the 
cognitive revolution itself. "Hot Cognition" is a term that 
is espoused by cognitive scientists, and affect is viewed as 
internal representations with structural properties, similar 
to those of schemata (Ortony, Clore, & Lollins, 1988). 
The Social Dimension of Knowledge 
No doubt cross-cultural studies like those that have 
been quoted previously provide adequate evidence for the 
effect of language on the meaning of concepts. However, the 
construction of meaning is not limited just to semantic 
factors; instead this construction is the result of the fact 
that human beings in general interact with one another. As 
Glasersfeld (1985) argues, "the consideration of Others 
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• is an indispensable requirement of the construction of 
reality" (p. 99). He also points out that the highest level 
of reality is achieved only when the cognitive structures of 
Others are taken into account. The following quotation 
makes this point quite clear. 
Having attributed the power of spontaneous movement, 
say, to a lizard, the child who would like to catch one 
will quickly come to the conclusion that her attempts 
would be more likely to succeed if, beyond the ability 
to move, the lizard were also thought of as being able 
to see and perhaps even to hear .... In other words, 
the child's reality will soon be populated by 
experiential items to which the child attributes 
capabilities modelled after those she attributes to 
herself. Some of these perceiving creatures--
especially those with whom the learning and maturing 
subject frequently has occasion to interact--will 
require an even more sophisticated model than the 
lizard .... That is to say, other creatures will come 
to be thought of as possessing cognitive structures and 
ways of operating that are similar to, but not 
identical with the subject's own. (Glasersfeld, 1985, 
p. 98) 
Mead (1934) had made the point that giving meaning to any 
experience becomes possible only within the social process. 
In fact, Mead argued that it is the social interactions 
which are responsible for both the appearance of new objects 
in the field of our experience and the consensus about the 
existence of objects of common sense. 
The social process, as involving communication, is in a 
sense responsible for the appearence of new objects in 
the field of experience of the individual organisms 
implicated in that process. Organic processes or 
responses in a sense constitute the objects to which 
they are responses; that is to say, any given 
biological organism is in a way responsible for the 
the existence (in the sense of meanings they have for 
it) of the objects to which it physiologically and 
chemically responds. There would, for example, be no 
food--no edible objects--if there were no organisms 
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which could digest it. And similarly, the social 
process in a sense constitutes the objects to which it 
responds, or to which it is an adjustment. That is to 
say, objects are constituted in terms of meanings 
within the social process of experience. (Mead, 1934, 
p. 77) 
Dewey (1956), in acknowledging the social dimension of 
knowledge construction, stressed the notion of "community" 
and asserted that 
every individual has grown up, and always must grow 
up, in a social medium. His responses grow 
intelligent, or gain meaning, simply because he lives 
and acts in a medium of accepted meanings and values. 
Through social intercourse, through sharing in the 
activities embodying beliefs, he gradually acquires a 
mind of his own. The conception of mind as a purely 
isolated possession of the self is at the very 
antipodes of the truth. (Dewey, 1956, p. 344) 
Vygotsky (1978) shares the same view with Dewey since at the 
heart of his theory is the idea that all learning is 
embedded in a social context. The assumption that 
"processes such as deduction and understanding, evolution of 
notions about the world, interpretation of physical 
causality, and mastery of logical forms of thought. 
occur by themselves" is criticized (p. 79). In contrast to 
the Piagetian child that is busily acting on reality and 
constructing schemata, and to Kelly's man-scientist who is 
making hypotheses and constructing models in isolation in 
order to expain and predict events, students understand 
because they share and negotiate meanings. Understanding, 
in this sense, becomes possible because communication 
creates a common frame of reference. This frame of 
reference is based upon an "agreement with others about 
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types of objects and experiences which are explicitly 
context-dependent" (Solomon, 1987, p. 67). 
over the last decade the social dimension of human 
knowledge has been emphasized by both cognitive scientists 
and science educators. Norman (1981) explicitly states that 
"human cognition exists within the context of the person, 
the society, the culture" (p. 1), and Wheatley (1991) says 
that, "knowledge is not something people possess in their 
heads, but rather something people do together" (p. 11). 
The idea of the "solo child" learning science has also been 
reconsidered by Bruner (1986), the advocate of the inquiry 
model, who acknowledges the importance of the social context 
in the construction of knowledge. Bauersfeld (1988) also 
stresses the importance of negotiating meanings in a social 
interaction, and Wheatley (1991), quoting Johnson (1987), 
accepts that "to know is to understand in a certain manner, 
a manner which can be shared by others who join with you to 
form a community of understanding" (p. 10). Solomon (1987), 
in discussing the social construction of meaning, notes that 
in an attempt to make sense of the world we integrate a 
personal ''stock of knowledge" resulting from beliefs, 
talked-over experiences, and hear-say into a socially 
constructed picture; and through social exchanges, we seek 
to reconfirm the fact that those people close to us see the 
world as we do. And as Solomon remarks, "this continual 
reaffirmation of social notions makes them very durable and 
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resistant to change" (p. 67). At present, there is a strong 
consensus about "socially situated cognition" that explains 
how individuals can understand each other despite, the fact 
that each one of them has constructed knowledge 
independently in his/her mind (Resnick, 1991). 
According to the strong constructivist assumption, 
everything an individual knows is personally 
constructed. But directly experienced events are only 
part of the basis of that construction. People also 
build their knowledge structures on the basis of what 
they are told by others, orally, in writing, in 
pictures, and in gestures. Our daily lives are filled 
with instances in which we influence each other's 
constructive processes by providing information, 
pointing things out to one another, asking questions, 
and arguing with and elaborating on each other's ideas. 
(Resnick, 1991, p. 2) 
Social interaction in classroom settings has been 
investigated by a number of researchers who provide evidence 
that the interaction taking place within cooperative groups 
results not only in considerable gains in terms of self 
esteem, social and cross-cultural relationships, but also in 
terms of academic achievement (Sharan & Shachar, 1988; 
Slavin 1988, 1989; Watson, 1991). In fact, cooperative 
groups that encourage shared understanding lead to higher 
levels of critical thinking (Sharan & Shachar, 1988; Webb, 
1982) . 
There is a good reason to believe that this critical 
thinking is the outcome of a dialectical process through 
which opposing points of view--thesis and antithesis--are 
resolved. Johnson and Johnson (1988) propose "structured 
controversy" as a means to negotiating meanings in classroom 
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settings. A controversial topic, they recommend, such as 
environment and energy, should provide the start of a debate 
that will in turn allow students with opposing points of 
view to confront one another until the issue is resolved. 
Paul (1984) also argues that the disequilibration resulting 
from conflicting points of view helps develop critical 
thinking. 
There is also reason to believe that students who feel 
isolated are provided with group support which in turn 
encourages the development of an environment that allows for 
opportunities for expressing ideas without the fear of being 
wrong. However, there seems to be another reason why 
passive and withdrawn students begin to adopt an active role 
once they become part of a group. For it could be argued 
that, although it is the interaction taking place within the 
group that gives students opportunities to be both teachers 
and learners at the same time and thus enhance their 
thinking (Kraft, 1985), it is the relationships formed 
during the interaction that both provide and sustain meaning 
in classroom settings. It is probably this meaning that 
acts as an incentive for thinking and sharing, and therefore 
responsible for an increase in performance. 
Webb (1984) investigated how different gender groupings 
can affect learning. It was found that, when the groups 
consisted of an equal number of males and females, the 
performance of both genders was the same. But when fewer 
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females than males were in the groups, the males appeared to 
ignore the females, and consequently the performance of the 
latter decreased. Perret-Clermont (1980) studied the 
concept of conservation among children of age 5 to 7 years 
and found that, if a child who did not have the concept of 
conservation was put together with two conservers there was 
progress, while a group consisting of two non-conservers and 
one conserver showed occasional progress. No progress was 
made if three non-conservers were put in the same group, 
though non-conservers from the control group made progress. 
The social nature of knowledge and the notion that "all 
the ideas and sentiments which motivate an individual" have 
not "their origin in him alone" (Mannheim, 1936/1972, p. 2) 
had been recognized much earlier by both sociologists of 
knowledge and historians of science. Weber (1949), in his 
interpretive epistemology, argued that concepts are 
constructed and reconstructed by individuals in their 
attempt to make sense of the world. 
Concept construction depends on the setting of the 
problem, and the latter varies with the content of the 
culture. The history of the social sciences is and 
remains a continuous process passing from the attempt 
to order reality analytically through the construction 
of concepts .•• and the reformulation anew of 
concepts on the foundations thus transformed. (Weber, 
1949, pp. 105-107) 
Mannheim (1936/1972) further stated that "it is incorrect to 
insist that the single individual thinks" and would be more 
correct to say that "he participates in thinking further 
what other men have thought before him" (p. 3). Barnes 
85 
{1977) also discussed in detail how the social environment 
influences the generation and maintenance of knowledge. 
Knowledge is not produced by passively perceiving 
individuals, but by interacting social groups engaged 
in particular activities. And it is evaluated 
communally, and not by isolated individual judgements 
•.. its maintenance is not just a matter of how well 
it relates to reality, but also of how it relates to 
the objectives and interests of a society. 
(Barnes, 1977, p. 2) 
Further evidence is provided by Munz (1985) and Kuhn (1970). 
The former takes the case of Leonardo Da Vinci to show how 
disorder and social unrest gave him the liberty to dissect 
corpses, and thus advance medical knowledge. And the latter 
argued that scientific knowledge is a social construction, 
and, far from being objectively true, it is seen as what the 
community of scientists have decided to accept as true. 
Kuhn in actual fact, along with Toulmin (1972), argued that 
science must be understood as a social activity which 
develops its own rules of practice. They made clear that 
observations are theory-laden, and therefore they are not 
"given" but are profoundly shaped by the scientists' 
preconceptions and theoretical notions. 
From a pedagogical point of view the idea that 
cognitive disequilibration and accomodation imply not just 
an action on reality but an experience within a social 
context is epitomized by Solomon (1987) who states: 
Social interaction, whether in the general culture, the 
peer group, or even, in its most tenuous form, via 
relationship with a television character, is not just 
an additional avenue for learning. Both sociological 
theory and classroom evidence suggest that in 
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socially acquired knowledge exchange of meaning and 
consensus take the place of logical testing, and 
typification by context replaces abstraction and 
conceptualization. (Solomon, 1987, p. 78) 
In giving due credit to the emotional attachment resulting 
from social interaction, Berger and Luckmann (1967) also 
stressed that "there is good reason to believe that without 
such emotional attachment to significant others the learning 
process would be difficult, if not impossible" (p. 151). 
In discussing the social dimension of knowledge, it 
should be pointed out that an intuitive type of personal 
knowledge (Polanyi, 1958, 1959) as well as schemata 
constructed through sensorimotor experiences at an early age 
(Johnson, 1987) do occur. However, accepting the 
inevitability of social exchanges, the interactive element 
that exists in classroom and other social settings will be 
responsible for the reaffirmation, modification, and even 
complete abandonment of those personally generated ideas. 
Even if one goes contra Mannheim, and argues that thinking 
is a subjective activity, the notion of "community of 
understanding," as was put by Johnson (1987, p. 206), and 
the "rationale for considering Others'' (Glasersfeld, 1985, 
p. 99) are at the very heart of the problem of human 
understanding. 
The Challenge for Constructivism 
Accepting the view that reality is constructed in the 
mind of each individual in his or her attempt to make sense 
of the world, it is no surprise why children, and even 
mature adults, hold ideas which are at variance with those 
of the scientists. It is also no surprise why most of the 
interest of science educators is in the area of science, 
particularly in mechanics. 
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Motion and forces are an indispensable part of our 
everyday life, and particularly of the life of children. 
Physical experience is their primary source of knowledge 
that starts with grasping a hand, pulling and pushing 
chairs, keeping their balance, and continues through life 
with throwing different objects with some expectation as to 
the path they will take, with walking, jumping, lifting, and 
running. However, these bodily experiences give rise to the 
construction of schemata that act as organizers for the 
subsumption of all of our subsequent concepts and 
experiences. For as Johnson (1987) argues, all abstract 
concepts and principles stem from bodily experiences through 
metaphorical projections into abstract domains. Even 
psychological states, arguments, moral rights, and 
mathematical operations are metaphorically structured as 
physical events. Unfortunately though these conceptual 
schemata are different from those employed by the 
scientists, and even more unfortunately, these schemata do 
make sense. And this is the real challenge in the area of 
conceptual understanding: to identify the "wrong ideas that 
sound right" to the students, as well as possible factors 
that might account for their development, and then devise 
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ways to change them (Brown & Clement, 1989; Dykstra et al., 
1992; Gorsky & Finegold, 1992). 
Part 4: studies On Conceptual Understanding 
studies on how students understand science concepts can 
be divided into two major categories. In the first category 
belong studies that identify whatever ideas students have in 
their mind without any attempt to compare those ideas to the 
scientific ones; these studies are called ideographic. In 
the second category belong studies that deliberately compare 
students' ideas with the scientific ones; these studies are 
called nomothetic (Driver & Easley, 1978). 
Studies conducted by Piaget and his collaborators could 
be described as ideographic, although, as Driver and Easley 
{1978) point out, it is difficult to make a sharp 
distinction between the two. Phenomenographic studies 
(Bowden et al., 1992; Marton, 1986} that identify categories 
or patterns of student's thinking could be also called 
ideographic. The majority of the studies, however, 
particularly with high school and university students, 
should be considered nomothetic, since their primary goal is 
to identify alternative (other than scientific) conceptions, 
and then devise ways to change them. 
The Contribution of Jean Piaget 
The study of conceptual understanding has its origins 
in Piaget's work in Geneva in the 1930s, where he studied 
the concepts of time, space, speed, movement, and causality 
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{Piaget, 1971b, 1971c, 1971d). His work was promoted by a 
number of questions suggested by Einstein whom he had met at 
an international symposium on philosophy and psychology at 
Davos, Switzerland, as Piaget himself reports (Piaget, 
1970}. The most important findings of his study of the 
concept of time (Piaget, 1971d} are: {a) Children confuse 
the concept of time with speed and distance, (b) the concept 
of speed is more fundamental than the concept of time, and 
(c) time is the co-ordination of motions at different 
speeds. Particular attention, however, deserve his 
investigations of the intuitive concept of speed. Piaget 
{1971e, p. 136) grouped his tasks of two moving objects into 
three major categories: 
1. The starting and stopping points alone are visible; 
the paths are unequal in length, run parallel and in the 
same direction, and the objects start together and also stop 
together at the end. 
2. Both paths are altogether visible; the paths are 
unequal in length, and the starting and stopping points are 
the same. 
3. The objects are traveling side by side on two 
concentric tracks of unequal sizes, and visible throughout. 
The findings of Piaget's research were very interesting 
and can be summarized as follows: 
1. Movement is assigned a cause. 
2. All movement has a goal (finalism). 
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3. All movement implies an inherent power (dynamism). 
4. The speed of movement is judged by the points of 
arrival rather than by the time it takes and the distance. 
5. Overtaking is equated with "going faster." 
However, the most significant result of Piaget's study was 
the parallel which was identified between the children's 
intuitive ideas and the ideas of Aristotle's physics. The 
significance of Piaget's studies could be summarized in one 
short paragraph: 
All movement tends towards a goal and implies an 
inherent vital or creative power. Hence a number of 
analogies with Aristotle's physics, in particular the 
hypothetical need for two motive forces, one internal 
and the other external, to explain movement like that 
of clouds or river water. (Piaget, 1971e, p. ix) 
New International Interest in Conceptual Understanding 
In addition to Piaget's work in Geneva, other 
researchers came to recognize the value of what became known 
as clinical interview as a diagnostic device for evaluating 
students' understanding. In the early studies on conceptual 
understanding Piaget's work was replicated. In England King 
(1961) asked children of ages four to early adolescence to 
give their explanation of natural phenomena, ranging from 
the origin of night and the movement of the clouds to 
objects they were able to manipulate such as bicycles or 
different things that float or sink in water. The findings 
just confirmed what Piaget had found. That in passing from 
an initial state of egocentricism as very young children to 
objectivity as young adults, children's explanations pass 
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through a pre-causal phase: a phase were explanations are 
teleological and animistic. 
Results of similar studies indicated that animism and 
precausal forms of thinking can persist into adolescence 
(Laurendau & Pinard, 1962). Nussbaum and Novak (1976), in 
a pioneering study at Cornell University, questioned 7- to 
14-year-old students using drawings and models. They 
studied how the children's concept of the earth develops, 
and several conceptual frameworks were identified. 
Children's notions about the earth evolve from a flat-earth 
notion, through a notion of the earth as a hollow sphere 
with life existing on a platform at the bottom, to a 
spherical earth with gravity. The value of this study was 
not so much that it could establish norms of conceptual 
development in learning science, but that it raised the 
awareness of the possible alternative perspectives that 
students may bring to the classrooom with them and influence 
effective communication. The study also gave evidence to 
what Ausubel (1968) was claiming at the time: that 
preconceptions are the most important factor of the learning 
process, and they are likely to persist despite instruction. 
It was in the light of these studies that a new 
international interest in conceptual understanding was shown 
worldwide. The area of Newtonian mechanics received special 
attention. However, these new studies began to investigate, 
not only children's intuitive ideas, but also alternative 
conceptions of high school and university students. What 
follows are studies on preconceptions in the area of force 
and motion. 
Preconceptions and Conceptual Understanding in Mechanics 
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In an influential study on dynamics, Viennot (1979) was 
the first to raise the awareness that university students 
entertain the same ideas as young children, and also remark 
that these ideas can exist in the minds of students without 
any conflict with what they are actually taught. Her 
central claim was that the student's concept of force has 
two distinct versions or models, each called upon in 
different contexts. The first model she called "force of 
interaction" representing a force that satisfies the 
equation F = ma. The force of interaction is a function of 
position and is used in contexts in which a local analysis 
of the problem situation is required, usually problems 
involving static situations, or when the the force acts in 
the same direction as the motion. In this context students 
speak of "the force acting on the body." The other model 
she called "supply of force" and it is used whem motion is 
made obvious in the statement of the problem, and 
particularly when the motion is in the opposite direction to 
the resultant forces. In this particular context, students 
speak of "the force of the body" in order to account for the 
motion of the body. 
Viennot (1979) stressed the fact that major teaching 
effort is needed if we want to replace the students' 
preconceptions. She remarked that "teaching of the 
Newtonian scheme will only be effective when students are 
led to look at the discrepancies between it and their 
spontaneous ideas" (p. 213). 
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However, Viennot's study was very significant because 
she found that the preconceptions held by high school and 
university students are "closer to the impetus theory than 
to Aristotle.'' Piaget (1971d), in studying young 
children's ideas about the motion of clouds and river water, 
had found that children adopt the Aristotelian schema, thus 
employing one inherent and one external force. This shift 
in the paradigms generated an interest in mechanics on both 
sides of the Atlantic, and studies undertaken by Watts and 
Zylbersztajn (1981), Clement (1982), Mccloskey (1983), 
Halloun and Hestenes (1985b), and Lie (1985) provided 
evidence for an impetus theory of motion in the thinking of 
many students. 
Clement (1982) argued that the students' intuitive 
ideas represent an integrated and coherent theory which has 
parallels with the pre-Galilean impetus theory of motion. 
He suggested that it is the coherence of this impetus theory 
which contributes to its stability. Central to the impetus 
theory that was first propounded by the Greek scholar Yannis 
Philoponous in the 6th century, and was fully developed by 
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the French philosopher Jean Buridan in the 14th century, is 
the notion that a moving object must have an inherent motive 
power or force. This internal power or force is dissipated 
as the object moves, and when it is all used up the object 
will either come to a stop, or start moving downwards due to 
gravity (Butterfield, 1957; Cohen, 1985; Crombie, 1963). 
This theory was a correction to the Aristotelian paradigm 
because it could better explain the motion of a projectile. 
Aristotle had been obliged to accept that the air must be 
continually pushing the arrow after the latter leaves the 
bow. The impetus theory circumvented this difficulty by 
assuming something inherent in the body (Butterfield, 1957). 
However, it shared with Aristotle's theory the idea that 
every motion must have a cause, and, therefore, the idea 
that motion in the absence of forces is impossible. The 
impetus theory differs substantially from the Newtonian 
paradigm in the sense that it makes a distinction between 
motion and rest; moving objects have impetus while objects 
at rest do not. 
In Newtonian mechanics moving bodies have momentum, 
which, however, is not inherent in the bodies themselves. 
Furthermore, this momentum is not the cause of motion or an 
agent that sustains it, but simply "a quantity employed to 
describe motion" (Mccloskey, 1983, p. 125), and it can in 
fact be in a direction opposite to, or generally different 
from, that of the force. For example in the case of a ball 
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moving straight up in the air the acting force, that is the 
weight, is downward, while the momentum is in the upward 
direction. In addition, the impetus of a body is viewed in 
an absolute sense, in sharp contrast to the momentum, which, 
like velocity, is always defined relative to frame of 
reference. 
Also, according to the impetus theory there is no 
fundamental distinction between linear and circular motion; 
both forms of motion require a certain amount of impetus. 
In Newtonian mechanics though, it is only circular motion 
that always requires the action of force. Motion in 
straight line though can exist even in the absence of forces 
if the speed is constant (Mccloskey, 1983). It is probably 
this conceptual difficulty, namely, the association of 
uniform motion with zero force that makes students develop 
the conceptual schema "Motion implies a Force," and be, 
according to (Cohen, 1985), in the same position as the 
scientists of the past. However, not all students use the 
impetus theory in their thinking. Halloun and Hestenes 
(1985b) found that 18% of a sample of 478 university physics 
students were predominantly Aristotelian. In addition, they 
noticed that the conceptual systems employed by the students 
"have much less internal coherence than the Aristotelian and 
Impetus systems" and could be described "as bundles of 
loosely related and sometimes inconsistent concepts" (p. 
1,058}. In regard to Newton's first and second laws, for 
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example, although 84% of the sample held the Newtonian 
conception that a free particle moves in straight line, only 
30% believed that the speed of such a particle remains 
constant, and only 15% thought that under a constant force a 
particle has a constant acceleration. 
In the 1980s several studies on how students understand 
concepts of force and motion were undertaken, and several 
preconceptions were identified. Although these 
preconceptions are misinterpretations of Newton's Laws of 
Motion, and, therefore, they are interrelated, a detailed 
breakdown by reference to the particular investigators would 
better show the patterns that students employ in their 
reasoning. 
The direction of the resultant force is the same as the 
direction of motion. This preconception is probably a 
subsumption of the more general schema namely "Motion 
implies a Force," and is reminiscent of the Aristotelian 
belief of an inherent internal force as well of the pre-
Galilean impetus theory (Mccloskey, 1983). Several studies 
undertaken with secondary school as well as with university 
students have shown that the idea of a force acting in the 
direction of motion is very common. 
In a survey carried out by Watts and Zylbersztajn 
(1981), junior-high school students were given a 
questionnaire with coded answers associated with the forces 
acting on a cannon ball at different points of the 
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trajectory. As watts and Zylbersztajn report, 85% of the 
students identified a force in the direction of the ball's 
motion (Figure 2). 
It is quite interesting to note that the researchers 
conducted interviews with the physics teachers, in which the 
latter were asked to predict the percentage of students who 
would respond correctly to the questionnaire tasks. The 
predictions, however, were not good enough, since the 
percentage of the correct answers was considerably lower 
than what the teachers had expected. For this reason, the 
researchers recommended that any teaching strategy, in order 
to be effective, should include: 
1. Awareness on the part of the teacher of the 
existence of children's prior conceptions. 
2. Knowledge of some of the forms that these 
conceptual fram~works can take. 
3. Utilization of these conceptual frameworks as the 
starting point of the teaching-learning process. 
Boeha (1990) replicated the study with 12th-grade high 
school students in Nigeria. He used semi-structured 
interviews that probed the understanding of the concept of 
force in the context of a moving softball after it was hit. 
Boeha (1990) reports identical results with those of Watts 
and Zylbersztajn (1981), since the majority of students 
thought that when the softball is hit a force is imparted 
that accompanies it during its flight, and which gets used 
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up. However, Boeha (1990) calls that kind of thinking 
Aristotelian, although it resembles more to the impetus 
theory as has been noted by McCloskey (1983) and Viennot 
(1979). 
Clement (1982) reports how university students in their 
laboratory write-ups about the motion of a simple pendulum 
identified a force in the direction of the motion of the 
bob, suggesting that if there were no such a force the 
pendulum could never move up to the top of its swing (Figure 
3). Most students who participated in the study, as Clement 
(1982} reports, identified a force in the direction of 
motion regardless of whether or not the pendulum was 
swinging up or down. 
Similar results with the motion of the pendulum were 
obtained by·sjoberg and Lie (1981) as reported by McDermott 
(1984). Sjoberg and Lie (1981) conducted a study with 
Norwegian high school and first year university students. 
They were among the first to stress the importance of 
preconceptions for the teaching process. 
In another study, as reported by Roper (1985), 31% of a 
sample of university science and engineering students at the 
University of Leeds, England, opted for a force in the 
direction of motion of a ball thrown vertically upwards. 
When asked, in a paper-and-pencil test, to insert the 
force(s) on the ball, students identified an upward force 
when the ball was going up, a downward force when it was 
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Figure 3. Forces Acting on Swinging Pendulum. 
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coming down, and no force when the ball had reached the 
maximum height on its trajectory. Clement (1982) also 
illustrates the same point, since 72% of a sample of 150 
university engineering students at the end of their 
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physics course, predicted an upward force from the hand that 
must be greater than the downward force of gravity in the 
case of a tossed coin. The students explained their answer 
by suggesting that the upward force must be greater, 
otherwise the coin would be moving down. It is apparent 
students associated the resultant of the two forces with the 
motion of the coin. 
Clement (1982) also reports on a task that asked 
students to predict the path of a spaceship, before, during, 
and after the firing of its engine. The results reveal that 
the initial sideways motion of the spaceship in a straight 
line implied a force, which was combined with the force 
produced by the engine to give a resultant straight line 
motion in the direction of the resultant force. As soon as 
the engine is off, the original straight line motion is 
followed once again (Figure 4). It is quite interesting to 
note that only 9% of a sample of 150 first year engineering 
students correctly combined the accelerated motion due to 
the firing of the engine with the initial straight line 
motion to produce a parabolic motion, and then a straight 
line motion at constant velocity according to Newton's first 
law. 
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If there is no force there will be no motion. This is 
exactly the opposite of the above preconception. Mccloskey 
(1983) carried out a study that probed college students' 
"knowledge-in-action". He asked them to release a ball from 
their hand as they were moving across the floor in order to 
hit a target. As he reports, only 45% of the students knew 
that the ball would travel forward as it fell, while 49% 
thought that the ball would fall straight down. These 
students released the ball when they were directly over the 
target, thus suggesting that they were either neglecting the 
horizontal component of the velocity of the ball, or 
assuming that this component was zero as soon as it leaves 
their hand (Figure 5). The rest 6% thought that the ball 
would move backwards. These students released the ball 
after they reached the target. 
Motion takes place in the direction of the applied 
force. In another study, Di Sessa (1982) presented 
elementary school students with an object on a screen. The 
object obeyed Newton's laws of motion (it remained at rest 
or moved in a straight line if no force acted on it), and 
could be given a force in the form of a kick. Most students 
ignored the initial velocity of the object, when they were 
asked to hit the target; they applied the force in the 
direction of the target. 
Motion in the direction of the applied force can be 
also seen in the case of a spaceship traveling in outer 
B 
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Figure 4. Path of Spaceship Coasting in Space After 
its Engine is Fired from B to c. 
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Figure 5. Hitting Target on Floor with Ball Dropped by 
Running Person. 
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space and propelled by impulse rockets. White (1983) gave 
series of pencil and paper tasks in an interview mode to a 
sample of 40 sixteen year old secondary school students. As 
she reports, when the students were asked to find how they 
could get the spaceship to fly in a circular and then a 
square path, they opted for a force in the direction of 
motion, 70% in the case of the circular path, and 22.5% in 
the case of the square path (Figure 6). Equally interesting 
was the fact that 80% of the sample correctly applied 
the first law of motion and predicted constant eternal 
motion if the impulse engine of the spaceship were fired 
once. White noted that students were not consistent in 
their responses, thus contradicting the argument about an 
integrated and coherent theory of motion, as reported by 
Clement (1982). 
Force varies with velocity. This is a very widespread 
preconception since everyday experience suggests that the 
greater the force the greater the speed. Thus one must 
apply greater force if one's bicycle is to move with greater 
speed, and the harder one pushes an object the higher its 
speed. Viennot (1979), in a study with French, Belgian, and 
British last year secondary school and university students, 
confirmed just that. 
Viennot presented the students with a number of paper 
and pencil questions including a question about six 
juggler's ball, all at the same height above the ground, but 
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at different points on their trajectories, and a question 
about a system of three identical masses oscillating on the 
ends of vertical strings (Figures 7 and 8). The students 
were asked to predict whether the forces on all the balls 
and the springs were identical. The results indicated that, 
even at the university level more than half of the students 
tend to associate force with velocity, assuming that, since 
the velocities are different, the forces must be different 
too. 
In the problem with the springs, although it was 
explicitly stated in the test that the force (tension) in a 
spring is proportional to the elognation, students 
encountered tremendous conceptual difficulty in reasoning 
that a mass with non-zero velocity passing through its 
equilibrium position is not acted upon by a force. 
Roper's study (1985) also indicated a similar 
preconception since students thought that at the highest 
point of the vertical trajectory of a ball the force must be 
zero. Although in this particular problem the preconception 
"force-acts-in-the-direction-of-motion" can give a plausible 
explanation, as with Clement's (1982) tossed coin problem, 
the idea that the ball will finally reach a point at which 
its velocity will become zero makes one suspect that the 
Aristotelian theory that views force as being proportional 
to velocity is also employed in students' thinking (Figure 
9) • 
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Figure 6. Forces on Spaceship Traveling in Circular and 
Square Path. 
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Figure 7. Forces on Balls in Different Trajectories. 
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Figure 9. Forces on Ball Moving Straight Up and Down in 
Air in three Different Positions. 
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Additional evidence for this preconception is provided 
by Halloun and Hestenes {1985a, 1985b). In an attempt to 
survey naive concepts about motion in a group of 478 
university physics students, they administered a diagnostic 
pre-test and a post-test at the beginning and end of the 
semester respectively. They found that many students 
believed {66% on the pre-test and 44% on the post-test) that 
under a constant force a body moves with constant velocity, 
although only 2% maintained this belief consistently. 
Continuous force is required to maintain motion. This 
preconception is another manifestion of the more general 
scheme "Motion implies a Force", and derives from personal 
experience with pushing and pulling objects. According to 
McDermott {1984), when university physics students were 
asked to make a puck on an air table move in a straight line 
with a constant speed by using blasts from an air blower, 
their first attempt was to apply continuous blasts. This 
clearly shows how the students' experience of a body that 
stops moving once they stop pushing or pulling it influences 
their reasoning process. A similar preconception among 
university students has been also found by Jira, Mccloskey, 
and Green (1981). Halloun and Hestenes {1985a) also report 
that 47% of the students on the pre-test and 20% of them on 
the post-test expressed the idea that under no net force a 
body must slow down. 
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Once a body leaves its frame of reference its motion 
becomes absolute. This preconception is not surprising if 
one takes into account the fact that in daily life there is 
always an absolute frame of reference (i.e., the ground), 
and that we all share the common sense Aristotelian belief 
that rest is different from motion. This is what a study by 
Lie (1985) reports. The idea of "meeting the movement" was 
very common in two cases. In the first one, students 
predicted that a broad jump inside a train and in the 
direction of the train's motion would be longer than a jump 
in the opposite direction (Figure 10). And in the second 
case, their prediction was identical: two airplanes that 
take off from the same place on the equator and fly in 
opposite directions will complete their trip around the 
earth in different time intervals. The plane traveling due 
west will arrive first because it is moving towards the 
place from which it took off. 
Use of absolute frames of reference. It is evident 
that, in the examples that were discussed above, absolute 
frames of reference were used. In the case of the train, 
motion becomes relative in relation to the ground, and in 
the case of the earth, motion becomes absolute in relation 
to space. This preference for absolute frames of reference 
has been documented by Aguirre and Erickson (1983) and 
Aguirre (1988) who studied high school students' conceptions 
of the vector characteristics of velocity and displacement. 
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The tasks that they used were simulated situations in which 
the subjects were standing on a bridge watching a river boat 
crossing the river, and on the shores of a lake trying to 
locate fishing spots. From the clinical interviews it 
became evident that the students always tried to locate a 
fixed position on the ground. However, several fixed 
positions were selected at the same time, thus suggesting 
that they (students) had difficulty in selecting a standard 
frame of reference. In addition, it was found that the 
speed and the path of an object were absolute in the the 
sense that they were viewed as intrinsic properties of the 
objects themselves and independent of any frame of 
reference. These "intrinsic speed" and "intrinsic path" 
properties of moving objects reconfirm the findings of 
Saltiel and Malgrange (1980). 
Stationary objects cannot exert forces. Driver (1973) 
spent several months observing junior-high school students 
in the laboratory as they were conducting experiments. The 
idea that a table or a chair cannot exert an upward force 
when there was no motion was very common. Minstrel! (1982) 
also reports that 50% of his high school students did not 
believe that an upward force can be exerted on a book by a 
table. As Minstrel! (1982) reports, 50% of his students did 
believe that the only force acting the book is its own 
weight (Figure 11). Identical findings have also been 
reported more recently by Brown and Clements (1987). 
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Figure 10. Jumping Inside Moving Train. 
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Figure 11. Forces on a Book Resting on a Table. 
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Terry, Jones and Hurford (1985) studied the conceptual 
understanding of forces and equilibrium with children who 
were at the mid-point of years three, four, and five in 
their study of physics. Each pupil was presented with a 
drawing of a box resting on a table and was then asked to 
explain what kept the box at rest. The researchers report 
that 95% of the pupils in the year three group asserted that 
it was not necessary for the table to exert a force on the 
box. When this response was discussed further, it was found 
that pupils had considerable difficulty in accepting that 
inanimate objects like a table can exert a force. However, 
only 25% and 54% of the other two groups could correctly 
explain the equilibrium of the box. 
Motion is different from rest. Whitaker (1983) 
replicated one of Galileo's famous thought experiments. In 
this particular thought experiment, Salviati, the voice of 
Galileo, is trying to change the belief of Simplicio, an 
Aristotelian advocate, that a bolt dropped from the top of 
the mast of a moving ship will not land at a point that is 
behind, but instead, at the foot of the mast as if the ship 
were at rest. 
As Whitaker reports, many university physics students 
believed that a bolt hanging loose from the ceiling of a 
uniformly moving train will not pass through a hole that is 
on the floor and directly under the bolt. For the students, 
motion and rest were fundamentally inequivalent (Figure 12). 
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Velocity is the same as position. Trowbridge and 
McDermott (1980), in a replication of Piaget's tasks, found 
that university students confused velocity with position. 
In observing the motion of two balls moving on different but 
parallel tracks (one ball with constant velocity on a 
horizontal track, and the other with an initial velocity 
greater than the first's ball velocity), they tried to 
identify the instant of passing in order to judge whether 
the velocities were equal. They thought that the velocities 
are the same when the positions are the same. And they also 
associated the idea of being ahead with having greater 
speed. As the researchers report, the students employed 
perception in their thinking, without any attempt to think 
of velocity as rate of change of displacement. The same 
results were obtained in a follow-up study with 
acceleration. Again students confused position and 
acceleration (Trowbridge & McDermott, 1981). 
Curvilinear motion in the absence of forces. As Lie 
(1985), McCloskey, caramazza and Green (1980), and Mccloskey 
(1983) report, impetus ideas that make students believe that 
moving objects "remember" their previous motion are 
widespread among secondary school and university students. 
For example, a stone tied to the end of a rope and circling 
around will not follow a straight line path in the direction 
of the tangent once the rope breaks, but a curvilinear path 
or a path along the same circle as before (Figure 13). What 
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is very interesting, however, is that in the task of an 
object moving inside a tube (Figure 14), the longer the 
object is in the curved tube the more curved its motion will 
be after it leaves the tube (Mccloskey, 1980). In addition, 
there were differences in the percentage of students who 
predicted a straight line path. These differences can be 
attributed either to the time spent inside the curved tube 
or to the degree of curvature. Lie (1985) reports similar 
findings, but not as frequent, with the case of a ball that 
leaves a spiral track. Students with "impetus" beliefs" 
thought that the path will continue to be spiral. 
Preconceptions about Action-Reaction. The 
preconceptions about Action and Reaction are held both in 
static and dynamic situations. Roper (1985) and Watts and 
Zylberstajn (1981) investigated static situations, while 
Maloney (1984) and Brown (1989) focused on dynamic 
ones. 
Roper (1985) reports how university students confuse 
the normal reaction from a surface with the reaction to the 
weight. Students tend to see the weight as Action, and the 
normal reaction from the table as the Reaction (Figure 15). 
Watts and Zylberztajn (1981) also report that junior-high 
school students failed to identify action-reaction correctly 
in the tug-of-war game. They thought that the winning team 
must exert a greater force on the rope (Figure 16). It is 
rather apparent that the movement of the losing team involved 
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Figure 13. Path Followed by Object Whirled at the End of 
String at the Instant the String Breaks. 
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Figure 14. Path Followed by Object After it Leaves curved 
Tube. 
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Figure 15. Action-Reaction on the Book-Table System. 
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the "Motion-implies-a-force" preconception, which in turn 
made students think that there has to be un unbalanced force 
in the direction of motion. 
The above preconception about Action and Reaction has 
been also pointed out by Viennot {1979), who studied 
Newton's third law in problem situations involving springs. 
Students thought that in equilibrium positions Action and 
Reaction are equal, but when there is motion the Action 
exceeds the Reaction. 
Maloney (1984) studied high school students' ideas 
about Action and Reaction in the context of two boxes that 
are in in contact {Figure 17). He identified several rules 
that students employ in their thinking when solving problems 
in this particular context. These are: 
1. Mass is the only determiner for all states of 
motion. That is, the object with the greater mass exerts 
greater force. 
2. At rest the forces are equal, but for moving 
systems the object with the greater mass exerts greater 
force. 
3. At rest the forces are equal, but for moving 
systems the "cause" exerts greater force. 
4. For rest and constant velocity the forces are 
equal, but for accelerating systems the greater mass exerts 
greater force. 
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Figure 16. Action-Reaction in Tug-of-War Game. 
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Figure 17. Problem Situation for the Identification of 
Preconceptions about Action-Reaction on Two Boxes. 
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5. For rest and constant velocity the forces are 
equal, but for accelerating systems the "cause" exerts a 
greater force. 
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As it can be seen, two general rules-preconceptions that 
seem to be applied in situations in which there is an 
interaction between two bodies are the following: a} The 
greater mass exerts the greater force, and b} the body that 
causes the motion of the other exerts the greater force, 
because it overcomes the other's opposition. 
In a more recent study with pre-physics high school 
students Brown (1989}, found similar preconceptions about 
Newton's third law. He reports that 99% of the students 
(sample size of 78} thought that a moving ball exerts a 
greater force on the pin than the pin does on the ball 
(Figure 18}. And 60% believed that in the case of two boxes 
which are in contact with each other, the bigger box exerts 
(or rather "has"} a greater force. 
The responses to the rest of the tasks in the 
questionnaire indicate that the rules identified by Maloney 
(1984} are applied with some consistency. In addition, 
Brown (1989} stressed the fact that forces are viewed as 
properties of single bodies rather than as relations or 
interactions between two bodies. 
Preconceptions about the path of projectiles. 
Mccloskey (1983} found that only 28% of college students 
predicted a parabolic path for a projectile that is launched 
119 
horizontally. The rest of the sample thought very 
differently, since 5% predicted that the projectile will 
move straight out and then straight down, and 35% believed 
that it first moves straight out but then curves downwards 
(Figure 19). 
However, it is not clear from McCloskey's (1983) 
findings that even those students who correctly predicted a 
parabolic path actually understood that it involved a 
combination of a horizontal motion with constant velocity 
and an accelerating vertical motion. Halloun and Hestenes 
(1985b) found in their study that many students had the 
notion of parabolic motion, as this became evident from the 
responses to the multiple-choice diagnostic questionnaire. 
But when they conducted interviews with a small sample of 22 
students to probe further the extent of students' 
understanding, they found that very few of them were able to 
recognize a parabola as a motion resulting from the 
composition of two different motions. 
Most of the students maintained impetus ideas about 
projectile motion, and some of them believed that a 
projectile's motion is not only determined by its initial 
velocity, but also by how this velocity is imparted. It 
makes, for example, a difference whether the projectile is 
an object thrown by hand, or an object projected off a 
table, or a bomb dropped from an airplane. 
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Figure 18. Action-Reaction when Ball Hits Pin. 
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Figure 19. Path of a Horizontal Projectile. 
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In a more recent and more structured study, Aguirre and 
Rankin (1989) report on the conceptual understanding of the 
independence of vector components in kinematics. They 
presented their first-year college students who had 
completed a course in mechanics with an experimental 
situation consisting of a frictionless inclined plane (air-
table). On it there was a projectile that was provided with 
a constant linear velocity across the incline by means of a 
spring-loaded plunger. This was the x-component of the 
velocity. They-component was due to the the component of 
the force of gravity that acted because of the incline. 
It was found that, only 52% (sample of 73 students) had 
grasped the formal vectorial treatment of composition of 
orthogonal component velocities. One third of the students 
{33%) predicted a combination of two velocities but 
resulting in a straight line. And 15% predicted a two-step 
path consisting of two straight lines, thus suggesting that 
the "velocity imparted to the projectile by the spring has 
to be dissipated before the velocity due to gravity takes 
over." In addition, 40% of the students entertained the 
preconception that the resultant motion would require more 
time than either of the separate orthogonal components, and 
7% thought that the time for the resultant motion would be 
less than either of the components. 
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Force is the same as energy. One of the models of 
force identified by Viennot (1979) is what she called 
"supply of force." This model is used when a body is in 
motion, and students refer to it by saying "the force of the 
body." This idea is compatible with the pre-Galilean 
impetus theory of motion, and allows one to suggest that 
students might think of a force as something close to 
kinetic energy. However, Viennot has some reservations, for 
she says that it is not very clear whether students actually 
think of energy when they use the concept of force. 
In a recent study, Boeha (1990) provides some evidence 
that some students do confuse force and energy, as they are 
employing both concepts at the same time. For example, in 
the context of a softball traveling in the air, some 
students thought that the ball has a force and this force 
increases as the height increases. As Boeha (1990) reports, 
there was a link between potential energy and force. 
Osborne and Gilbert (1980) have also noted that young 
children hold an anthropocentric conception of force, which, 
in many cases is related to the concept of energy. As they 
noted, "the everyday use of the word force as it relates to 
human action tends to reinforce anthropocentric views" (p. 
377), since many students could not identify a force on a 
bike when the biker is not pedalling. 
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The centripetal force is an additional force and not 
the resultant of all other forces. Savage and Williams 
{1989) studied the conceptual understanding of force in the 
context of circular motion. Their sample was first year 
science and engineering students who were to begin a course 
in Newtonian mechanics. They used a questionnaire in which 
the problem of the conical pendulum asked for the 
identification of all forces acting on the mass {Figure 
20). The majority of students inserted a force in addition 
to the weight and the tension of the string. 
Viennot {1979) also noticed that in the problem of a 
stone turning at the end of a string, students identified 
the tension of the string on the stone, which, however, 
balances the centrifugal {outward) force. 
Limitations of Previous Research 
Although previous research identified preconceptions 
about force and motion, the main focus was upon Newton's 
third law, as well as upon the "Motion Implies a Force" 
schema, as identified from the study of the trajectory of 
objects. No extensive study has been conducted on how 
students think about the motion of objects in moving frames 
of reference, and the factors-strategies that they consider 
when approaching problem tasks in this context. In 
addition, the conceptual link between zero resultant force 
and uniform motion has not been studied across a variety of 
contexts. These two inadequacies have not allowed 
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researchers to assess the complete picture of physics 
students' Newtonian schema of motion. This study attempts, 
through Phenomenography and Rule Assessment Methodology, to 
explore the variety of concepts, relevant or irrelevant, 
that might exist in the students' schemata, and therefore 
provide a more coherent picture of how students understand. 
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Figure 20. Forces on Conical Pendulum. 
CHAPTER III 
ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
Participants 
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A group of 20 students consisting of 15 males and 5 
females who were enrolled in a non-calculus physics course 
with elements of Newtonian mechanics at the University of 
Northern Iowa were selected for the study. The participants 
were all volunteers who received 10 course grade points for 
their participation. Only 5 students had previously taken a 
physics course while in high school. For the rest of the 
group, the introductory physics course at the University of 
Northern Iowa provided the first exposure to the Newtonian 
concepts of force, motion, and frame of reference. 
Methods and Procedures 
Paper and pencil tasks in an interview mode were 
employed throughout the study. The advantage of using this 
kind of protocol instead of an unstructured clinical 
interview was that, while the latter has been used "to probe 
a student's cognitive structure in a narrowly circumscribed 
area of science" (Stewart, 1980), the former would be more 
appropriate for assessing understanding in multiple contexts 
which had to be designed in advance and checked for content 
validity. 
Each student was interviewed for approximately one 
hour. All 20 interviews were audio-tape recorded so that 
validity checks could be made on certain responses after 
126 
transcription. The place as well as the days on which the 
interviews took place, were selected by the students 
themselves. This approach to scheduling was employed to 
help them feel more comfortable without undue constraints of 
time. 
Before each interview started I explained that the 
purpose of the study was to identify whatever ideas and 
beliefs the students employ in their understanding, and not 
right or wrong answers to the various problem tasks. I 
thought that this would encourage students to give whatever 
ideas they might have had without the fear of being wrong, 
something that could bias, and at the same time limit, the 
reliability of the instrument. 
During the interview I also tried to be as unobtrusive 
as possible by asking questions such as "how do you think 
about that?" why is this so?" "can you explain this 
further?" and so forth without showing any signs that the 
response to a given problem task might have been non-
acceptable. Even the "why" type of questions were avoided 
in order for students not to feel that they were being 
questioned about a wrong response. Only when it was thought 
necessary a "why" type of question was asked. However, that 
question was not a mere inquiring "why," but rather in the 
form "why is this so?" and in a tone of voice that suggested 
encouragement and reassurance. Before the presentation of 
the problem tasks, however, a short clinical interview 
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helped me with assessing whether students had any prior 
knowledge, both declarative and procedural, related to the 
concept of motion, as well as specific contexts in which 
that knowledge is used (Appendix C). During the clinical 
interview, the students were asked to support their 
knowledge with as many examples as they could give. This 
gave me the opportunity to speculate, and probably make 
inferences, about why students had conceptual problems in 
the problem tasks that were used during the course of the 
interview. 
Although concept mapping is a way to probe a student's 
cognitive structure, and specifically its organization 
(Heinze-Fry & Novak, 1990; Novak & Gowin, 1984; Stewart, 
1980), concept mapping was not considered as an assessment 
instrument due to the fact that students would need time to 
become familiar with it and practice. In addition, concept 
mapping could only assess declarative knowledge through the 
identification of links among the various concepts, without 
any reference to procedural knowledge. 
After the identification of prior knowledge, the 
students were presented with several tasks out of a wide 
variety of contexts. The sequence of the presentation of 
the problem tasks during the interview was entirely fixed 
but the follow-up questions varied according to each 
interviewee's mode of reasoning. In order to facilitate 
students' demonstration of the extent of the coherence of 
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their conceptual framework, the tasks were grouped into 
three major categories. These categories are discussed in 
detail in the section on instrumentation. 
Before the presentation of the problem tasks of each 
category, I explained the general problem situation. I 
assumed that this explanation would provide a framework, or 
organizer, which could help subsume the specific problem 
tasks, and also help students relate whatever factors they 
might have had in their schema to the general problem 
situation. In addition, this technique would also minimize 
the effect of random responses, probably influenced by an 
isolated problem situation, a certain linguistic, or a 
visual representation. The problem tasks were presented 
orally, while simultaneously the students were shown 
drawings representing the tasks in question. 
During the interviews and while solving problem tasks, 
the students were requested to think aloud and explain their 
predictions. Special attention was given to the students' 
explanations and general reasoning process, so that possible 
ambiguities were eliminated. For this reason, the students 
were requested to compare and contrast specific problem 
tasks, in order to identify similarities and differences, if 
any, that might have led them (students) to respond the way 
they had. This, of course, might also have resulted in 
conceptual change, since the disequilibration that 
accompanied apparent contradictions might have very well led 
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students to reconsider previous ideas, and influence their 
responses to the rest of the tasks as well. This, however, 
is a limitation of any study involving an interaction 
between a student and a researcher. But since the purpose 
of the study was to identify the preconceptions that the 
students had, only the initial conception, after it was 
clarified, was used for the analysis. 
Special attention was also given to the identification 
of the frame of reference relative to which the motion of 
the body in question takes place, as well as to the 
identification of the forces acting on that body. The above 
clarifications helped me with providing a more valid 
interpretation of preconceptions, and hence, a more valid 
inference about the students' schematic structure. 
The model shown in Figure 21 was used to guide the 
analysis and interpretation of the data. similar responses 
to a particular problem task were grouped in different 
categories, and then for each category patterns of reasoning 
strategies were identified. For the same response was 
arrived at through a different strategy (see section on 
strategies in Chapter V). These strategies were then 
compared with the accepted Newtonian conception in order for 
the preconception(s) to be identified. After the 
identification of both strategies and preconceptions, an 
attempt to give an interpretation of the representation of 
the students' schema was made. 
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Figure 21. A Research Model for the Assessment of the 
Schematic Structure. 
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As can be seen in Figure 21 the student's schema leads 
to a certain response through a preconception and reasoning 
strategy. For the interpretation of the responses the 
researcher moves in the opposite direction. Although it 
appears that the relationship between preconceptions and 
schematic structure is a dialectical one, in the sense that 
they both evolve and develop through a two-way interaction--
a preconception contributes to the development of the 
schema, while the latter reinforces, or modifies that 
preconception, or helps develop a new one--the linear model 
that was proposed facilitated the analysis and 
interpretation of the data. 
Instrumentation 
Starting from the premises that human cognition 
proceeds from the general to the more specific, rather than 
in the reverse direction {Ausubel et al., 1978; Gardner, 
1987), and that understanding involves the restructuring of 
ideas and experiences one already has rather than the taking 
in of new ideas and experiences (Driver & Bell, 1986), it is 
imperative that an assessment of understanding start from a 
familiar problem situation in which students are asked to 
identify the concept or principle involved. For this reason 
the tasks of the interview did not address specific laws, 
for example, "what would happen, or how would you explain or 
predict this according to the First Law of Motion?" 
Instead, the tasks were designed in such a way as to 
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identify reasoning patterns out of a wide variety of 
everyday contexts. All contexts were carefully designed so 
that they could facilitate access to students' relevant 
schemata, and at the same time help me with identifying the 
strategies and preconceptions derived from those conceptual 
schemata. 
In designing problem tasks I took into account the 
Phenomenographic Approach to investigating different 
understandings of reality (Bowden et al., 1992; Marton, 
1986), and the Rule Assessment Methodology (Siegler, 1978), 
as has been used by Maloney (1984, 1985). The 
Phenomenographic Approach is based on the notion that people 
perceive, conceptualize, and understand each phenomenon in 
the world in a limited number of qualitatively different 
ways. Therefore, understanding is contextual, and a given 
concept could be understood differently by different 
students. The different types of understandings are 
categorized without reference to the scientific conception. 
However, unlike Phenomenography, I further attempted, as has 
already been pointed out in the Methods section, to identify 
preconceptions for those categories--which I call reasoning 
strategies. 
The Rule Assessment Methodology is based on empirical 
research conducted by Siegler (1978), who, in replicating 
Piaget's balance beam problem, found that children employ 
with consistency a number of rules or strategies. Maloney 
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{1984, 1985) in two follow up studies applied Siegler's 
findings in order to identify the strategies, or rules, 
students use in solving problem tasks involving Newton's 
third law and conservation of mechanical energy. Maloney, 
in order to identify those strategies, generated a complete 
list of possible factors that a student might think of while 
approaching a particular problem task. The problem task 
used by Maloney {1984) for the identification of strategies 
in regard to Newton's third law can be seen in the section 
of the literature review in the fourth part of 
preconceptions about Action and Reaction. 
Although it appears that Phenomenography and Rule 
Assessment Methodology share such notions as "categories of 
understanding," "rules," or "strategies," the latter could 
be seen as an extension of the former. The reason for this 
is that Rule Assessment Methodology enables the researcher 
to identify in advance the categories that might exist in a 
student's schema. These categories could be seen as the 
research hypothesis, which will be either confirmed or 
rejected. 
For the present study, I grouped the tasks into three 
categories. The first category assessed the understanding 
of the notion that uniform straight line motion is relative, 
as well as the idea that uniform straight line motion and 
rest are fundamentally equivalent. It also assessed the 
notion that motion in general is defined relative to an 
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inertial frame of reference. The second category assessed 
whether students view the earth as a frame of reference, 
and, therefore, whether its state motion is seen as 
different from its state of rest. Finally, the third 
category evaluated the conceptual link between zero force 
and uniform motion. 
The content validity of the problem tasks was 
established in two different ways (Halloun & Hestenes, 
1985a). First, the tasks were examined by a number of 
physics and mechanics experts, such as Dr. Mike Savage and 
his team from the Mechanics in Action Project, University of 
Leeds, England, and Dr. Roy Unruh from the University of 
Northern Iowa. Second, the same tasks were administered in 
the form of a test to ten physics graduates from the 
University of Leeds, and the consistency in their 
explanation using the accepted conceptions was noticed. 
The categories, the questions and the lists of possible 
factors-strategies that guided the construction of tasks in 
each one of them were as follows: 
CATEGORY 1: Motion of Bodies in Frames of Reference 
General problem task questions. 
1. Will two bodies that start moving with the same 
speed from either "end" of an inertial frame of reference in 
opposite directions (towards each other), and parallel to 
the direction of motion of the frame of reference, reach the 
opposite "end" simultaneously? 
2. Will a body projected vertically upwards from an 
inertial frame of reference return to the same point? 
List of factors-strategies and specific contexts. 
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1. The motion of a body depends upon the "openness" or 
the "closedness" of the frame of reference, as in the case 
of the motion of a ball moving on the roof of a train 
{Figures 22a & e), the case of the motion of a ball thrown 
straight up by a running person {Fig. 22f), and the case of 
the motion of a ball inside the car compartment of a train 
{Figures 22b & d). Probable strategy: Motion relative to 
the train when motion takes place inside the train, and 
relative to the ground when motion takes place outside the 
compartment of the train, or the human body. 
2. The motion of a body depends upon the direction of 
its motion, that is, parallel or perpendicular to the 
direction of the motion of the frame of reference as in the 
case of the motion of a ball in the direction of the train's 
motion (Figures 22a & b), and in the vertical direction 
{Figures 22d & e). Probable strategies: Motion relative to 
the ground for motion parallel to the direction of motion of 
the frame of reference, and motion relative to the frame of 
reference for motion perpendicular to its (frame of 
reference) direction of motion. 
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Figure 22. Problem Tasks for Assessing Understanding of 
Motion of Object in Frame of Reference. (Explained in Text) 
137 
3. The motion of a body depends upon whether it is in 
contact with the frame of reference, as in the 
case of a ball rolling on the floor of a train (Figure 22c). 
Probable strategies: Motion either relative to the ground 
or relative to the frame of reference. 
CATEGORY 2: Motion of Bodies on the Inertial Frame of 
Reference of the Earth 
General problem task questions. 
1. Will a body projected vertically upwards from the 
earth, modeled both as "flat motionless surface" and as 
"flat surface moving with constant velocity," return to the 
same point? 
2. Where will a body dropped from a point high above 
the ground, modeled as "flat surface moving with constant 
velocity," land? 
3. Will two bodies moving with equal speeds around the 
earth along the equator, but in opposite directions, arrive 
at the starting place simultaneously? 
List of factors-strategies and specific contexts. 
1. The motion of a body projected straight up in the 
air is viewed as motion from "flat motionless ground" as in 
the case of the motion of a stone (Figure 23a), the motion 
of a cannon ball (Figure 23b). Probable strategy: Motion 
relative to the ground. 
2. The motion of a body projected straight up in the 
air from the ground, modeled as "a flat surface moving with 
constant velocity," is viewed from space as in the case of 
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the motion of a rocket (Figure 23c). Probable strategy: 
Motion relative to the space (fixed stars). 
3. The motion of a body moving vertically from the 
earth, modeled as "a flat surface moving with constant 
velocity" depends upon the earth's atmosphere, as in the 
case of a hot-air balloon (Figure 23d). Probable strategy: 
Motion relative to the earth. 
4. The motion of a body dropped from a large height to 
the ground, modeled as "a flat surface moving with constant 
velocity," is dependent upon the existence of a reference 
point on the surface, as in the case of an iron ball dropped 
from an imaginary hand that remains fixed in space (relative 
to the stars) (Figure 23e), from an imaginary hand remaining 
fixed in space near the top of the building (Figure 23f), 
and from the top of a building (Figure 23g). Probable 
strategies: Motion relative to space when no building is 
present, relative to the ground when a building is present. 
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Figure 23. Problem Tasks for Assessing Understanding of 
Motion of Object in Frame of Reference of Earth. (Explained 
in text) 
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5. The motion of a body on the frame of reference of 
the earth depends upon whether the body is in contact with 
the earth's surface, as in the case of two boats (Figure 
23h), and two airplanes (Figure 23i) sailing and flying 
respectively around the earth. Probable strategies: Motion 
relative to the space for case of the airplanes, and motion 
relative to the space or earth for the motion of the boats. 
CATEGORY 3: Motion of Bodies with Constant Velocity 
General problem task questions. 
1. Is a net force acting on a body moving with 
constant speed in straight line? 
List of factors and specific contexts. 
1. The conceptual link between zero net force and 
uniform straight line motion depends upon the kind of the 
moving object (e.g., a spaceship, car, box). 
2. The conceptual link between zero net force and 
uniform straight line motion depends upon episodic knowledge 
(e.g., a car on a "windy'' day, a box being pushed along the 
floor by a person, objects hanging from strings inside cars, 
boxes being lifted from the floor). 
3. The conceptual link between zero net force and 
uniform straight line motion depends upon the mass of the 
moving body (e.g., a bicycle, car, truck). 
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CHAPTER IV 
ANALYSIS OF RESPONSES 
This chapter groups the responses, as given by the 20 
students to each task of all three categories, without any 
attempt to interpret them. (The responses to the clinical 
interview appear in quotations in the chapter of 
Interpetation and Discussion.) For each task there is the 
accepted response (in accordance with the Newtonian 
conception) and the alternative response(s). The number of 
students for each response is also given. 
Category 1: Motion of Bodies in Frames of Reference 
This category deals with two general problem situations 
addressed through different contexts. The first situation 
and the responses (collectively and individually) can be 
seen in Tables 1 and 2, while the second situation is 
presented in Tables 3, 4 and 5. Below are the specific 
tasks and the respective responses to those two problem 
situations. 
Task 1: Two friends are standing on either end of the 
roof (outside) of a train moving with constant speed in 
straight line. Suddenly they each throw the balls they are 
holding to each other. What can you say about the time the 
balls take to reach the other person? The velocities and 
the masses of the balls are the same, and the effect of air 
resistance is negligible. 
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Accepted responses: Neglecting air resistance, both 
friends will catch the balls simultaneously as if the train 
were at rest because it does not make a difference whether 
the train is at rest or in motion (n = 0). 
Or, the motion of the balls is considered relative to 
the frame of reference of the train, which is an inertial 
frame of reference and therefore both friends will catch the 
balls simultaneously (n = 0). 
Alternative response 1: The person in the rear will 
catch the ball first because he is moving towards the ball 
(n = 17). 
Alternative response 2: The person in the front will 
catch the ball first because the ball is approaching him 
with higher velocity The ball has, in addition to its own 
velocity, the velocity of the moving train (n = 2). 
Task 2: Two friends are standing on either end 
(inside) the car compartment of a train moving with constant 
speed in straight line. Each is holding a ball in his 
hands. Suddenly they both throw their balls simultaneously 
to each other. What can you say about the time the balls 
will take to reach the person on the opposite end? The 
velocities and the masses of the balls are the same. 
Accepted responses: Taking into account the conception 
that uniform straight line motion and rest are equivalent, 
both friends will catch the ball simultaneously (n = 0). 
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Or, the motion of the balls is considered relative to 
the frame of reference of the train, and therefore both 
friends will catch the balls simultaneously (n = 3). 
Alternative response 1: Both friends will catch the 
ball simultaneously because the balls are moving along with 
the train because the train is a closed system (n = 4), but 
if the air were pumped out of the train the friend in the 
rear would catch the ball first because this situation 
would be the same as being outside on the roof of the train 
(n = 2) • 
Alternative response 2: The friend in the rear will 
catch the ball first because he is moving towards the ball 
en= 11). 
Alternative response 3: The friend in the front will 
catch the ball first because the ball is approaching him 
with greater velocity. The ball has, in addition to its own 
velocity, the velocity of the train (n = 2). 
Task 3: Two friends are standing on either end 
(inside) of the car compartment of a train moving with 
constant speed in straight line. Suddenly they both roll a 
ball to each other. What can you say about the time it will 
take the balls to roll to the other person? 
Accepted responses: Taking into account the conception 
that uniform straight line motion and rest are equivalent, 
both friends will catch the ball simultaneously (n = O). 
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Or, the motion of the balls is considered relative to 
the frame of reference of the train, which is an inertial 
frame of reference, and therefore both friends will catch 
the balls simultaneously (n = 3). 
Or, both friends will catch the balls at the same time 
because the balls are in contact with the train and they 
therefore participate, in the motion of the train (n = 5). 
Alternative response: The friend in the rear will 
catch the ball first because he is moving towards the ball 
(n = 12). 
Task 4: A person is sitting in the car compartment of 
a train traveling with constant speed in straight line. 
Suddenly he throws a softball a small way straight up in the 
air. Where will the softball land? The force the person is 
applying is in the vertical direction. 
Accepted responses: The softball will fall straight 
back down into the person's hands because its motion is not 
affected by the uniform motion of the train (n = O). 
or, the motion of the softball is relative to the frame 
of reference of the train and therefore it will fall 
straight back down (n = 3). 
Or, the softball will fall straight back down because 
it will continue to move in the direction of the train's 
motion (n = 5). 
Alternative response 1: The softball will land behind 
the person because he is moving forward along with the train 
while the ball is moving upwards (n = 5). 
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(Three of those 
five students believed that a person on the train sees a 
straight line path of the softball, and a person on the 
ground sees a curved path, while two students believed the 
opposite.) 
Alternative response 2: The softball will fall 
straight back down because it will continue to move in the 
direction of the train's motion due to a force that carries 
the softball forward (n = 7). 
Task 5: A person is standing on the roof of a train 
moving with constant speed in straight line. Suddenly he 
throws a softball straight up in the air. Where will the 
softball land if the effect of wind and air resistance are 
negligible? 
Accepted responses: Neglecting the effect of wind and 
air resistance, the softball will fall straight back in the 
person's hands because the motion of the softball is not 
affected by the uniform motion of the train (n = 0). 
or, the motion of the softball is considered relative 
to the frame of reference of the train, and therefore it 
will move straight up and then fall straight down and will 
land in the person's hand (n = 0). 
Table 1 
Number of Responses to Problem Situation of Two Persons standing on Either End of Car 
Compartment of Train and Throwing or Rolling to Each Other the Ball They are Each 
Holding 
RESI'_ONSE 
A: Accepted B: Alternative 
Both persons Either person 
catch the balls catches the 
at the same time ball first 
TASK 
1 1 19 
2 5 15 
3 8 12 
_li'_RA.ME OF REFERENCE 
FOR RESPONSE A 
Train Ground 
1 
4 1 
7 1 
FRAME OF REFERENCE 
FOR RESPONSE B 
Train Ground 
3 
3 
2 
16 
12 
10 
,_. 
.i=-
°' 
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Table 2 
Responses of Individual students to Problem Situation of Two 
Persons Standing on Either End of Car Compartment of Train 
and Throwing or Rolling to Each Other a Ball They are Each 
Holding 
TASK 
1 
2 
3 
RESPONSES 
Both persons 
catch the balls 
at the same time 
I A, 
G, 
N, 
T 
I, J, K A, 
L, M, Q, R G, 
T 
I, J, K A, 
L, M, N, o, p G, 
Either person 
catches the 
ball first 
B, c, D, E, F, 
H, J, K, L, M, 
o, P, Q, R, s, 
B, c, D, E, F, 
H, N, o, P, s 
B, C, D, E, F, 
H, Q, R, s, T 
Or, the softball will land in the person's hand because 
the softball continues to move in the forward (horizontal) 
direction while it is going up and down in the air (n = 5). 
(Three of these five students believed that there is a force 
that carries the softball forward.) 
Alternative response 1: The softball will land behind 
the person because he is moving forward, while the softball 
is moving up and down in the air (n = 10). 
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Alternative response 2: The softball will land behind 
the person because the softball is moving outside the frame 
of reference (n = 5). 
Task 6: A person is holding a baseball in his hand 
while running with constant speed in a straight line. 
Suddenly (and while he is in uniform straight line motion) 
he applies a vertical force to the baseball and the ball 
starts moving vertically upwards in relation to the person's 
body. Where will the baseball land? 
Accepted responses: The baseball will fall straight 
back in the person's hands because the motion of the ball is 
not affected by the uniform motion of the person's body 
<n = o) . 
Or, the baseball will fall straight back in the 
person's hand the because the ball continues to move in the 
forward direction while it is going up and down in the air. 
This situation is similar to that of the train (n = 1). 
Alternative response 1: The baseball will land behind 
the person because he is moving forward, while the baseball 
is moving up and down in the air (n = 14). 
Alternative response 2: The baseball will land behind 
the person because the earth is the frame of reference 
(n = 5). (All five students believed that the human body is 
not a frame of reference.) 
Table 3 
Number of Responses to Problem Situation of Person Throwing Softball Straight Up in 
Air from Frame of Reference 
RESPONSE FRAME OF REFERENCE FRAME OF REFERENCE 
FOR RESPONSE A FOR RESPONSE B 
A: Accepted B: Alternative 
The ball falls The ball lands Train Ground Train Ground 
straight back behind the 
to the person's person 
hand 
TASK 
4 15 5 
5 5 15 
6 1 19 
7 8 2 
1 4 4 
1 
3 
11 
19 
I-' 
,:,,. 
\0 
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Table 4 
Responses of Individual students to Problem Situation of 
Person Throwing Softball Straight Up in Air from Frame of 
Reference 
TASK 
4 
5 
6 
RESPONSE 
The ball falls 
straight back 
to the person's 
hand 
I, J, K, 
L, M, N, 0, P, Q 
A, B, C, D, E, F 
I' J' 
A, B, N 
J 
The ball lands 
behind the 
person 
G, H, R, S, T 
C, D, E, F, G, H, 
K, L, M, O, P, Q, 
R, S, T 
A, B, C, D, E, F, 
G, H, I, K, L, M, 
N, O, P, Q, R, S, 
T 
151 
Table 5 
Responses to Sarne Problem Situation of Person Throwing Ball 
Straight Up From Inertial Frame of Reference in Different 
Contexts Show Pattern of Consistency in Thinking of Students 
ball thrown 
inside the 
compartment 
of a train 
CONTEXT 
ball thrown 
from the roof 
of the train 
ball thrown 
from a person 
running on the 
ground 
Response: The ball always lands behind the 
person 
Response: The ball lands in the person's 
hand when the person is inside the train, 
but behind the person if he/she is on the 
roof (outside) of the train or running 
Response: The ball lands in the person's 
hands if he/she is on the train (inside or 
outside), but behind the person if he/she 
running on the ground 
Response: The ball always lands in the 
person's hands 
Total Number of Students 
n 
5 
10 
4 
1 
20 
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Category 2: Motion of Bodies on the Frame of Reference 
of the Earth 
This category deals with three general problem 
situations. The first problem situation and the responses 
(collectivelly and individually} in different contexts are 
presented in Tables 6 and 7. The second problem situation 
and the responses to this situation can be seen in Table 8, 
while the responses to the third problem situation are shown 
in Tables 9 and 10. Below are the specific problem tasks 
responses to these tasks. 
Task 7: A person is standing in his backyard holding a 
rock. He suddenly throws it straight up in the air. Where 
will the rock land? 
Accepted response: The rock will land in the person's 
hands because the rock has only a vertical (component of} 
velocity (n = 20}. 
Task 8: A cannon is firing a cannon ball straight up 
in the air. Will the cannon ball return to the same point 
on the ground? The earth is considered a non-rotating frame 
of reference moving with constant speed in straight line. 
Accepted responses: Assuming that there are no 
external forces except for the weight acting on the cannon 
ball as it is traveling through the air, the cannon ball 
will return to the same point on the ground because its 
motion is considered relative to the frame of reference of 
the earth (n = 0}. 
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Or, the cannon ball returns to the same point because, 
the cannon ball has, apart from a vertical velocity, a 
horizontal component equal to the velocity of the earth's 
surface that remains constant during its flight (n = O). 
Or, the cannon ball will return to the same point 
because this situation is similar to that of the softball 
thrown straight up in the air from the roof of the train. 
The cannon ball is moving up and down in the air but it also 
has the horizontal velocity of the earth. Its path is 
parabolic (n = 2). 
Alternative response 1: The cannon ball will not 
return to the same point because as it is going up and down 
in the air, the earth has moved considerably (n = 17). 
Alternative response 2: The cannon ball will land at a 
point on the ground that is far ahead of the point of 
projection because the cannon ball has also the velocity of 
the moving earth (n = l}. 
Task 9: A rocket is fired vertically from the ground. 
The rocket travels straight up until all its fuel is used up 
and then starts falling straight down. Will the rocket 
return to the same point on the ground, that is, to the 
point from which it originally took off? The effect of wind 
and air resistance are considered negligible. The only 
force acting on the rocket on its way back to the ground is 
its weight. 
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Accepted responses: Assuming that there are no 
external forces except for the weight acting on the rocket 
as it is traveling in the air, it will return to the same 
point on the ground because its motion is considered 
relative to the frame of reference of the earth. The path 
of the rocket is a straight line (n = 0). 
Or, the rocket will return to the same point because, 
at the moment it leaves the ground, the rocket has, apart 
from a vertical velocity, a horizontal component equal to 
the velocity of the earth's surface which remains constant 
throughout its flight. The path of the rocket is a parabola 
<n = o). 
Or, the rocket will return to the same point because 
this situation is similar to that of the softball thrown 
straight up in the air from the roof of the train. The 
rocket is moving up and down but it also has the velocity of 
the earth. The path of the rocket is a parabola due to the 
composition of two components of velocity, the vertical 
component and the horizontal one (n = 2). 
Alternative response: The rocket will not return to 
the same point because as it is going up and down in the 
air, the earth has moved considerably (n = 18). (Three 
students believed that the rocket is not in the frame of 
reference of the earth because the rocket is moving away 
from the surface of the earth.) 
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Task 10: An air-balloon is rising vertically above the 
ground. After it goes up high, it stays there for some 
time, and then comes back down again. Will it land on the 
point from which it took off? 
Accepted responses: Assuming that the only forces 
acting on the balloon are its weight and the force of 
buoyancy, both acting in the vertical direction (the weight 
in the downward direction and the buoyancy in the upward 
direction), the balloon will land to the same place. Its 
motion--straight up and down--is relative to the frame of 
reference of the earth (n = 0). 
or, the balloon returns to the point from which it took 
off because it is moving along with the earth's atmosphere 
(n = 3) • 
Alternative response 1: The balloon will never land at 
the same point because the earth has moved while the balloon 
was going up and down. The path of the balloon is a 
straight line (n = 16). 
Alternative response 2: The balloon will not land at 
the same point because it stays motionless for some time 
en = 1) • 
Table 6 
Number of Responses to Problem Situation of Vertical Projection of Object from Ground 
RESPONSE 
A: Accepted B: Alternative 
The object The object 
returns to cannot return 
same point to the same 
on the ground point on the 
ground 
TASK 
7 20 
8 2 18 
9 2 18 
10 3 17 
FRAME OF REFERENCE 
FOR RESPONSE A 
Earth Space 
20 
1 1 
2 
3 
FRAME OF REFERENCE 
FOR RESPONSE B 
Earth Space 
2 16 
2 16 
2 15 
I-' 
U1 
O'I 
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Table 7 
Responses of Individual students to Problem Situation of 
Vertical Projection of Object From Ground 
TASK 
8 
9 
10 
RESPONSE 
The object returns 
to the same point 
on the ground 
I, J 
I, J 
A, B, I 
The object cannot 
return to the same 
point on the ground 
A, B, c, D, E, F, 
G, H, K, L, M, N, 
o. P, Q, R, s, T 
A, B, c, D, E, F, 
G, H, K, L, M, N, 
o, P, Q, R, s, T 
C, D, E, F, G, H, 
H, J, K, L, M, N, 
o, P, Q, R, s, T 
Task 11: An iron ball is dropped from a point high 
above the ground by an imaginary hand fixed in space. Where 
will it land? 
Accepted responses: The motion of the iron ball can be 
considered relative to space (fixed stars), and therefore 
the iron ball will fall straight down and will land at a 
point that was not directly under the point of release 
en = o > • 
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Or, the iron ball will land at a point that was not 
directly under the point of release because the earth has 
moved (n = 20). 
Task 12: An iron ball is dropped by an imaginary hand 
that is near the top of a very high building. Where will it 
land? 
Accepted responses: The iron ball will land at point 
that is far away from the foot of the building because the 
motion of the ball is relative to space (fixed stars) 
en = o) • 
Or, the iron ball will land at a point that is far away 
from the foot of the building because while the ball is 
falling the earth has moved (n = 17). 
Alternative response: The iron ball will land directly 
under the point of release, that is, at the foot of the 
building because the iron ball, being near the building, is 
falling parallel to it (n = 3). 
Task 13: An iron ball is dropped from the top of a 
high building. Where will it land? The only force acting 
on it is its weight. The effects due to the rotation of the 
earth is negligible. 
Accepted responses: The motion of the iron ball can be 
considered relative to the earth (or building), and 
therefore it will fall straight down and will land at the 
foot of the building, that is, at a point directly under the 
point of release (n = 5). 
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Or, the iron ball will land at the foot of the building 
because the ball is also moving with the velocity of the 
building (n = 8). 
Alternative response: The iron ball will land away 
from the foot of the building (to the left) because as the 
iron ball is falling through the air the earth has moved (to 
the right) (n = 7). 
Task 14: Two boats set sail from the same place on the 
equator and they are going to sail around the earth and 
along the equator. The boats will sail in opposite 
directions with the same speeds. Will the boats arrive at 
the place from which they set sail simultaneously? The 
Coriolis effect is not taken into account. 
Accepted responses: The motion of the boats is 
relative to the earth, and therefore they will both arrive 
at the place from which they set sail at the same time 
(n = 2). 
Or, both boats will arrive at the same time because 
they belong in the frame of reference of the earth since 
they are in contact with the earth (n = 2). 
Alternative response: The boat sailing west will 
arrive first because the earth is moving towards it 
(n = 16). 
Table 8 
Number of Responses to Problem Situation of Dropping of Iron Ball from Height Above 
Ground by Considering Only Weight of Iron Ball 
RESPONSE FRAME OF REFERENCE FRAME OF REFERENCE 
FOR RESPONSE A FOR RESPONSE B 
A: Accepted B: Alternative 
The iron ball The iron ball Earth Space Earth Space 
hits the ground will hit the 
at a point that ground at a 
is under the different point 
point of release 
TASK 
12 3 17 
13 13 7 
3 4 
5 8 2 
13 
5 
I-' 
°' 0 
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Task 15: Two airplanes are taking off from the same 
place on the equator, and are flying around the earth 
parallel to the equator but in opposite directions and with 
equal speeds. Will the planes arrive at the take-off place 
simultaneously? The Coriolis effect and forces due to wind 
are not taken into account. 
Accepted response: Neglecting air resistance and the 
effect of wind, both planes will arrive simultaneously 
because their motion is relative to the frame of reference 
of the earth (n = 0). 
Alternative response: The plane flying due west will 
arrive first because it is flying towards the place from 
which it took off (n = 20). 
Category 3: Motion of Bodies with Constant Velocity 
This category deals with the motion of an object with 
constant speed in straight line. The responses and the 
different contexts in which students were requested to 
assess whether there is a net force acting on the object in 
question are summarized in Table 11. Following are the 
responses to the specific tasks. 
Task 16: A spaceship is traveling in outer space with 
constant velocity. The spaceship is not acted upon by any 
planetary forces. The force exerted by interplanetary dust 
is also negligible. Do you think there is a net force 
acting on the spaceship as it is moving in outer space with 
constant velocity? 
Table 9 
Number of Responses to Problem situation of Motion of Two Objects Traveling Around 
Earth 
RESPONSE FRAME OF REFERENCE FRAME OF REFERENCE 
FOR RESPONSE A FOR RESPONSE B 
A: Accepted B: Alternative 
The objects will The object that Earth Space Earth Space 
arrive at the 
point from which 
set off at the 
same time 
TASK 
14 4 
15 0 
is moving due 
west will arrive 
first 
16 4 
20 
1 
1 
15 
19 
.... 
O'I 
I\) 
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Table 10 
Responses of Individual students to Problem Situation of 
Motion of Two Objects Traveling Around Earth 
TASK 
14 
15 
RESPONSE 
The objects will 
arrive at the 
point from which 
the set off 
at the same time 
I, J 
M, N 
A, 
G, 
Q, 
The object moving 
due west will 
arrive first 
B, c, D, E, F, 
H, K, L, o, P, 
R, s, T 
ALL 
Task 16: A spaceship is traveling in outer space with 
constant velocity. The spaceship is not acted upon by any 
planetary forces. The force exerted by interplanetary dust 
is also negligible. Do you think there is a net force 
acting on the spaceship as it is moving in outer space with 
constant velocity? 
Accepted response: There is no net force acting on the 
spaceship because it is moving with constant velocity 
(n = 12) . (Six of those 12 students believed that the 
spaceship is not acted upon by a net force because, once set 
in motion, there are no forces to slow it down.) 
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Alternative response 1: There is a net force in the 
direction of motion. It is the reaction to the action of 
the engine which is exerted on the ejected fuel (n = 4). 
{All four students believed that the force acting on the 
spaceship is constant, otherwise the spaceship would 
accelerate, and also that the constant velocity of the 
spaceship is due to the fact that the force on it is applied 
discontinually, since action and reaction are not continuous 
forces.) 
Alternative response 2: There is a net force acting on 
the spaceship because it is moving (n = 4). {Three students 
believed that the force that set the spaceship in motion 
must be applied continuously otherwise the spaceship would 
travel a certain distance and stop, and two of them also 
believed that the force acting on the spaceship has a 
constant magnitude, because constant magnitude forces 
produce and maintain constant velocity and forces of 
increasing magnitude produce acceleration.) 
Task 17: A car is traveling against a strong wind but 
the driver manages to keep the car in a straight line with 
constant speed. Do you think there is a net force acting on 
the car? 
Accepted response: There are two forces in the 
horizontal direction, one exerted by the ground and the 
other by the air, but the net force is zero because the car 
is moving with constant velocity (n = 4). 
Alternative response: There are two forces but the 
force exerted by the engine of the car is greater because 
the driver is pressing the accelerator harder in order to 
overcome the force exerted by the wind (n = 16). 
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Task 18: Three identical airplanes are traveling with 
constant speed in a straight line on three different 
occasions. The first airplane is traveling up an incline, 
the second is traveling along a horizontal line parallel to 
the ground, and the third plane is traveling down an 
incline. Do you think there is a net force acting on the 
planes? If yes, which airplane is acted upon by greater net 
force? 
Accepted response: On all three occasions the net 
force is zero because the plane is always moving with 
constant velocity (n = 3). 
Alternative response 1: The net force is zero only 
when the plane flies horizontally. There is force in the 
direction of motion when the plane flies on a slope 
en = 6 > • 
Alternative response 2: There is a net force in the 
direction of motion on all three occasions, but the force on 
the plane moving downwards is smaller because there is a 
component of the weight in this direction, and the force is 
greater when the plane is moving upwards because it has to 
overcome the component of the weight that is now applied in 
the opposite direction (n = 11). 
Task 19: There are three different vehicles: A 
motorbike, a racing car, and a truck. They are all 
traveling with constant speed in straight line. Do you 
think there is a net force acting on these vehicles? If 
yes, which one is acted upon by greater net force? 
Accepted response: The net force is zero on all 
occasions because all vehicles are moving with constant 
velocity (n = 1). 
Alternative response: The net force on the truck is 
greater because it has the greatest mass (n = 19}. 
Task 20: A person is pushing a heavy box along the 
floor with constant speed in straight line. Do you think 
there is a net force acting on the box? 
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Accepted response: The net force is zero because the 
box is moving with constant velocity (F = T} (n = 3}. 
Alternative response: The force applied by the person, 
F, is greater than the frictional force, T, and therefore 
there is a net force in the direction of the motion of the 
box (n = 17}. 
Task 21: There are three identical vans. A piece of 
string is hanging from the roof of each van, while a bob is 
attached to the other end of the string. In the first van 
the string is tilted backward, in the second van the string 
is hanging straight down, and in the third van the string is 
tilted forward. Do you think that any of these vans is 
moving with constant speed in straight line? 
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Accepted response: The van with the string hanging 
straight down is moving in straight line with constant speed 
because there are is no force acting on the bob in the 
direction of motion (n = 4). 
Or, since the state of rest is equivalent to the state 
of uniform straight line motion the van with the string 
hanging straight down is moving with constant speed in 
straight line (n = O). 
Alternative response 1: The van with the string 
hanging straight down is moving with constant velocity 
because from our experience we know that objects tied to 
strings hanging from rear view mirrors remain vertical 
en= 13). 
Alternative response 2: The van with the string tilted 
forward is moving with constant velocity because the string 
is tilted in the direction of the motion of the van (n = 1). 
Alternative response 3: The van in which the string is 
tilted backward is moving forward with constant velocity 
because the string is acted upon by a force that is the 
reaction to the force of the car. It is about the law of 
Action and Reaction (n = 2). 
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Table 11 
Responses to Problem Situation of Motion of Object with 
Constant Velocity (Tasks 16, 17, 18, and 20) 
CONTEXT 
Spaceship 
in outer 
space away 
from forces 
Car on a 
windy day 
Airplane 
flying up 
and down 
an incline 
A box being 
pushed 
along the 
floor 
RESPONSE 
Accepted 
The net force acting 
on the object is 
zero 
12 
4 
3 
3 
Alternative 
There is a net force 
in the direction of 
the object's motion 
8 
16 
17 
17 
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CHAPTER V 
INTERPRETATION OF RESPONSES 
This chapter provides an interpretation of students' 
thinking during the clinical interview and their responses 
to the 21 problem tasks that followed. The chapter is 
divided into six major sections according to the original 
research questions: 
1. On the understanding of the qualitative definition 
of uniform straight line motion: Is uniform straight line 
motion understood as being equivalent to rest? 
2. On the understanding of the notions of relativity 
and frame of reference: Is motion defined relative to a 
frame of reference? What is the the preferred frame of 
reference across the various problem tasks? Do students use 
consistently the same frame of reference, or do they change 
the frame of reference according to the context of the task 
in question? 
3. On the understanding of the relationship between 
zero net force and uniform straight line motion: Do 
students understand that uniform straight line motion can 
exist in the absence of a net force? 
4. On reasoning strategies and preconceptions: What 
reasoning strategies do students employ in their thinking, 
and what preconceptions lead students to adopt these 
strategies? 
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5. On schematic representation: What schema(ta) might 
be inferred from the identified preconceptions? 
6. On knowledge representation: What kind of 
knowledge representations--propositional and analogical--
exist in the cognitive structure of these particular 
students? 
The interpretation given in the first three sections is 
based mainly upon the students' thinking employed during the 
clinical interview, while the strategies and preconceptions, 
along with the schematic and knoweledge representation are 
inferred from the responses to the problem tasks of the 
three categories (see Chapter IV). However, the most common 
responses to one or two particular problem tasks, as were 
given by the great majority of students, are also 
incorporated in the discussion. 
The Qualitative Definition of Uniform Straight Line Motion 
The most fundamental idea of the Newtonian model of 
motion is the equivalence between uniform straight line 
motion and rest. From a Newtonian point of view no 
differentiation is made between an object at rest and an 
object moving with constant speed in straight line. The 
tasks of the first two categories were used to assess this 
equivalence. In both categories the problem tasks were 
about predicting the motion of an object in a frame of 
reference, that is, a train, the human body, and the earth, 
all moving with constant speed in straight line. According 
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to the Newtonian conception, the object would move as if the 
train, the human body, and the earth were at rest. However, 
there was a difference in the thinking of students between 
the case of the motion of an object in the frame of 
reference, when the latter is at rest, and the case of the 
motion of the same object in the same frame of reference 
when the latter is in uniform straight line motion. 
During the preliminary clinical interview all students 
were unable to find a way to determine whether they are 
moving with constant speed in straight line or whether they 
are at rest. {Students were asked to imagine themselves 
inside a windowless vehicle, and then find a way to tell 
whether they are in uniform straight line motion.) However, 
the difficulty that most students had in determining whether 
or not they are in uniform straight line motion was not 
related to the identification of force(s), or the 
performance of an experiment that could provide some 
evidence as to the different behaviour of an object in the 
vehicle, but rather to the lack of visual contact with the 
external world that would act as a reference point. This 
reference point becomes quite apparent from what three 
students said: 
If we cannot look outside we can't tell whether we 
are moving ..• we must have a reference point. 
How can we tell if we cannot look outside? If we are 
traveling in a car we must look outside and see other 
cars, and other objects like trees and houses .... 
It's always the trees and the houses going in the 
opposite direction that make us perceive motion. 
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Without looking outside ••. I think it would be hard 
to tell if something is moving with constant speed. 
It should be mentioned, though, that six other students did 
make a reference to "feeling," that is, whether or not they 
would feel anything inside the vehicle, but they 
nevertheless reasoned that, since there is no acceleration, 
they would not feel anything. The following are the actual 
words of four students who made explicit reference to 
"feeling:" 
I don't know ... I suppose it's very difficult to 
tell if we are moving with constant speed ... we 
don't feel anything. 
If the vehicle does not accelerate ... I don't think 
we can say whether we are moving with constant 
velocity. 
If I don't feel any forces when I'm inside the vehicle 
... I cannot tell whether I am at rest or in motion 
with constant velocity. 
No ... we cannot feel anything if the road is smooth 
and the vehicle is traveling in a perfect straight 
line. 
Yet, this type of reasoning was strongly tied to that 
particular context, namely, "the feeling of something" when 
inside a non-accelerating vehicle, and was not used in other 
contexts, like those used in the present study. 
It should be also mentioned that three students thought 
of performing an experiment (dropping a coin, or performing 
a standing vertical jump) in order to ascertain the 
vehicle's uniform straight line motion. But all three 
employed perception and concluded that whatever is in the 
air, whether a coin or their own body, will land at point 
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that is different from what it would be if the vehicle were 
at rest, thus giving in advance the response to the problem 
tasks that were to follow the clinical interview. 
If we dropped a coin . we could see where it would 
land. • If it landed behind me then I could say 
that I am in motion. 
I could jump and watch where I would land. If the 
vehicle is in motion ... I will land either to the 
left or to the right ... because while I'm in the air 
the vehicle has moved. 
In short, students relied heavily on perception, which in 
turn provides strong evidence that they did not have the 
conception of the equivalence between rest and uniform 
straight line motion. 
Further evidence was also provided by the students' 
responses to the problem tasks, particularly the first task 
of the first category. Only one student could think that 
both people standing on either end of the car compartment of 
a train could catch the ball simultaneously, as they would 
if the train were at rest. This finding reconfirms the 
results of Lie's (1985) and Whitaker's (1983) studies. As 
has been cited in the review of the literature, the former 
found that the length of a standing broad-jump performed by 
a person in the compartment of a train is thought to be 
dependent on the direction of the jump--being longer if the 
person jumps in the same direction as that of the motion of 
the train. The latter reports that students thought that a 
bolt falling from the ceiling of the car compartment of a 
train that is moving with constant velocity will not move in 
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straight line but rather in a parabola due to the motion of 
the train. 
The Concept of Relativity of Motion 
Another fundamental concept of the Newtonian model of 
motion is that of relativity; motion as well as the laws 
that describe it are defined relative to an inertial frame 
of reference. An inertial frame of reference is a frame of 
reference moving with constant speed in straight line; 
therefore it should be considered as any system on which the 
laws of motion are applicable, in the same way as if the 
system were at rest. It is quite apparent that the notion 
of relativity and that of the equivalence between rest and 
uniform straight line motion are inter-related. Yet, an 
assessment of whether or not students have an understanding 
of the concept of relativity of motion allows for an 
evaluation of the preferred frame of reference in the 
students' thinking. 
From the clinical interview it became evident that all 
students had the conception that motion is defined relative 
to an "observation point"--not frame of reference--such as a 
point on the ground or another object which we consider to 
be at rest. (Students were asked to imagine themselves 
onboard an aircraft, and determine whether they are in 
motion. They could also see another airplane that appeared 
to be at rest relative to them.) Moreover, several students 
used expressions such as "that's how I perceive it," "that's 
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how I see it," and "that's how it appears to me," thus 
providing evidence that motion is observed from a reference 
point. The following excerpts represent the thinking of 
five students: 
You mean I can see an airplane in the sky? .•. Well 
it appears to be at rest but it's not ... we know it 
is moving. . The only thing we can do is find 
something that is at rest ... the ground ... a 
star. 
I see the aiplane in the sky ... to me it appears to 
be at rest ... it's like an illusion, because the 
airplane is moving relative to the ground. 
If I see another plane in the sky that appears to be at 
rest ... then to me that airplane is at rest, but it 
is moving relative to someone on the ground .•.. We 
are both right •.. only the guy on the ground sees 
the real motion of the airplane. 
You mean how I see it? Well, when I'm inside the 
airplane and I don't feel anything .•. I have to look 
down and see the ground ... so motion is relative to 
the ground •••. It could be relative to the airplane 
but it's more, I would say, convenient to take the 
ground as our reference point. 
Motion is not relative to the airplane that I'm 
seeing in the sky because to me that airplane appears 
to be at rest .... Always we have to find something 
that is not moving. 
Although the above responses provide a commonsense way of 
approaching motion, they nonetheless provide evidence that 
the preferred frame of reference is "terra firma. 11 A few 
students, of course, when asked, gave the train as a 
reference frame; but their reasoning strategy, namely, that 
the ball and the train "move towards each other" (Task 1), 
or that the ball and the train "move away from each other," 
the former going up, while the latter moving forward (Task 
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4), made it apparent that motion was observed from the 
ground. Additional evidence for this preference is provided 
by the fact that, although two persons (one onboard a moving 
train and one standing on the platform, as well as one 
running and another one standing still in the rain) can 
describe motion according to their own point of view (both 
persons are right in describing paths and velocities of 
moving objects), a realist perspective was predominant in 
all students. For they all responded that the real 
direction of the raindrops or of a coin flipped inside the 
car compartment of a train is that perceived by the person 
who is standing still on the ground. However, in the 
situation of a person standing still and another one running 
in the rain, several students (ten) appeared to adopt a 
point of view from the fixed stars thus giving a 
metaphysical realist belief. Two of those 10 students 
said: 
The real direction of the rain is vertical ... this 
is what the person standing still sees but ... it is 
also the direction of the raindrops if we look from 
outside the earth. 
We have to look at the earth from space if we want to 
see real direction of the rain. 
Their responses to the particular problem tasks further 
verified the fact that motion is approached from an absolute 
point of view, that is, from a point of view from the ground 
or the fixed stars. 
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Only three students talked explicitly about frame of 
reference. Yet, for all students, the notions that motion 
is defined relative to a reference--or rather observation--
point and/or relative to a frame of reference appeared to be 
strongly dependent upon the context of the problem 
situation. Even those three students who seemed to have an 
understanding of the concept of relativity thought that 
motion is relative to the frame of reference (train) only 
when motion takes place inside the compartment as in the 
case of Tasks 2 and 4 (see Tables 1, 2, 3 and 4 in Chapter 
IV and Table 12 in the section of Strategies and 
Preconceptions in this Chapter). Some other students 
approached motion relative to the train (although this was 
not made explicit but was rather inferred from their 
thinking strategy) but only when the motion of the object 
was in the vertical direction (Task 4), when the object was 
moving "inside" the frame of reference (Task 2), and when it 
was in contact with the frame of reference (Task 4). For 
those particular students, the notion of relativity was 
intuitive, as this is discussed in the section of 
preconceptions. On the other hand most of the students who 
used the train or the ground as a frame of reference, 
explicitly or implicitly, reasoned that motion should be 
viewed relative to the stars when the motion of an object 
projected vertically from the ground was instead considered. 
This suggests that always something that is considered to be 
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at rest must be established and then motion will be viewed 
relative to it. 
It deserves to be mentioned that the responses to the 
problem task of a cannon ball fired straight up in the air 
make it quite evident that the supposedly simple notion of 
an earth moving with a constant velocity poses tremendous 
conceptual problems that are similar to those experienced by 
scholars and philosophers in the 16th and 17th century 
Europe. Even the two students who thought that the cannon 
ball will fall straight back down, since "this situation is 
similar to that of a person throwing a softball from the 
roof of a train," adopted an observation point on the fixed 
stars from which they could describe the parabolic path of 
the cannon ball. Yet, this reasoning strategy, although not 
incorrect, does show that the idea that motion is relative 
to an inertial frame of reference is difficult for students 
to grasp unless it is taught to them explicitly. 
In summary, the majority of students showed a 
preference for defining motion relative to a point either on 
the ground or on the fixed stars. Although a point of 
reference is not the same thing as a frame of reference, the 
preference for the ground or the fixed stars as an implicit 
point of observation suggests that the concept of frame of 
reference was not understood. This preference for an 
absolute frame of reference is in agreement with findings of 
previous studies which have been discussed in the review of 
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the literature (Aguirre, 1988; Aguirre & Erickson, 1983; 
Saltiel & Malgrange, 1980, Whitaker, 1983). 
The Conceptual Link between Zero Net Force and Uniform 
Straight Line Motion 
The fundamental idea that motion with constant velocity 
takes place in the absence of a net force was understood by 
three students as this appears from the consistency with 
which they thought about the various problem tasks. But 
only one student had a higher level of understanding since 
he used the same reasoning strategy, namely, that the net 
force on any body moving in straight line with constant 
speed is zero, across all contexts (see Table 11 and 
responses to tasks of category 3 in Chapter IV). 
From the preliminary interview it became evident that 
most students could correctly predict eternal uniform 
straight line motion in the absence of external forces. 
These students could reason that a spaceship, once set in 
motion, can move even with its engine off since it is 
carried by its initial momentum that remains constant, 
provided that there are no forces to slow the spaceship 
down. And they also thought that a spaceship already 
traveling with constant velocity is not acted upon by a 
force. However, as the context began to change so did the 
thinking of the students. As was already mentioned, it was 
only three students who had the conceptual link between zero 
force and motion at constant velocity. For the great 
majority of students uniform straight line motion and force 
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in the direction of motion were two concepts that could 
exist in their minds without any contradiction. The co-
existence of a net force and constant velocity in the minds 
of students is in line with previous findings (Halloun & 
Hestenes, 1985a, 1985b). 
Strategies and Preconceptions 
The purpose of any study on how students think is first 
to identify and describe the strategies that students 
employ. These strategies are rather explicit, and are 
directly revealed through the responses. The second step is 
to identify and describe the preconceptions that lead 
students to adopt their strategies. The preconceptions are 
rather implicit, and an inference based upon further 
questioning about other related concepts, such as frame of 
reference, acting forces, and path of the moving object is 
made. Sometimes it might be necessary that students become 
aware of their change in reasoning strategy through a 
comparison between their responses to similar or different 
problem tasks. In such cases the students make their 
preconceptions explicit. For example, the comparison 
between the problem situation of a ball thrown upwards from 
the roof of the train (Task 5) and that of a ball thrown up 
from the floor of the train (Task 4) made some students 
state explicitly that "objects moving outside the train are 
not in the frame of reference." 
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But it is also possible that a preconception could be 
directly inferred from the reasoning strategy. For example, 
the "meeting of two objects" moving in the horizontal 
direction (such as the ball and the train in Task 1) implies 
a preference for a reference point on the ground. This 
preference, in turn, suggests the preconception that motion 
is observed from the ground. 
Although strategies and preconceptions are intricately 
related, and it therefore remains a mere speculation which 
gives rise to which, a linear model (see Figure 24 in 
Chapter III) that postulates a distinction between these two 
is a convenient way to both identify and descibe them. From 
the analysis of the individual responses the strategies that 
students employed while thinking about the problem tasks 
could be identified. Although students used with some 
consistency the same strategy while thinking about 
particular problem tasks (for example, most students 
employed perception and approached motion relative to the 
ground in Tasks 1 and 2, while two students used vector 
composition of velocities in the same tasks and one of them 
also used it in Task 8), the responses, when considered 
across all contexts, did reveal that the same problem 
situation results from different strategies that are 
dependent upon the context in which the problem is set. In 
short, the same students changed their strategies according 
to the context (see Tables 12, 13, 14, and 15). 
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Table 12 
Reasoning Strategies and Preconceptions for Problem 
Situation of Two Persons Standing On Either End of Car 
Compartment of Train and Throwing or Rolling To Each Other 
the Ball They are Each Holding 
TASK 
1 
2 
STRATEGY 
(a) Motion relative 
to the frame of 
reference (n = 1) 
(b) Motion of two 
bodies (ball, 
train) relative 
to the ground 
and meeting each 
other (n = 17) 
(c) Vector composition 
of velocities (ball, 
train) without 
reference to 
distances traveled 
en= 2) 
(a) Motion relative 
to the frame of 
reference (n = 3) 
(b) Motion of two 
bodies (ball, 
train) relative 
to the ground 
and meeting 
each other (n = 11) 
(c) Vector composition 
of velocities without 
reference to distances 
traveled (n = 2) 
PRECONCEPTION 
Motion is observed 
from the ground 
en= 11) 
Motion is observed 
from the ground 
en= 2) 
Motion is observed 
from the ground 
en = 11) 
Motion is observed 
from the ground 
en= 2) 
(table continues) 
TASK STRATEGY 
3 
(d) Motion inside the 
atmosphere of the 
train that "carries" 
the ball (n = 2) 
(e) Motion relative to 
the train due to 
its "closedness" 
<n = 2) 
( a) Motion relative 
to the frame of 
reference <n = 3) 
(b) Motion of two 
bodies (ball, 
train) relative 
to the ground 
without reference 
to speeds and 
distances traveled 
<n = 12) 
(c) Motion relative 
to the train 
that "carries" the 
ball (n = 5) 
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PRECONCEPTION 
Frames of reference 
have an atmosphere 
(n = 2) 
Frames of reference 
are closed vehicles 
(n = 2) 
Motion is observed 
from the ground 
(n = 12) 
Objects belong in 
the frame of 
reference only 
when they are in 
contact with it 
<n = 5) 
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Table 13 
Reasoning Strategies and Preconceptions for Problem 
situation of Person Throwing a Ball Straight Up From car 
Compartment of Train, and when Running on Flat Ground 
TASK 
4 
STRATEGY 
(a) Motion relative 
to the frame of 
reference (n = 3) 
(b) Motion of two 
bodies (ball, 
train) relative 
to the ground 
that move in 
different 
directions and 
away from each 
other (n = 5) 
(c) Forward motion of 
ball relative to 
the ground as the 
ball is going up 
and down in the 
air (n = 12) 
PRECONCEPTION 
Motion is observed 
from the ground 
<n = 5) 
The observer on the 
train sees a 
straight line path 
of an object thrown 
straight up while 
the observer on the 
ground sees a 
curved path (n = 3) 
The observer 
on the train sees 
a curved path of an 
object thrown 
straight up while 
the observer on the 
ground sees a 
straight line path 
(n = 2) 
Objects continue to 
move in the forward 
direction once they 
are thrown up in the 
air because there is 
a force supplied by 
the motion of the 
train (n = 7) 
(table continues) 
TASK 
5 
6 
STRATEGY 
(a) Forward motion of 
ball relative to 
the ground as the 
ball is going up 
and down in the air 
(n = 5) 
(b) Motion of two 
bodies (ball, 
train) relative 
to the ground 
that move in 
different directions 
and away from each 
other (n = 15) 
(a) Motion relative to 
the frame of 
reference (n = 1) 
(b) Motion of two 
bodies (ball, 
human body) 
moving in 
different 
directions away 
from each other 
(n = 19) 
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PRECONCEPTION 
Motion is observed 
from the ground 
(n = 5) 
Objects continue to 
move in the forward 
direction once they 
are thrown up in the 
air because there is 
a force supplied by 
the motion of the 
train (n = 3) 
Motion is observed 
from the ground 
<n = 10) 
Frames of reference 
are closed vehicles 
(n = 5) 
Motion is observed 
from the ground 
(n = 14) 
The human body is 
not a frame of 
reference (n = 5) 
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Table 14 
Reasoning Strategies and Preconceptions for Problem 
Situation of Motion of Body Thrown or Projected Straight Up 
in the Air From Ground 
TASK 
7 
8 
STRATEGY 
(a) Motion due to 
the vertical 
component of 
velocity (n = 20) 
(a) Motion of cannon 
ball relative to 
space by considering 
the ball's forward 
velocity as it is 
going up and down in 
the air due to the 
earth's forward motion 
<n = 2) 
(b) Motion of two bodies 
(cannon ball, earth) 
relative to space 
that move in different 
directions and away 
from each other (n = 17) 
(c) Vector composition 
of velocities (cannon 
ball, earth) without 
reference to 
distances traveled 
(n = 1) 
PRECONCEPTION 
Motion is observed 
from the fixed 
stars (n = 2) 
Motion is observed 
from the fixed 
stars (n = 17) 
Motion is observed 
from the fixed 
stars (n = 1) 
(table continues) 
TASK 
9 
10 
STRATEGY 
(a) Motion of two 
bodies (rocket, 
earth) relative 
to space that move 
in different 
directions and away 
from each other 
en= 18) 
(b) Motion of rocket 
relative to space 
by considering the 
rocket's forward 
velocity as the 
rocket is going up 
and down (n = 2) 
(a) Motion of two bodies 
(air-balloon, earth) 
relative to space 
that move in different 
directions and away 
from each other (n = 17) 
(b) Motion of air-balloon 
inside the earth's 
atmosphere that 
"carries" it along 
en= 3) 
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PRECONCEPTION 
Motion is observed 
from the fixed 
stars (n = 18) 
An object thrown 
up from the frame 
of reference does 
not belong in the 
frame of reference 
because it is 
"moving away" from 
it en = 3) 
Motion is observed 
from the fixed 
stars (n = 2) 
Motion is observed 
from the fixed 
stars (n = 17) 
An object rising 
straight up from 
the ground belongs 
in the frame of 
reference of the 
earth because the 
object is moving 
inside the earth's 
atmosphere (n = 3) 
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Table 15 
Reasoning Strategies and Preconceptions for Problem 
Situation of Motion of Two Bodies Moving Along the Equator 
in Opposite Directions Around the Earth 
TASK 
14 
15 
STRATEGY 
(a) Motion of boats 
relative to the 
frame of reference 
of the earth (n = 4) 
(b) Motion of boats 
relative to space 
without reference 
to distances 
traveled (n = 16) 
(a) Motion of airplanes 
relative to space 
without reference 
to distances 
traveled (n = 20) 
PRECONCEPTION 
An object in 
contact with the 
frame of reference 
belongs in the 
frame of reference 
en= 2) 
Motion is observed 
from the fixed 
stars (n = 16) 
Motion is observed 
from the fixed 
stars (n =20) 
Evidence that context plays a major role in the 
students' reasoning process can be seen in the thinking of 
three students who consistently used the concept of "frame 
of reference" and approached motion relative to the train in 
contexts involving the motion of a ball "inside" a train, 
regardless of the direction of the motion of the ball, and 
regardless of whether the ball is moving in the air or 
rolling on the floor (see Tasks 2, 3, and 4, and Tables 12 
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and 13). Yet those same students did consider the motion of 
the ball when thrown from the roof of a train or by a 
running person relative to the ground (see Tasks 5 and 6, 
and Table 13). It is worth mentioning that, although those 
three students did not see any difference between the 
situation of a ball thrown upwards by a person standing 
inside the car compartment of a moving train and that of a 
ball thrown upwards by a person standing on the roof of a 
train, they nonetheless ''felt," or had the intuition, that 
something is different. 
In the context of the running person the students 
explicitly said that ''things are different." Even that 
student who correctly thought about the problem tasks 
involving the motion of the ball inside and outside the 
train (Tasks 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5) approached motion relative 
to the ground in the context of the running person (see Task 
6 and Table 13). And the only student who responded that 
the ball should come straight down to the person's hand, did 
so because he did not want to contradict himself. For if 
that were the case, he should have reconsidered everything 
that he had said about the rest of the problem tasks. 
Another good illustration of the effect of context can 
be seen in the problem situation involving the motion of an 
object that is thrown up or projected from the ground (see 
Tasks 7, 8, and 9, and Table 14). A unanimous response to 
the problem situation involving a person throwing a rock 
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straight up in the air was that the rock always comes back 
straight down. And the accepted explanation that the person 
imparts only an upward velocity and not a horizontal one was 
given almost intuitively. 
The same unanimous response was given to the problem 
situation of a cannon ball fired straight up in the air. 
Yet, a disequilibration began to take place when the 
students were reminded that the earth is also moving. Many 
of them began to reconsider their previous ideas: 
Oh, yes, the rock doesn't go very high. the 
cannon ball shouldn't return to the same point, because 
the earth has moved. 
The rock I'm throwing up in the air will not fall 
straight back to my hands because the earth is always 
in motion. But we cannot feel this motion, and 
that's why the rock will always fall in my hands. 
The stone comes straight down because it doesn't go 
high up, but the rocket goes very high, and in the 
meantime the earth has moved. 
All of the students began to have second thoughts about 
whether a cannon ball or rocket will return to the same 
point on the ground on their way back down to the earth. It 
is very interesting to note how the 100% certainty in the 
context of a rock thrown up in the air changes into 100% 
uncertainty in the case of a rocket. 
Although all tasks in the first two categories were 
essentially concerned with the same problem situation, that 
is, the motion of an object in an inertial frame of 
reference (train and earth), and the tasks of the third 
category with the identification of a net force on a body 
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traveling with constant velocity, all students did respond 
by considering other irrelevant (from a Newtonian point of 
view) to the problem concepts. This also reconfirmed the 
fact that students construct knowledge by putting into 
relationship all the possible factors that might be involved 
in a given problem situation. 
The evidence provided by the thinking patterns of 
students strongly supports the premise of Phenomenography 
(Bowden et al., 1992; Marton, 1986), namely, that people 
understand each phenomenon in a number of ways. In looking 
at Tables 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16 one can see how strategies 
changed from task to task. The preconceptions for each 
strategy are also shown. The most common preconceptions are 
now discussed. 
Preconception 1: Motion Is Observed From A Point Considered 
At Rest Relative To The Surroundings 
For all students, including those who explicitly used 
the notion of frame of reference in some contexts, motion 
was also viewed from a point either on the ground or on the 
fixed stars in other contexts. It is quite interesting to 
note that even those students who had consistently used the 
ground as their frame of reference both in the context of 
the motion of the ball inside and outside the train (see 
Tasks 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, and Tables 1, 2, 3, and 4 in 
Chapter IV, and Tables 12 and 13 in this Chapter) and in the 
context of the firing of the cannon ball and the projection 
of the rocket (see Tasks 8 and 9, and Tables 6 and 7 in 
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Chapter IV, and Table 14 in this Chapter) "observed" motion 
from a point on the fixed stars in the context of the 
sailing of the boats and flying of the airplanes around the 
earth (see Tasks 14 and 15, and Tables 8 and 9 in Chapter 
IV, and Table 15 in this Chapter). When asked about what 
was the frame of reference in the latter case all those 
students thought that it should be "the space" or "something 
outside." And when they were requested to compare the 
situations of the firing of the cannon ball and the 
projection of the rocket with those of the sailing of the 
boats and the flying of the airplanes around the earth, most 
students reasoned that "the frame of reference changes" or 
that ''it is easier or more convenient to see it from space," 
while two students characteristically said: 
When I'm on the ground I can see where the cannon ball 
or rocket falls •.. I can stay near the cannon and 
watch the cannon ball land farther to the left ... But 
I must be outside the earth if I want to see the boats 
or the planes go around it. 
We must move outside the frame of reference (earth] if 
we want to see the whole thing. 
Another point worth mentioning and which is consistent 
with the view that motion is observed from a point is that 
many students used the notion of the "person" on the frame 
of reference as the frame of reference. Evidence for this 
anthropomorphic conception of the frame of reference is also 
provided by the "me" as a frame of reference in several 
contexts. 
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Preconception 2: Motion Is Considered Relative To The Frame 
of Reference When Motion Takes Place Inside The Frame of 
Reference 
It made a difference in the thinking of most students 
whether the body is moving inside or outside a moving 
vehicle. "Moving inside" was associated with motion 
relative to the vehicle, while "moving outside" was 
associated with motion relative to the ground or the stars. 
Lie (1985) found the same preconception. 
It is quite interesting to note the difference in the 
responses, and, of course, the reasoning patterns of the 
same students. For although only one student thought that 
simultaneity is possible in the situation of the two balls 
moving outside along the roof of the compartment of the 
train (see Task 1 and Tables 1 and 2 in Chapter IV, and 
Table 12 in this Chapter), the idea that the balls can be 
caught simultaneously when the two people are inside a 
moving train was much more frequent (see Task 2 and Tables 1 
and 2 in Chapter IV). Four students thought as follows: 
One guy will catch the ball first because he is 
moving towards the ball. But inside the train, I 
don't know, I think I'm confused now. 
When you are outside, the frame of reference is the 
earth, therefore the guy in the back of the train will 
catch the ball first because the ball travels a 
shorter distance. But inside the train, the frame of 
reference is the train, so both guys should catch it at 
the same time. Well, I think •.. yes, I'm sure both 
guys will catch it at the same time. 
Well, when you are inside the train things should be 
different; because the air is moving. 
There is a difference when you are inside because 
everything is moving with the train. Everything is 
part of the frame of reference. 
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Preconception 3: Motion Is Considered Relative To The Frame 
Of Reference Due To The Atmosphere Inside The Frame Of 
Reference 
It made a difference in the thinking of two 
students whether the object in motion is inside the 
"air" or "atmosphere" of the train (see Task 2 and Table 1 
and 2 in Chapter IV). For "if the air where pumped out of 
the car compartment of the train" things would be different 
"because the frame of reference would change." Or, as the 
other student thought, "when there is air inside the train 
we can define a frame of reference; but with no air, the 
frame of reference becomes the earth." Although both 
students reasoned that if there were no air inside the 
compartment of the train the person in the back would catch 
the ball first because "he is moving towards the ball" (thus 
adopting the ground as their reference point and using 
perception like the majority of the students), the idea that 
the existence of an atmosphere implies the establishment of 
a frame of reference cannot be dismissed. 
However, the notion of atmosphere was invoked by 
another three students in the context of the rising of an 
air balloon (see Task 10 and Tables 6 and 7 in Chapter IV). 
When those three students were asked to compare the motion 
of a cannon-ball with that of an air balloon they explicitly 
spoke of the velocity of the balloon (it is not as great as 
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that of the cannon ball) as well as of the fact that "an air 
balloon is rising" while "a cannon ball is fired." And one 
student (of those three) who had previously thought that a 
cannon ball or rocket should return to the same point 
because the situation is similar to the one involving a ball 
thrown straight up from a moving train, did not think in a 
similar manner in the context of the air balloon. For as he 
stated, "the air balloon returns to the same point because 
as it's going up in the air, the atmosphere pushes it 
along." This provides additional confirmation of the 
pri~acy of the context over the universality of the laws of 
motion! 
Another interesting point is that those three students 
who used the notion of atmosphere to predict the motion of 
the air balloon adopted the earth as a frame of reference. 
Although this adoption does not provide evidence for an 
understanding of the concept "frame of reference," it does 
show that the students' "observation point" was on the 
earth. All three students did believe and explain that "we 
can stay above the same place if there are no strong winds," 
and that by going very high in a hot-air balloon, they could 
not land in a different place, as the rest of the students 
thought, despite the fact that one of them had his 
reservations: 
But this way of travelling would be very tiring and 
dangerous too .... The crossing of the Atlantic would 
require many hours •.. and we never know where we 
will land because there are strong air currents over 
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the Atlantic. And the earth moves from west to east, 
so we could only go west. But still, it can be very 
dangerous .••• Oh, you said we neglect wind. Then I 
suppose it would take many hours ... oh, yes, it takes 
only 24 hours for a complete rotation ... so it wouldn't 
take that long .•. but ... I think we don't do this 
kind of travelling because we cannot neglect the wind. 
But as the earth spins it creates a wind ... air 
currents. 
However, what is interesting is the fact that all three 
students agreed that "if there were no atmosphere the 
balloon would never return to the same point." And two of 
them also changed the frame of reference, or rather the 
observation point, since perception became their thinking 
strategy thus viewing the motion of two objects--the earth 
and the balloon--relative to the fixed stars. 
Preconception 4: Motion Is Considered Relative To The Frame 
Of Reference When The Moving Body Is In Contact With The 
Frame Of Reference 
It made a difference whether the balls are moving in 
the air or whether they are rolling on the floor of the 
compartment of the train {see Table 12 in this Chapter). 
For five students the rolling of the balls {see Task 3 and 
Tables 1 and 2 in Chapter IV, and Table 12 in this Chapter) 
implied that motion should be considered relative to the 
train because "the balls are part of the motion of the 
train'', or "the balls are traveling the same distances." 
And two of those five students used the same strategy in the 
context of two boats sailing around the earth {see Task 14 
and Tables 9 and 10 in Chapter IV, and Table 15). And in 
the case of the two planes flying around the earth all 
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20 students thought that one plane should arrive first at 
the point from which the planes took off (see Task 15 and 
the same Tables as above). 
It is quite interesting to be mentioned in passing that 
even those two students who appeared to have the concepts of 
relativity and frame of reference, since they used those 
concepts with consistency both in the context of the ball 
moving inside the train (Tasks 2, 3, 4, and 5) and the boats 
sailing around the earth (Task 14), did not used the earth 
as a frame of reference. For they thought that "the 
airplanes are not on the earth any more." In their 
phenomenographic study, Bowden et al. (1992) have also 
identified a category of this type of student reasoning. 
Preconception 5: Motion Is Considered Relative To The Frame 
Of Reference When The Body Is Moving Towards The Frame Of 
Reference 
It made a considerable difference in the thinking of 
students whether an object is projected upwards from the 
ground or whether it is dropped from a height to the ground. 
For although 18 students approached motion from an 
absolute point of view and thought that a rocket cannot 
return to the same point on the ground (see Task 9 and Table 
6 in Chapter IV, and Table 14), 13 students did think, by 
viewing motion as being relative to the ground or the stars, 
that an iron ball will hit the ground at a point that is 
directly under the point of release (see responses to Task 
13 in Chapter IV). Another interpretation of the responses 
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to Tasks 9 and 13 is also given in the section of Knowledge 
Representation. 
Preconception 6: Two Observers See Different Events 
For some students a person on the train and a person on 
the ground see, not only different paths and velocities of 
the ball thrown straight up in the air (see Table 13), but 
also different events taking place since the former sees the 
ball coming straight down to his/her hands, while the latter 
sees the ball landing behind him/herself. And the opposite 
is also true. One student, in fact, gave a very rational 
explanation, which, however, shows the effect, and at the 
same time the limitation, of analogies on understanding 
abstract concepts. 
It's like the two people, one standing and the other 
running in the rain. The one standing still sees the 
raindrops falling straight down •.. if he holds the 
umbrella straight up. But to the other guy who's 
running the raindrops appear to be coming at an angle 
..• they see different things ... they are both 
right, but this is how they perceive it ... and one 
will be soaked to the skin even if he's running with an 
umbrella in his hand, unless he changes the direction 
of the umbrella .... So they see different paths, one 
straight, vertical, and one at an angle .•• and the 
guy standing still will be dry ... and the other 
one will be wet in the front, unless like I said he 
turns his umbrella like that. 
Preconception 7: Uniform Straight Line Motion Is The Result 
Of The Interaction Between Two Opposing Forces Of Different 
Magnitude 
It makes a difference whether an object is moving away 
from any interactions, as in the case of a spaceship 
traveling in outer space (see responses to Task 16 in 
Chapter IV and Table 16 below), or whether it is moving 
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under the influence of two forces of which one is opposing 
the object's motion, as in the case of car traveling on a 
windy day or a box being pushed along the floor (see 
responses to Tasks 17 and 20 in Chapter IV). One student 
said: 
When I'm pushing the box the force I'm applying must be 
greater than the force of friction. On the spaceship 
there are no forces .•. it (the spaceship) is moving 
because it has a momentum that was given by the 
engine ••. it will move forever unless there are 
forces to slow it down ••.. If there is a force in 
the opposite direction, the force from the engine must 
overcome this force •.. a force must be supplied 
continuously, otherwise the spaceship would slow down. 
Is is very interesting to be mentioned that, although the 
preconception that motion with constant velocity implies a 
net force began to surface in the context of a moving car, 
the preconception that an object can move with constant 
speed only in the absence of resistive forces were 
identified when students were questioned about the initial 
problem task with the spaceship, to which they had 
apparently given the accepted Newtonian response. 
I don't see any difference between the spaceship, 
the car, and the box, if the spaceship is moving inside 
an atmosphere. 
There is no net force on the spaceship ... it just 
moves .•. it is carried ... because there was a 
force that set it in motion ... (this) force acted 
for a very short time .... we are in outer space, but 
if there are forces in the opposite direction ••. 
then there must be a force in the forward direction. 
You asked me about the force on the spaceship .... If 
you told me that the spaceship has to overcome friction 
. I think the net force on the spaceship is the 
force applied by the engine and the force of friction . 
. • yes like the car moving on the road. 
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This type of reasoning provides evidence that motion is 
viewed as the result of two competing forces even when the 
problem situation explicitly states that the object in 
question is moving with constant velocity. Halloun and 
Hestenes (1985a) reported identical findings. 
Preconception 8: Motion Of Objects In The Forward Direction 
Once They Are Thrown Up In The Air From A Frame Of Reference 
Is Due To A Force Supplied By The Motion Of The Frame Of 
Reference 
Seven students believed that a softball, once thrown up 
in the air by a person standing on the floor of moving train 
(see Table 13), will continue to move forward while it is 
also moving up and down in the air (inside the car 
compartment), because there is a force supplied by the 
train. 
It is the force of the train ... because the train is 
moving. 
We know that whatever we throw up ... falls back down 
to our hand .... If there is no force on the ball 
while it's going up in the air it will land behind. 
Motion without a force? I mean, there has to be a 
force, otherwise everything would hit the back of the 
train ..• this doesn't happen. 
Three of those seven students also entertain the same 
preconception in the context of the motion of the softball 
thrown up in the air from the roof (outside) of the train. 
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Table 16 
Reasoning Strategies and Preconceptions for Problem 
Situation of Object Moving with Constant Velocity 
TASK 
16 
STRATEGY 
(a) Linking net force to 
constant velocity 
en = a) 
PRECONCEPTION 
There is a force 
in the direction 
of the spaceship's 
motion because 
the spaceship is 
in motion (n = 4) 
Objects in motion 
are acted upon by 
a continuous force 
because the force 
that sets objects 
in motion has a 
limited range of 
action (n = 3) 
Forces producing 
acceleration have 
an increasing 
magnitude (n = 6) 
A spaceship can 
move with constant 
velocity because 
the force supplied 
by the propulsion 
engine is applied 
in short bursts 
en= 4) 
There are forces 
producing 
acceleration and 
those maintaining 
constant velocity 
en = 4 > 
(table continues) 
TASK STRATEGY 
17 
18 
(b) Linking zero net force 
to constant velocity 
(n = 12) 
(a) Linking the resultant 
of the forces exerted 
by the engine and the 
wind to constant 
velocity (n = 16) 
(b) Linking zero net force 
to constant velocity 
<n = 4) 
(a) Linking net force 
to motion along 
an incline (n = 17) 
(b) Linking zero net 
force to constant 
velocity (n = 3) 
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PRECONCEPTION 
An object can 
move in the 
absence of a net 
force only if it 
is set in motion 
and there are no 
forces to slow it 
down (n = 6) 
The force exerted 
from the engine 
is greater than 
the force exerted 
by the wind 
(n = 16) 
There is a force 
in the direction 
of the object's 
motion resulting 
from one 
accelerating 
force and one 
decelerating 
force (n = 4) 
Motion along an 
an incline is 
due to two forces 
of different 
magnitude (n = 17) 
(table continues) 
TASK 
19 
20 
STRATEGY 
(a) Linking greater net 
force to the motion 
of an object with 
greater mass (n = 19) 
(b) Linking zero net 
force to constant 
velocity (n = 1) 
(a) Linking the resultant 
of the force exerted 
by the person and the 
force of friction to 
constant velocity 
<n = 11) 
(b) Linking zero net 
force to constant 
velocity (n = 3) 
Some Comments On Preconceptions 
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PRECONCEPTION 
Objects with 
greater mass are 
acted upon by 
greater force 
<n = 19) 
The force by the 
person is greater 
than the force 
of friction 
<n = 11) 
Explanations about why a particular student has thought 
about a particular problem task the way he or she has are 
usually taken to be mere speculations. Why, for example, 
did the two students who used vector composition of 
velocities in Tasks 1 and 2--incorrectly though since they 
did not take into account the different distances covered by 
the two balls--not use this same strategy in the context of 
the two balls rolling on the floor of the compartment of the 
train (Task 3)? Why did only one of these two students use 
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vector composition of velocities to predict the motion of a 
cannon-ball (Task 8)? Why did the two students who invoked 
the notion of atmosphere to predict the motion of the balls 
inside the train (Task 2) not use the same notion in the 
context of the rising balloon (Task 15) given the fact that 
the notion was invoked by three other students? And why did 
that same student who had supposedly used with consistency 
the same strategy across three contexts not use vector 
composition in the context of the rocket (Task 9)? From a 
pedagogical point of view, however, it would be more 
appropriate to make a number of general points regarding 
preconceptions than concentrate on providing explanations 
about why or how these preconceptions have been developed. 
The Contextual nature of preconceptions. Like 
reasoning strategies, preconceptions are contextual since, 
for example, only two, of those five students who used 
"contact" as a criterion for judging whether or not an 
object belongs to the frame of reference (Task 3), thought 
that the boats (Task 14) move relative to the earth. The 
notion of "atmosphere" was invoked by two students in the 
context of the motion of a ball inside the car compartment 
of a train (Task 2), but not in the context of the rising 
air balloon (Task 10). Instead, three other students made 
reference to "atmosphere" in the latter context. 
The inter-relationship of preconceptions. 
Preconceptions are inter-related and a certain response 
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could very well result from more than one preconception. 
Five students, for example, thought that once a ball is 
thrown straight up in the air by a person standing on the 
roof of the moving train the ball will land behind the 
person because "the ball is outside the frame of reference'' 
while two had also the preconception that "there is no force 
acting in the forward direction because the ball is not 
moving inside the train." However, it should be stressed 
that for each problem task there was a primary preconception 
that led students to reason the way they did, and secondary 
preconceptions were identified upon further questioning. 
The latent nature of preconceptions. Preconceptions do 
not become evident from the responses. Preconceptions are 
inferred either from reasoning strategies or through further 
questioning about those strategies. Most of the time 
students were requested to compare and contrast their 
responses to certain problem tasks. It was after they 
became aware of their strategies in thinking about problem 
tasks that preconceptions were identified. 
For example, in the case of a rocket fired vertically 
from the ground (Task 9), the great majority of students 
used perception as their reasoning strategy, and the 
preconception that ''motion is observed from the fixed stars" 
was inferred from that strategy and from their response to 
the question about what was the frame of reference. Yet it 
was upon further questioning that the preconception "an 
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object moving away from the frame of reference does not 
belong in the frame of reference" was identified for three 
students. It was also through further questioning that a 
preconception about force and motion was identified. For 
although 12 students thought that a ball, thrown straight up 
by a person standing in the car compartment of a train, will 
land in the person's hand because, while the ball is moving 
up and down in the air, it is also moving forward {Task 4), 
seven students thought so because they had the preconception 
that "there is a force acting in the forward direction that 
carries the ball forward." Similarly, it took students some 
time beyond the accepted response and the correct strategy, 
that is, a spaceship is not acted upon by a net force 
because it is moving with constant velocity {Task 16), to 
give the preconception that "an object can move with uniform 
straight line motion only when there are no resistive forces 
to oppose the object's motion." 
Three students who had approached motion relative to 
the train in contexts involving the motion of a ball inside 
the train {Tasks 2, 3, and 4), gave the accepted response 
through an accepted strategy by observing motion from the 
ground in another context {Task 5). It is obvious that for 
those three students the preconception of viewing motion 
from the ground was totally undetected in the context of 
Tasks 2, 3, and 4. 
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The implicit and explicit nature of preconceptions. It 
should be recognized that preconceptions can be implicit or 
explicit. The idea that motion is observed from the ground 
or the fixed stars was tacit for some students, while other 
students explicitly stated their preference for that 
selection. For example, the three students who changed 
their point of observation expressed awareness of it. Yet, 
they could not find an explanation as to why they changed 
their point of observation when the ball was thrown up from 
the roof of the train (Task 5). They thought that the path 
of the ball, once in the air, "should be a curve (parabola) 
because that's how we see it." They also had a conceptual 
difficulty with the path of the ball as viewed by a person 
standing on the roof of the moving train. The same 
preconception was also had by the two students who employed 
vector composition in Tasks 1 and 2, and by one of those two 
students who used in Task 8. 
With regard to the nature of preconceptions it should 
be mentioned that several preconceptions about force were 
explicit. For when asked about the magnitude of the force 
acting on a spaceship moving with constant velocity, six 
students stated that the force is constant because if it 
were not the spaceship would accelerate. And they went on 
to identify forces of increasing magnitude as forces 
producing acceleration, and forces of constant magnitude as 
forces maintaining constant speed. 
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Preconceptions vs misconceptions. Preconceptions are 
not necessarily misconceptions, but instead ideas that are 
at variance with the scientific ones. For example the 
preconception that "contact implies that motion is relative 
to the frame of reference" is not a misconception. Yet it 
is an idea that is different from the one used by physicists 
since the latter do not make such a distinction. And the 
fact that the visual perception of motion is a strategy of 
the human perceptive system does not make even a perceptual 
type of thinking a wrong thinking if the strategy is 
acceptable. Yet "perceptual thinking" is not scientific 
thinking since a differentiation between a moving vehicle, 
the ground and the fixed stars is implicitly or explicitly 
made by the students. 
Similarly the preconception "frames of reference are 
closed vehicles" is not a misconception but rather an 
incomplete idea, since physicists do not distinguish between 
"closed" or "open" vehicles. Nor do they differentiate 
between vehicles and frames of reference, or between 
vehicles that are "full with air" and vehicles from which 
air has been pumped out. On the other hand, the idea that 
there is a net force on a body traveling with constant speed 
is a misconception since this is an idea that is not only 
different from the scientific one but is also a wrong one. 
For there is no net force acting on a body moving with 
constant velocity. Empirical evidence, either through 
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direct experience or computer simulation, that contradicts 
the belief in the existence of a net force in the direction 
of motion can show that this belief is in fact a 
misconception. 
Schematic Representation 
From the identification of the strategies and 
preconceptions an inference about what concepts exist and 
how they are organized in the students' cognitive structure 
in regard to their model of motion can be given. This 
content and its organization is certainly based upon the 
number of problem tasks used in the present study, and there 
is the possibility that other concepts might also exist. 
The conceptual organization of the student's model of 
motion is represented by two major types of schemata as 
shown in Figures 24 and 25. It should be mentioned though 
that despite the similarities some students' schemata 
contained more concepts than other students' schemata. In 
general, however, these two types of schemata provide a 
comprehensive representation that is particularly useful 
from a pedagogical point of view when a comparison with the 
accepted scientific schema (Figure 26) is made. 
As can be seen, Figure 24 represents an intuitive 
schema based upon perception and everyday experiences with 
motion and forces. This type of schema was employed in the 
thinking of those students who did not have any 
understanding of the Newtonian conceptions. On the other 
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hand, Figure 25 represents a schema combining intuitive and 
scientific concepts. This type of schema contains both the 
concept of frame of reference and the preconception of 
motion as observed from a reference point. This inference 
is based upon the fact that students who used explicitly the 
term frame of reference and viewed motion relative to that 
frame of reference--train--also approached motion relative 
to the ground or the fixed stars in subsequent contexts. In 
addition, it contains other concepts related to the frame of 
reference such as "vehicle," "closed," and "atmosphere," 
since for some students, the concept of frame of reference 
was linked to a closed vehicle, while for some other 
students the notion of "atmosphere" was further employed. 
The notion of being in contact with a vehicle, was also used 
by some students who intuitively approached motion relative 
to the frame of reference. Moreover, an intuitive 
differentiation between two directions of motion, that is 
horizontal and vertical, was also made. For some students 
vertical motion, such as that of a ball thrown up by a 
person standing on the floor of the car compartment of a 
train, was related to motion relative to the frame of 
reference, while horizontal motion, as in the case of a ball 
moving along the length of the train, was approached 
relative to the ground. 
In regard to the causal link between zero net force and 
motion, there are additional concepts related to that link. 
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As shown in Figure 25, several students differentiated 
between "moving" and "resistive" forces, while the magnitude 
of a force was viewed as being either "constant" or 
"increasing." Constant magnitude forces were linked to 
velocity or deceleration, while increasing magnitude forces 
were associated with acceleration. However, as can be seen 
in Figure 25, the Newtonian link between constant magnitude 
forces and acceleration was also present in the schema of 
some students. 
Figure 24. Network Representation of Intuitive Schema of 
Motion. 
Figure 25. Network Representation of Schema Combining 
Intuitive and Scientific Concepts. 
212 
Figure 26. Network Representation of Newtonian Schema 
of Motion. 
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Knowledge Representation 
With regard to the representational format of the 
students' knowledge, both propositional and analogical 
representations seem to exist. Although an interpretation, 
the reasoning strategies and preconceptions do provide some 
evidence that the concepts of motion and force are stored 
not only in a propositional form, and hence in a schematic 
structure representd by a networks of concepts (Figure 28), 
but also in an analogical form. And although propositional 
representations of the concepts of force and motion appeared 
to exist in all students, the fact that students employed 
perception suggests that visual images do play an important 
role in their reasoning process. Moreover, for some 
students analogical representations were predominant as this 
became evident from their responses to the task of the 
motion of a ball thrown upwards from the roof of the train 
and from the hands of a running person (Tasks 5 and 6) as 
well as from the responses to the problem situation of 
string hanging from the roof of a van (Task 21). 
In regard to Tasks 5 and 6, students employed visual 
perception of two separate objects (ball-train, ball-human 
body) moving in two different directions--the ball moving 
upwards and the train or human body in the forward 
direction. However, it was in the case of the ball thrown 
up in the air by a running person (Task 6) in particular 
that students provided evidence for the existence of 
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analogical representations. In thinking aloud three 
students said: 
I'm moving under the ball •.. I have done this ... 
I know it. 
We are running under the ball ... it's like the train 
.•. but I'm not 100% sure. But I'm sure that If I 
throw a ball while I'm running the ball will land 
behind me. • Look my head is moving under the ball. 
I don't know how to explain it, but as you throw the 
ball up you are moving away from the ball ..•• It's 
similar to the situation with the guy on the roof of 
the train, but here you are also involved ... I mean 
when you are on the train, you are just moving with the 
train ••• when you are actually running ... I think 
this is a different kind of motion •.. problem. 
now you confuse me. 
Even the only student who had the notion that motion is 
defined relative to a frame of reference (as this became 
evident from his responses to all five tasks of the first 
category) thought that 
this case is different because the person is moving 
under the ball .... Here [in the train] the person is 
also moving under the ball ... but this is 
different. I don't know why .... But I know •.. 
and I cannot explain it. 
In discussing these responses, it should be pointed out 
that there is a difference between the visual image of a 
string hanging straight down from the roof of a van moving 
in straight line with constant speed (this image has been 
acquired and retained from personal experiences while inside 
moving vehicles), and mental images like those of "moving 
under a ball." For mental images have been acquired not 
only through visual perception but also through personal 
experiences with the world. However, as Johnson {1987) 
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argues, these mental images fall in between visual images 
and abstract propositional structures, and they are 
therefore partly analogical and are stored in the episodic 
memory. 
Two further points, however, in regard to analogical 
representations need to be made. The first point is that 
the present study provides some evidence that visual 
representations might give rise to propositional 
representations. For as the majority of the responses to 
two similar problem tasks demonstrated, an iron ball dropped 
from the top of a high building would land at the foot of 
the building, that is, at a point on the ground that was 
directly under the iron ball at the moment the latter was 
released {Task 13), while a rocket launched vertically from 
the ground would not return to the same point on its way 
back {Task 9). Although for some students the 
preconceptions of "moving away or towards the ground or 
frame of reference" was responsible for their response to 
those two tasks, for other students the visual 
representation of a building on the ground might have made 
them established in their mind a local frame of reference 
and hence treat motion relative to the earth, while in the 
problem situation with the rocket motion was approached 
relative to space. This interpretation becomes evident from 
the responses of some students: 
The iron ball dropped from the building moves in 
straight line and falls parallel to the building 
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•.. it (iron ball) will strike the ground at the 
foot of the building ...• The rocket is moving in 
space ••. away from the earth ... I may be wrong, 
but that's how I understand it. 
The building is attached to the earth .•• the 
building moves with the earth .... The rocket is 
moving alone. 
The earth is moving but the building is also moving 
with the earth • the building is fixed on the 
earth •.. so the iron ball will land at the foot of 
the building. 
The earth and the building are moving together ..• 
they are on the same frame of reference ... the guy 
who dropped the ball was on the frame of reference. 
But the rocket is moving away from the frame of 
reference. 
The second point is that analogical representations are 
not contextual. This means that, unlike propositional 
representations, analogical representations are not tied to 
the context in which the concepts of force and motion are 
required. For as the thinking of many students about the 
situation of a spaceship traveling in outer space showed 
(Task 16), the mental image of "two competing forces" (a 
moving one and a resistive one), acquired through 
sensorimotor activities and certainly in contexts that did 
not involve airplanes (Task 18) and spaceships (Task 16) did 
in fact guide the reasoning process. 
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CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Summary 
The present study investigated how undergraduate 
university students who have completed one semester of 
coursework in non-calculus general physics with elements in 
Newtonian mechanics understand the Newtonian model of 
motion. For the evaluation of conceptual understanding 
paper and pencil tasks in an interview mode were employed 
throughout the study, while a short clinical interview in 
the beginning was used to assess prior knowledge such as the 
concept of relativity, frame of reference, equivalence 
between motion and rest and Newton's First Law, and contexts 
in which this knowledge is utilized. 
For the construction of the problem tasks two research 
approaches to assessing conceptual understanding were 
employed: Phenomenography and Rule Assessment Methodology. 
The former is based on the philosophical notion that people 
perceive, conceptualize and understand each phenomenon and 
concept in a number of qualitatively different ways; the 
latter is a research methodology based on the idea that 
people use with consistency a number of reasoning strategies 
depending upon the context in question, and it is therefore 
incumbent upon the researcher to identify all possible 
strategies by constructing contexts in which the same 
concept is embedded. 
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The problem tasks were grouped into the following three 
categories: 
1. Motion of an object in a frame of reference. 
2. Motion of an object in the frame of reference of 
the earth. 
3. Motion of an object with constant velocity. 
The problem tasks assessed the following three 
fundamental notions of the Newtonian model of motion: 
1. Uniform straight line motion is equivalent to rest. 
2. Motion in general is relative to an inertial frame 
of reference. 
3. Uniform straight line motion can exist in the 
absence of a net force. 
The responses were analyzed by considering the accepted 
and the alternative conception(s), and then for each 
alternative conception reasoning strategies and 
preconceptions were identified. However, preconceptions 
were found, even in the accepted conceptions. Finally an 
inferrence about the schematic representation and about 
knowledge representation in general was made. 
It was confirmed that conceptual understanding is a 
complex process involving many interrelated factors that 
depend upon personal experiences and beliefs. There is 
evidence that the context has primacy over the content since 
the same concept was understood differently depending upon 
the context in which the concept was required. There is 
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also strong evidence that in all students' thinking 
perception played a major role. For in approaching problems 
involving the motion of an object in a moving frame of 
reference, all students thought in terms of two separate 
bodies (the object and the frame of reference) moving 
relative to each other, but nevertheless viewed motion from 
their own absolute point of view without reference to the 
velocities of the objects and the distances they traveled. 
This "absolute point of observation" was either on the 
ground or on the fixed stars. 
With regard to the schematic representation, two major 
types of schemata were identified. The first type is an 
intuitive schema derived from the perception of motion as 
well as from bodily experiences that suggest a causal link 
between motion and forces (the moving ones and the resistive 
ones). This type of schema is a crude one, simplistic, yet 
convenient and explanatory. The second type of schema is a 
mixture of the intuitive one and a scientific one. This 
schema is more complicated with many contradictory concepts 
which, however, exist in the students' cognitive structure 
without any contradiction. These findings about the 
existence of two superimposed schemata without apparent 
contradiction reconfirm the conclusion of previous studies 
(di Sessa, 1982; Gilbert et al., 1982; Halloun & Hestenes, 
1985a; Reif & Larkin, 1991; Viennot, 1979). 
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The responses to the various tasks also suggest that 
the concepts of force and motion are stored not only in the 
form of propositions, but also in the form of visual images, 
and mental-image schemata resulting from personal bodily 
experiences. In short, the concept of force and motion are 
represented both propositionally and analogically. The 
first type of schema refers to analogical representations, 
while the second type is a combination of both analogical 
and propositional representations. And it deserves to be 
pointed out that in some students those analogical 
representations seemed to be much "stronger" than, and 
remained quite separate from, the propositional ones in 
certain contexts. 
The implications of the existence of those two types of 
schemata for instructional practices are that the following 
preconceptions should be the starting point of the learning 
process if understanding is the goal: 
1. Frames of reference are observation points. 
2. Frames of reference are closed vehicles. 
3. Objects move relative to (move along with) the 
frame of reference because the objects are moving inside the 
frame of reference. 
4. Objects belong in the frame of reference only when 
they are in contact with it. 
5. Two observers, one on the ground and the other on a 
frame of reference see not only different paths and 
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velocities for a moving object, but also different events 
involving the object. 
6. An object dropped from a point high on the frame of 
reference belongs in the frame of reference because the 
object is moving towards the frame of reference. 
7. An object projected straight up from a frame of 
reference does not belong in the frame of reference because 
the object is moving away from it. 
8. An object rising straight up from the ground 
returns to the same point on the ground on its way back down 
because the object moves along with the atmosphere of the 
earth. 
9. An object continues to move in the forward 
direction once it is thrown straight up in the air from a 
frame of reference because there is a forward force supplied 
by the motion of the frame of reference. 
10. An object in motion, including straight line 
motion, is acted upon by a net force in the direction of 
motion. 
11. A constant force produces constant velocity while 
an increasing force produces acceleration. 
12. The effect of a constant force depends upon its 
magnitude. 
13. An object can move in the absence of a net force 
only if there are no resistive forces. 
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14. The net force responsible for the uniform motion 
of an object results from the interaction of two opposing 
forces, the accelerating force and the resistive force. 
15. An object of greater mass is acted upon by greater 
net force even when the object is moving with constant 
velocity. 
Conclusion 
Students demonstrated an everyday--common sense--
understanding based on perception and past experiences with 
the world. However, they did not have a conceptual 
understanding of the Newtonian model because they had 
difficulty in: 
1. Treating motion always relative to a frame of 
reference. 
2. Identifying zero net force on an object moving with 
constant velocity across all contexts. 
3. Identifying the equivalence between motion and rest. 
4. Using the same concept with consistency in a variety 
of contexts. 
Recommendations 
If we, as science educators, take seriously and espouse 
the shift from behaviourism to cognitive science, then it 
goes without saying that understanding should be the goal of 
any science lesson. More than a decade ago, Resnick {1983) 
made it quite clear that new findings in the area of 
cognitive science necessitate new approaches to teaching and 
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learning. More than a decade, however, has passed; and, 
despite the energy, effort, and talent on the part of 
excellent instructors, "understanding" is seen as a far-
fetched dream, let alone a reality in classrooms at both the 
high school and college level. 
True, it took mankind 2000 years to model 
successfully phenomena of force and motion. It would be 
therefore paradoxical to expect students to acquire an 
understanding of the Newtonian model in one or two years, 
let alone in one semester! It is also true that visual 
images and the problem of language will always exist--
perception is a form of understanding, and motion in 
everyday language is fundamentally different from rest--and 
that bodily experiences will inevitably help develop 
intuitive schemata, and hence "mini theories" and 
preconceptions about force and motion. However, this type 
of reasoning does not absolve science educators and 
instructors from their purpose, that is helping students, at 
all levels of education, to "truly" understand. But how 
could they achieve this purpose, given the existence of both 
intuitive and scientifico-intuitive explanatory schemata, as 
well as the inevitability of the development and 
strengthening of those schemata? 
Thus far science educators and cognitive scientists 
have been stressing a number of strategies for helping 
students understand, and for treating their preconceptions, 
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such as clarification of student ideas at all levels of 
instruction, challenging these ideas through counter 
examples, using precise and unambiguous language, 
differentiating between Newtonian and everyday language, and 
finally applying a concept in a variety of contexts {Gorsky 
& Finegold, 1992; Hadzigeorgiou, 1987; Posner et al., 1982, 
Driver & Oldham, 1986). However, the inevitability of the 
development of intuitive schemata as well as their 
persistence into adulthood, point to another alternative 
avenue. This avenue is the development of a strong 
scientific schema that can be called upon whenever the 
situation arises without the constraints imposed on thinking 
by the intuitive schema. 
The development of a strong schema is an idea 
conceived while conducting the interviews. I noticed quite 
often that, for the students who had a partial understanding 
of the Newtonian conceptions, a kind of "intellectual 
struggle" between the Newtonian conceptions and the 
intuitive schema was taking place. I therefore postulated 
that it is the "stronger schema" that determines the final 
retrieval of concepts, and hence the reasoning strategy 
employed in a certain problem task. And for almost all 
students the retrieval took place from the intuitive and not 
from the scientific, which, as was interpreted, are 
intermingled. The following specific recommendations could 
very well show that in the long run (although this will be a 
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matter of another longitudinal study to determine) the only 
remedy to developing ''scientific" understanding is to help 
students develop the scientific Newtonian schema through a 
conscious effort on the part of teachers. This approach may 
very well prove to be more effective and more efficient than 
the conceptual change approach. These specific 
recommendations should be seen as steps, taken both jointly 
and independently, to developing and strengthening the 
Newtonian schema of motion. 
1. Provision of Advance Organizers and Schemata at a Very 
Early Age 
It is my belief that students should be helped to 
develop the scientific Newtonian schema from early on. It 
is therefore imperative that a conceptual framework be 
developed at a very early age, and also strengthened in 
later years. But not just by teaching the scientific ideas, 
but rather by providing abstract ideas in a way that could 
become understood. 
Taking into account the shift from the concrete to the 
abstract, the notion that all knowledge is abstract, and 
therefore general concepts and ideas that in some way can 
become understood should be introduced even to young 
children, appears to be making more sense now than it did 
ten or twenty years ago. However, it would be totally 
unrealistic to expect students at the elementary level to 
understand abstact concepts in a propositional form. For 
this reason the fundamental ideas should be introduced to 
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students through learning episodes that deliberately contain 
general ideas. These episodes will serve as advance 
organizers that will help subsume other less inclusive 
concepts through progressive differentiation. In addition, 
the episodes will be remembered due to the "contextual set 
up." Given the by now famous idea that the most important 
factor influencing learning is the prior conceptions and 
experiences of the learner (Ausubel et al., 1978), the 
utilization of sensorimotor activities becomes justified. 
In order for the first law to be introduced through an 
advance organizer, "action of forces" should be the starting 
point. An object, like a stone or ball, tied to a piece of 
string that is twirled around in a circle means action of a 
force; this is what students, at all levels, feel because it 
is real. Following this line of reasoning, the advance 
organizer "circular motion means the action of a force" that 
can be "felt" by all students can initiate the instructional 
process. Once this general idea is assimilated, "straight 
line motion in the absence of a net force" can be subsumed 
under it. For it would be easier and much more meaningful 
for students to "see" and "feel" that once they release the 
string from their hand "the force they were applying becomes 
zero and the object moves in a straight line." (In 
addition, this particular advance organizer can help develop 
at a later stage a meaningful link between circular motion 
and acceleration.) Given the fact that Newton's First Law, 
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that is motion in the absence of net force, goes contrary to 
common experiences, then it would make more sense to start 
from those experiences. 
It is not news that the Newton's First Law poses the 
greatest conceptual problems, since motion in the absence of 
forces is a utopia and goes contrary to common sense. Yet, 
activities carefully designed and interpreted could help 
towards alleviating these problems. Walking, for example, 
over a trolley-car with constant speed could be used as an 
organizer that states that "uniform motion in straight line 
does not involve a net force," since students could "see" 
and "feel" that, by walking over it, the final displacement 
of the trolley-car is zero. But as was said, the 
sensorimotor experiences and their interpretation should be 
used simultaneously. If these two complementary activities 
are used at the same time, even the fundamental, but so 
difficult to grasp, notion that "rest and uniform straight 
line motion are equivalent," could be understood. For once 
students are encouraged to imagine themselves inside the car 
compartment of a train and predict in which direction their 
standing broad jump would be longer, while, at the same 
time, performing "live" the same jump inside the classroom, 
in all possible directions, and becoming aware that the 
earth is in fact a moving vehicle, conceptul problems 
associated with the Newtonian model would be alleviated. 
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Another advance organizer would be "forces are applied 
over time or distance." This particular organizer will 
subsume the concept of acceleration. Students can perform 
any kind of activity in which the concepts of impulse (F*t} 
and work (F*S} are embedded. For example, jumping, 
throwing, coming to a stop by use of an elastic or rope, and 
twirling an object tied to a piece of string are good 
experiences that will form a ''roof" under which new concepts 
and experiences will be subsumed. 
Certainly the second law is a quantitative definition 
of force, and does not pose those immense conceptual 
difficulties as does the first law. However, without a 
sound grasp of the concept of acceleration, students should 
not be expected to relate force to acceleration and 
therefore understand what the second law is all about. And 
there is also another problem that seems to complicate 
things further, namely, that the second law does not become 
manifest in daily experiences though its simple formula 
F=ma, as much as it does through its consequences, that is 
the concepts of impulse and work respectively. What all 
people experience in their daily life is "forces acting over 
a distance or over a time interval." People squeeze, push, 
pull, kick, slap and throw objects. And it is through these 
experiences that teachers should introduce the second law. 
But sensorimotor activities can also be used for the 
provision of schemata. The schema of Force, for example, 
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could be developed through an activity involving two 
students on skate-boards who are holding an extended piece 
of rope, and who are pulling the rope; first only one 
student pulls, then both pull. It is obvious that this 
activity does provide the Newtonian schema of force, namely, 
that forces act in pairs, and that these forces act in 
opposite directions. For regardless of whether only one 
student or both of them pull, motion will always take place 
in opposite directions. 
It should be recognized that learning episodes in the 
form of activities involving the child's own body, and which 
are designed in such a way that they contain unambiguously 
general ideas, seem to be a potential educational tool in 
the hands of science teachers. In actual fact, these 
episodes may well prove to be both an answer and a 
complement to current theories of learning since all three 
domains of the brain are involved simultaneously. In 
addition, they are the only way to introduce students to 
general and abstract ideas at an age in which propositions 
among concepts do not make sense at all, and at the same 
time help them with the unification of semantic and episodic 
knowledge, which, as the present study showed, can remain 
separate and quite isolated from each other. 
2. Reinterpretation of student Ideas about Sensorimotor 
Experiences 
Because intuitive schemata are embedded in, and stem 
from, bodily experiences with motion and forces, and because 
231 
these schemata have an explanatory power, students should be 
helped to reinterpret their experiences. For it is true 
that, although what students experience and feel is real, it 
is the interpretations of these experiences and feelings 
that develop, and subsequently reinforce through additional 
agents, the intuitive schemata. It is therefore imperative 
that several misinterpretations stemming from daily 
experiences be corrected at an early age before students 
move on to a higher level. A good example is the 
misinterpretation of the reverse thrust which gives rise to 
the preconception that the direction of the acceleration is 
opposite to that of the applied force. And yet this 
preconception can be changed once students are led to accept 
that there is no force pushing them backwards or forwards, 
but instead there are only contact forces that must be 
provided by the objects with which the human body is in 
contact. Another common misinterpretation is the idea that 
motion is the result of two competing forces, such as the 
force one applies to push a box, and the opposing force of 
friction. It is obvious that the reintepretation of the 
idea that the "pushing force is greater than the frictional 
force" should be the first priority of physics instructors 
when it comes to the introduction of the First Law. 
3. Reintroduction of a Concept at Different Grade Levels 
It should be emphasized that the progressive 
development of the concepts of the Newtonian model over a 
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period of six or eight years is much more realistic than 
their mastery in one year or a couple of semesters. Physics 
instructors should design activities that could demonstrate 
the coherence of the laws of motion as students move from 
the elementary grades throught high school and even 
university. It is quite certain that if the Laws of motion 
are introduced in this spiral fashion at all levels, by the 
time students leave senior-high school they will have a 
conceptual understanding comparable to that of a physicist. 
4. Explicit Teaching of the Newtonian Model 
Given that the Newtonian schema of motion is at 
variance with the intuitive schemata possessed by students, 
it would be unreasonable to expect students to understand 
the Newtonian concepts unless these concepts are defined and 
used in a way that explicitly shows the difference between 
the Newtonian and the common sense way of looking at 
phenomena of force and motion. It would be also unrealistic 
to expect students to "rediscover" the concepts of the 
Newtonian model if we take into account the fact that even 
Galileo himself had not completely abandoned the 
Aristotelian belief that the perfect and perpetual motion 
was circular. Moreover, the constraints of time imposed 
upon any curriculum and any instructional model do not allow 
for such "rediscoveries." 
Another reason why the explicit teaching of the 
Newtonian model is recommended is that it can facilitate 
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access. For as was discussed in the review of the 
literature, access is affected by the nature of the problem 
situations considered during the learning process, and 
therefore, not only the concepts but also the context and 
the conditions under which those concepts are applicable are 
of importance. If different contexts as well as the 
conditions that "trigger" the applicability of a concept are 
provided to students, access to relevant information is more 
likely to occur. In such a way students could abandon the 
perceptual type of thinking and instead use, for example, 
the notion that rest and uniform straight line motion are 
fundamentally equivalent whenever the appropriate context 
and conditions arise. 
The power of modeling is not my own idea since the 
explicit teaching of the particulate model of matter, the 
modeling of real-life objects as dimensionless particles, 
the Bohr model for the atom, to mention but a few, has been 
utilized by science educators with considerable success 
(Shelley, 1989). In the same fashion, students should be 
taught explicity the notion of frame of reference (and at 
the same time become aware that a frame of reference is 
different from "a point from which we just perceive 
motion"), the notion that motion in straight line with 
constant speed does not involve a net force, and, of course, 
the idea that rest and motion with constant speed in 
straight line are the same thing. The idea that students 
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should be taught explicitly the rules and techniques of 
modeling in general is remarked upon by Hestenes (1992), 
while Reif and Larkin (1991) have recommended the explicit 
teaching of scientific knowledge--its goals and structure. 
5. Use of Concept Mapping 
Taking into account the idea that our concepts in 
memory are not held as separate or scattered units but are 
highly organized into schematic sctructures (Anderson, 
1985), then a conscious effort on the part of physics 
instructors should be to develop and promote knowledge 
structure. Concept mapping of the concepts of the Newtonian 
model at every level of instruction would very much help 
towards this development and promotion. There is evidence 
that concept mapping can promote knowledge structure and 
hence enhance understanding (Heinze-Fry & Novak, 1990; Novak 
& Gowin, 1984). Also a recent study by Willerman and McHarg 
(1991) found evidence that concept mapping at the beginning 
of instruction resulted in better understanding. 
6. Careful Selection of Problem Tasks 
No doubt the selection of the problems that will be 
worked out under both guided and independent practice plays 
an important role. Yet that selection should be carefully 
done so that students become aware that a contradiction 
exists. This awareness of a contadiction, however, goes 
well beyond the Piagetian idea of disequilibration, since 
the latter implies a confusion between existing conceptions 
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and new knowledge, while the former is an awareness of the 
contradictions of one's own thoughts. For this reason, 
problems should be selected in such a way that the thinking 
strategy employed in one of the problems contradicts the 
thinking strategy employed in another. 
It is therefore crucial that a general problem 
situation is selected, and then specific contexts are 
devised, all of which address the same concept. However, 
these specific contexts do not imply just a multiplicity of 
contexts, but rather contexts that closely resemble one 
another. For only then will students become aware of their 
"implicit" or "tacit" reasoning strategies. And the 
advantage ensuing from this awareness will certainly result 
in a conceptual change as the interviews conducted during 
the present study showed. 
7. Reconsidering the Traditional Approach to Teaching 
Newtonian Mechanics 
The recommendation that the development and subsequent 
reinforcement of the Newtonian model of motion start at an 
early age through sensorimotor activities necessitates a 
reconsideration of our ideas about instructional design. So 
far students have been taught by starting from straight line 
motion, supposedly because it "looks" simpler, and then move 
on to circular motion. Or starting from bodies at rest and 
then move on to the study of bodies in motion, and teach 
first about acceleration and then move on to the concepts of 
impulse and work. "This procedure," as Ausubel et al. 
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(1978) remind us, "is effective with infrahumans and rote 
learning of nonsense materials" and not ''for meaningful 
learning" (p. 362). And the problems that continue to 
plague the teaching-learning process also tell us that this 
approach does not work. 
Perhaps it is time we started from circular motion and 
the action of forces; that is what is real and what students 
are aware of, not only during the lesson, but also when they 
are out of school. And after they get a grasp that 
"circular motion involves the action of forces" teachers can 
confidently introduce them to the first law. 
Although teaching strategies such as computer 
simulations through games where an object on the screen 
obeys the Newtonian laws of motion is a motivating way to 
introduce students to the Newtonian model, the effectiveness 
of such an approach for developing acceptable conceptions 
could be called into question. For understanding is 
contextual, and therefore students will be able to apply 
successfully the laws of motion while playing the Newtonian 
games, and yet retain the intuitive schema resulting from 
sensorimotor experiences. On the contrary, the provision of 
sensorimotor activities into which ideas that can subsume 
less inclusive concepts are embedded seems more promising. 
In actual fact, this may be the best approach, and, at the 
same time, a compromise to teach something that goes 
contrary to common experience through common experience. 
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APPENDIX A 
INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
The purpose of this study is to assess how university 
physics students understand concepts of Newtonian mechanics, 
that is, those of force and motion. The study is qualitative, 
and therefore no mathematical formulae are involved. There 
are no right or wrong answers; instead, any ideas and beliefs 
that you may have in your mind, both from instruction and 
personal experiences with the world, are important. 
Your participation in the study will involve an interview 
approximately one hour in length. Your participation is 
voluntary, there are no risks or discomforts involved, and you 
may terminate it at any time during the study. It is hoped 
that you will benefit from your participation, in the sense 
that you will acquire a better grasp of the concepts of force 
and motion. This study can be also seen as a complement to, 
and extension of, the physics course you are taking from Dr. 
Peter Hoekse and Dr. Roy Unruh. 
Dr. Susann Doody (273-2719, EDC 159) can provide you with 
additional information regarding the purpose of the study. 
You are also encouraged to ask further questions about the 
study after its completion. 
If you have questions concerning your rights as a 
participant of a research project you may wish to call the 
office of the Human subjects Coordinator, University of 
Northern Iowa, (319-273-2748). 
I am fully aware of the nature and extent of my 
participation in this study as stated above, and 
the possible risks arising from it. I hereby agree 
to participate in this study. I ackowledge that I 
have received a copy of this consent statement. 
Signature of Participant Date 
Printed name of Participant Date 
Signature of Investigator Date 
October 15, 1993 
Yannis Hadzigeorgiou 
APPENDIX B 
APPROVAL SHEET 
• ~·versityof 
I rthem . 
I owa · 
Curriculum & Instruction, SEC 618 
University of Northern Iowa 
Cedar Falls, IA 50614 
Dear Yannis Hadzigeorgiou: 
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Your project, "Conceptual Representation of the Newtonian Model of Motion 
in University Physics Students", which you submitted for human subjects 
review on October 10, 1993 has been determined to be exempt from further 
review under the guidelines stated in the UNI Human Subjects Handbook. You 
may commence participation of human research subjects in your project. 
Your project need not be submitted for continuing review unless you alter 
it in a way that increases the risk to the participants. If you make any 
such changes in your project, you should notify the Graduate College 
Office. 
If you decide to seek federal funds for this project, it would be wise not 
to claim exemption from human subjects review on your application. Should 
the agency to which you submit the application decide that your project is 
not exempt from review, you might not be able to submit the project for 
review by the UNI Institutional Review Board within the federal agency's 
time limit (30 days· after application). As a precaution against 
applicants' being caught in such a time bind, the Board will review any 
projects for which federal funds are sought. If you do seek federal funds 
for this project, please submit the project for human subjects review no 
later than the time you submit your funding application. 
If you have any further questions about the Human Subjects Review System, 
please contact me. Best wishes for your project. 
s~ 
Norris M. Durham ... P.h.D. 
Chair, Institutional Review Board 
cc: Dr. David A. Walker, Associate Dean 
Dr. Susann Doody 
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APPENDIX C 
INTERVIEW SCRIPT 
Dear student (by name), first of all I would like to 
thank you for participating in this study. It is a study 
that involves philosophy, psychology, and physics, and I am 
doing it for my doctoral dissertation. I am interested in 
finding out about how people think about various familiar 
situations. There are no right or wrong answers. Nor are 
there any mathematical formulae involved. Therefore I would 
appreciate it if you gave me whatever ideas you have in your 
mind. It would be also very useful if you thought aloud by 
explaining the way, that is "how", you are thinking. 
I will first start by asking you some general questions 
about how objects move and then I will present you with some 
specific problems. I am hoping that we will be through in 
about an hour. We might, however, take five or ten minutes 
longer. If, at any moment, you feel tired or have any 
problems, please let me know. Stretch out, relax and 
think. 
QUESTIONS FOR ASSESSING PRIOR PROPOSITIONAL KNOWLEDGE 
1. How would you define motion? 
2. How can you say whether or not a body is moving? 
If, for example, we are sitting next to each other on an 
airplane, and we are looking out through the window and see 
an airplane, would you agree with me that the airplane is 
not moving, since to me the airplane appears to be at rest? 
3. In the case of two people, one aboard a moving a train, 
and the other on the platform, who watch the same event 
taking place inside the train, that is the flipping of a 
coin, what can you say about the path, the time of flight, 
and the velocity of the coin? 
4. In the case of a person standing still in the rain, the 
rain drops appear to fall vertically, while to a person 
running in the rain the drops appear to fall at an angle. 
Who is right? What is the real direction of motion of the 
rain drops? 
5. Can a body move in the absence of forces? Can you give 
some examples? 
6. A spaceship is at rest at a space-station, away from any 
planetary forces. Suddenly its engine is fired once. What 
do you think will happen? (Further explanation: How far will 
the spaceship travel?) 
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7. Suppose you are inside a vehicle or room which have no 
windows that allow you to look outside. How can you tell 
whether or not you are moving? 
This is fine. I will now present you with specific problem 
tasks. I have categorized my problems into three 
categories. Each category is about one or two general 
problem situations. 
CATEGORY 1 - MOTION OF BODIES IN MOVING FRAMES OF REFERENCE 
This category is concerned with two problem situations. 
The first one, as you can see here in the drawing, is about 
two friends standing on either end of the roof of a car 
compartment of a train, facing each other, and who throw the 
ball they are holding in their hands to each other. The 
effect of wind or air resistance is considered negligible. 
Task 1: Suppose that the train is at rest. What do you 
think will happen? (Further explanation: will the two 
friends catch the ball simultaneously?) What is you frame 
of reference? (Clarification: relative to what point do you 
perceive motion?) What makes the balls travel the length of 
the compartment? suppose now that the train is moving with 
constant speed in straight line, and suddenly the two 
friends are throwing the balls. What do you think will 
happen now? What is you frame of reference? What now makes 
the balls travel the length of the compartment? 
Task 2: Now as you see in this drawing, the two friends are 
doing the same activity, but this time inside the train. 
What do think will happen now? What is your frame of 
reference? What makes the ball travel the length of the 
compartment? 
Task 3: What do think would happen if the two friends 
rolled the balls, as you can see it in the drawing, towards 
each other? 
Task 4: Now we come to the second problem situation. There 
is a person, as you can see it in the drawing, sitting in 
the car compartment of a train traveling with constant speed 
in straight line. Suddenly the person throws the softball 
he/she is holding a small way straight up in the air. Where 
will the softball land? What is your frame of reference? 
What path does the softball take? What makes the ball 
travel along that path? 
Task 5: Where will the ball land if the person is standing 
on the roof of the same train? What is your frame of 
reference this time? What is the path of the ball? What 
makes the ball travel along that path? 
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Task 6: Now look at this drawing. What you see is a person 
running with constant speed in straight line. Suddenly the 
person throws a baseball straight up in the air. 
(Clarification: the person applies a vertical force by 
moving his hand vertically relative to his/her body.) Where 
will the baseball land? 
CATEGORY 2 - MOTION OF BODIES ON THE INERTIAL FRAME OF 
REFERENCE OF THE EARTH 
We now come to the second category. This category is 
concerned with three general problem situations. The first 
situation is about an object (like a rock, rocket, or air-
balloon) that is thrown or projected straigth up from the 
ground. I would like you to think about where that object 
will land. The second situation is about an iron ball that 
is dropped from a height to the ground. Again, I would like 
you to think about where the iron ball will land. The third 
situation is about two airplanes and two boats that are 
going around the earth. 
Task 7: So I start with this drawing that shows a person 
standing in a yard and throwing a rock straight up in the 
air. The air resistance is not taken into account. Where 
will it land? What is your frame of reference? What makes 
the rock travel up and down? 
Task 8: What do you think now about a cannon ball fired by 
a cannon as shown in the drawing? Where will the cannon 
ball land? The effect of the air is not taken into account. 
What is your frame of reference? What makes the cannon ball 
travel up and down? Do you think the place of landing would 
change if we took into account the motion of the earth? We 
assume that, for the time it takes for the cannon ball to go 
up and down, the earth travels with a constant speed in 
straight line. 
Task 9: Where would a rocket land if it were fired 
vertically from the ground? The rocket travels straight up 
until all its fuel is used up and then starts falling 
straight down. Now, as you can see in the drawing, we take 
into account the motion of the earth. Again the effect of 
the air resistance is negligible. What is your frame of 
reference? What path does the rocket follow? What makes 
the rocket travel along that path? 
Task 10: Now we will take the case of an air-balloon rising 
vertically above the ground. After it goes high up, it 
stays there for some time, and then comes back down again. 
Where will it touch down? The are no winds in the 
atmosphere to disturb the motion of the air-balloon. What 
is your frame of reference? What path will the balloon 
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take? What makes the balloon travel along that path? 
Task 11: Let's now come to the second problem situation 
about falling iron balls. As you can see in the drawing, an 
iron ball is dropped from a point high above the ground by 
an imaginary hand fixed in space. Where will the iron ball 
land? The only force acting on the ball is its weight. 
What is your frame of reference? What path will the iron 
ball take? What makes the iron ball move along that path? 
Task 12: Do you see any difference in your thinking if the 
iron ball were dropped by an imaginary hand that was near 
the top of very high building? What would be your frame of 
reference? What path would the iron ball follow? What 
would make the iron ball move along that path? 
Task 13: Now the iron ball is dropped from a very tall 
building. As you see in the drawing, the man dropping the 
ball is standing at the top of the building. Where will it 
land? The only force acting on the ball is its weight. 
What is your frame of reference? What path does the iron 
ball follow? What makes the iron ball move along that path? 
Task 14: The third and final situation of this category 
involves two objects going around the earth. As you see in 
the drawing, two boats are setting sail from the same place 
on the equator, and they are going to sail around the earth 
and along the equator. The boats will sail in opposite 
directions. Will the boats arrive at the place from which 
they set sail at the same time? What is your frame of 
reference? 
Task 15: How would now think if two airplanes were to take 
off from the same place on the equator, and fly around the 
earth parallel to the equator but in opposite directions? 
Do you see any difference between this and the previous 
problem with boat? What is your frame of reference? 
Do you see any differences between the problem with the boat 
and the airplane going around the earth, and the problem 
with the two friends on the train? (Effect of wind is 
negligible.) 
I think you have been an excellent participant. You 
really thought aloud during the problem tasks. If you think 
you could devote ten or fifteen more minutes I would really 
appreciate it. You don't have to stay because I have enough 
information to do my study, and as I said this was supposed 
to last approximately one hour. But there is an additional 
point which I would like to clarify further. So if you 
think that you can stay and "squeeze" your mind for an other 
ten minutes, that would be fine. If you feel tired or if 
you have other things to attend to, that is again fine, and 
259 
I want to thank you for your time. 
CATEGORY 3 - MOTION OF BODIES WITH CONSTANT VELOCITY 
This category has different questions about the relationship 
between motion and net force. 
Task 16: Do think that there is a net force acting on a 
spaceship traveling in outer space with constant velocity? 
Task 17: How about a car traveling against a strong wind? 
The driver, as you see in the drawing, manages to keep the 
car in a straight line with constant speed. Do you think 
there is a net force on the car? 
Task 18: Here you see three identical airplanes traveling 
with constant speed in a straight line. Is a net force 
acting on the planes, and if yes, on which ones? If yes, 
which net force is greater? 
Task 19: There are three different vehicles: a bicycle, a 
racing car, and a truck. They are all traveling with 
constant speed in straight line. What can you say about the 
net force acting on them? 
Task 20: In the drawing you see a person pushing a heavy 
box along the floor with constant speed in straight line. 
What can you say about the net force acting on the box? 
Task 21: In the drawing you see three identical vans. As 
you see there is a string hanging from the roof of each van. 
There is also a bob attached to the end of the string. 
Which case do you think better shows a van moving with 
constant speed in straight line? 
